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SUMMARY

This dissertation follows a three-essay format. Each essay evaluates a different
fiscal institution from a public administration perspective.
In the first essay I examine whether state-funded property tax exemptions are
effective in reducing the property taxes. This class of exemption is characterized by a
grant from state to local governments that is intended to replace property tax revenue and
lower property tax payments. Two separate theories of local fiscal behavior predict that
that price effects and fiscal illusion will reduce the effectiveness of this type of tax relief.
I test these predictions using panel regression analysis on county-level data from Georgia.
I find that only two thirds of the revenue allocated to this program is actually used for tax
relief.
In the second essay I test a model of the property tax in which the levy is set to
balance the difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from all
other revenue sources. This model demonstrates how the property tax can be used to
offset unexpected changes to other revenues given a change in personal income. This
model is contrasted with an alternative model in which expenditures are budgeted after
expected total revenues have been determined. I will estimate both models for local
governments in Georgia and test which more accurately describes local fiscal
performance. I will also use both to predict changes to the property tax over a period of
time and measure which model generated the more accurate forecast.
Unlike the first two papers, which are quantitative analyses of fiscal data, this
chapter is a case study of the contract city model of governance as implemented in the

x

newly incorporated city of Sandy Springs, Georgia. I investigate whether the scope of
outsourcing in contract cities creates additional challenges for city officials that manage
contractor performance. I evaluate the incentive structures in the contract agreements
that influence the principal-agent relationship using a textual analysis research method. I
find that certain combinations of municipal functions in a single public-private
partnership creates the potential for negative synergies to arise which would increase the
difficulty of monitoring and managing the private partner.
.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Fiscal institutions can be studied through a number of academic lenses. For
example, an economic approach focuses on efficiency and equity, while a legalistic
approach examines institutions' interaction with the rule of law. In this dissertation I
examine three fiscal institutions from a public administration perspective. This means
that I approach taxation and expenditure systems as public policies that can be evaluated
in terms of their effectiveness and their unintended consequences. I am interested in how
public officials respond to intergovernmental fiscal policies. I also explore how the
tightly constrained budgetary environment of state and local governments affects fiscal
policy.
I have structured this dissertation as three separate manuscripts. The first two
essays employ the tools of public economics to evaluate state and local property tax
policies. The third is rooted in public financial management and is a case study of the
principal-agent dynamic in the contract city model of municipal governance. Despite the
differences among the essays in their disciplinary background and their research methods,
these studies are united by their focus on the impact of fiscal policy on the behavior of
public officials. This multidisciplinary approach and the focus on public financial
management helps distinguish my research program from traditional public economics.
The Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit
All states have implemented policies intended to provide property tax relief to
homeowners. As of 2007, 47 states offer homeowners either a homestead exemption or a
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credit, 34 states have circuit breakers and 26 states allow deferrals on property taxes
owed (Baer 2008). While some of these policies are simply regulations that restrict local
procedures for calculating the tax for a given property, many tax relief programs transfer
state funds to local governments to replace property tax revenues. However, if local
governments are able to use these grants for purposes other than property tax relief, then
state-funded relief programs may yield little actual reduction in taxpayer burden and may
even increase the level of property taxation.
This essay evaluates one specific type of property tax relief program – a statefunded homestead exemption. These programs generally consist of a fixed property tax
exemption specified by the state that is paired with a grant to local governments to offset
lost revenue. Duncombe and Yinger (2001) identified 13 states with some form of statereimbursed exemption, though seven of them only funded exemptions to special groups,
such as residents over 65 years of age or veterans. For states that fund general homestead
exemptions for all homeowners, Duncombe and Yinger note that state expenditures can
become quite large. In fiscal year 2008-09, California paid out $442.5 million to local
governments to fund a $7,000 general homestead exemption.
I examine whether state-funded homestead exemptions provide tax relief to
homeowners, or whether local officials ‗capture‘ the reimbursement funds by raising
property tax rates. Two factors appear to make the latter outcome likely. First, the
structure of the relief grant gives local officials an incentive to raise their property tax
rates because the size of the grant depends on the local millage rate. Increasing the tax
rate results in a larger transfer from the state. Second, because the revenue replacement
grants are paid directly to local governments, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the
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amount of funds received. If taxpayers do not know how much tax relief they should
receive from the exemption, local officials may be able to capture the grant by raising
property tax rates and achieve a higher level of overall revenue from the grant and the
property tax.

The result is that some state funds designated for reducing the property tax

burden through a homestead exemption instead are used to increase local spending.
I evaluate the HTRC based on its effectiveness at providing property tax relief.
Does the grant actually replace property tax revenue or do local governments use
property tax relief funds to boost spending? I examine the effects of the grant on the
level of revenues, the share of revenues derived from the property tax and on the property
tax rate. I estimate the effects using a panel of county governments over a 12 year
period. The results indicate that approximately a third of HTRC funds are employed by
local governments to raise local spending.
The Residual-Rule Model of Property Tax Determination
In this essay I analyze how the property tax is used by local governments in an
environment without binding tax limitations. If local officials are able to use the millage
rate and assessment practices to achieve a desired property levy, what set of rules or
behavioral patterns would they follow as they use this power? One model of property tax
rate determination is the ‗residual rule‘. Under this approach the property tax levy fills
the gap between budgeted expenditures for the year and projected receipts from all other
available revenue sources. Local officials set the property tax millage rate so that the tax
yields just enough revenue to balance the budget. An implication of adhering to this rule
is that in the event that other local revenues fall due to a recession the property tax rate
will need to be raised in order to replace the lost receipts. This behavior allows the local
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government to stabilize its overall revenues by increasing the short-term volatility of the
property tax. The pursuit of stability for the local government comes at the cost of
homeowners' ability to predict their annual property tax bills.
In contrast to the ‗residual rule‘ model, an alternative model of property tax
growth predicts that receipts will grow in proportion to the property tax base. This model
predicts less volatility in the yield of the property tax and no role for the property tax in
counter-balancing cyclical volatility in the other local revenue sources.
The research objective of this paper is to compare these two models empirically in order
to determine which model more accurately describes the pattern of changes to the millage
rate and variation in the overall property tax levy. The policy implications for following
the ‗residual rule‘ approach are significant because it would demonstrate a tradeoff
between overall stability in the tax structure and the predictability of the property tax.
Stability is a concern for ensuring the adequacy of local fiscal policy across economic
cycles, while predictability is a concern for taxpayers who want to know their future tax
liability and for policymakers interested in the political viability of their tax regime. The
danger of following the ‗residual rule‘ is that local officials that use the property tax to
smooth their budget may surprise taxpayers with unexpected changes to the levy and
incur political costs that threaten the sustainability of financing services through the
property tax.
The primary contribution of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the role
of the property tax in local tax structures during times of economic volatility. The
underlying questions asked are how do local policymakers use the property tax to
promote an adequate and stable fiscal structure and what are the implications of this
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approach? The framework outlined in this paper describes an interconnected revenue
system in which the relative responsiveness of public expenditures and non-property tax
revenues to changes in personal income, along with the share of revenue provided by
property taxes, will determine the size of the shift in property levies local tax officials
will have to impose in order to comply with their budget balancing rule. This model
predicts the size and the direction of the changes to the property tax levy local officials
will make in order to offset shocks to their other revenue sources and stabilize the overall
revenue stream.
I test this budget balancing model against an alternative model that assumes that
the property levy is independent of other revenue sources and is instead determined by
growth in the tax base. Policy makers following this alternative model do not use the
property levy to stabilize their overall revenues in response to short-term economic
shocks.

I estimate both models using data from Georgia school districts and then

generate predicted property tax levies to determine which model is able to generate more
accurate revenue projections. I find that the budget-balancing model is better able to
predict property tax revenues for the districts that have higher incomes per capita and
higher populations as well as those districts that rely on the property tax for a larger share
of their revenues.
The Contract City Model of Municipal Governance
The rise of the contract city as a new form of municipal governance presents
many thorny issues for the theory and practice of public management. The contract city
model is an extreme form of municipal outsourcing in which the city enters into
comprehensive private partnerships for the production of the majority of municipal
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functions. On the practitioner side, cities adopting this model of service delivery see the
role of the city manager shift from administering public resources to monitoring and
enforcing contracts (Prager 2008). For researchers interested in the theory of public
contract management, this form of government challenges the conventional approach to
studying internal vs. external production decisions. The question shifts from whether a
single service function is a candidate for external production (see for example Levin &
Tadelis, 2007), to whether a large set of service delivery and managerial functions can be
outsourced at once. A key difference between the two models of governance is that
rather than evaluating the economic merits of outsourcing each function individually,
contract city managers choose the overall service delivery regime and contract for an
array of services. Additionally, limited competition in the market for the private
production of municipal functions, forces contract city officials to evaluate bids from a
small set of potential service providers who are willing and able to undertake the
production of the bulk of municipal functions.
In this essay I investigate the implications that the contract city model of
governance has for contract management. It raises questions such as: does the scope of
this type of public-private partnership facilitate interactions between outsourced functions
that create greater contract management problems than would have otherwise existed if
the services were provided by different partners? Are there synergies among certain
municipal functions that when they are outsourced together increase the difficulty of
contract management by creating the potential for conflicts of interest? Does the design
of the actual contracts between contract cities and their private partners reflect the unique
managerial challenges that could arise with this scale of outsourcing?
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I investigate these questions through a case study of the initial contracts signed by
the city of Sandy Springs, Georgia with its primary contractor, the private firm CH2M
Hill. I identify three key categories of municipal functions that are interrelated and, when
outsourced to a single private partner, create the potential for a conflict of interest. These
three functional categories are: 1) the production of direct services, 2) the creation of
managerial and financial information and 3) administrative and control functions. My
analysis of the contract documents indicates that combining this broad scope of services
in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for ―negative synergies‖ which
raise the cost of monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be
required if the functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors. I also
identify beneficial structures that can counteract some of the adverse incentives created
by the scope of the contracts. These features would not be present in the contracts
associated with traditional municipal public-private partnerships that do not exhibit the
same scope of outsourcing. The identification of these interrelationships between
municipal functions can inform the design of contracts, especially when determining how
contract cities should allocate functions across various private partners.
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CHAPTER II
DO STATE-FUNDED PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ACTUALLY
PROVIDE TAX RELIEF?
“While the [grant program] had great motives initially – to reduce the local tax burden –
it has not worked out that way.” Governor Sonny Perdue (Salzer, 2008)
Introduction

All states have implemented policies intended to provide property tax relief to
homeowners. As of 2007, 47 states offer homeowners either a homestead exemption or a
credit, 34 states have circuit breakers and 26 states allow deferrals on property taxes
owed (Baer 2008). While some of these policies are simply regulations that restrict local
procedures for calculating the tax for a given property, many tax relief programs transfer
state funds to local governments to replace property tax revenues. However, if local
governments are able to use these grants for purposes other than property tax relief, then
state-funded relief programs may yield little actual reduction in taxpayer burden and may
even increase the level of property taxation.
This essay evaluates one specific type of property tax relief program – a statefunded homestead exemption. These programs generally consist of a fixed property tax
exemption specified by the state that is paired with a grant to local governments to offset
lost revenue. Duncombe and Yinger (2001) identified 13 states with some form of statereimbursed exemption, though seven of them only funded exemptions to special groups,
such as residents over 65 years of age or veterans. For states that fund general homestead
exemptions for all homeowners, Duncombe and Yinger note that state expenditures can
become quite large. In fiscal year 2008-09, California paid out $442.5 million to local
8

governments to fund a $7,000 general homestead exemption. Table 2.1 shows state
expenditures for five state funded exemptions.
Table 2.1 Expenditures on State-Funded Homestead Exemptions1
State
Fiscal Year
Expenditure
(in millions)
New York
2009/10
$3,249
California
2008/09
$442
Georgia
2007/08
$432
Indiana
2008/09
$140
Iowa
2009
$99

I examine whether state-funded homestead exemptions provide tax relief to
homeowners, or whether local officials ‗capture‘ the reimbursement funds by raising
property tax rates. Two factors appear to make the latter outcome likely. First, the
structure of the relief grant gives local officials an incentive to raise their property tax
rates because the size of the grant depends on the local millage rate. Increasing the tax
rate results in a larger transfer from the state. Second, because the revenue replacement
grants are paid directly to local governments, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the
amount of funds received. If taxpayers do not know how much tax relief they should
receive from the exemption, local officials may be able to capture the grant by raising
property tax rates and achieve a higher level of overall revenue from the grant and the
property tax.

The result is that some state funds designated for reducing the property tax

burden through a homestead exemption instead are used to increase local spending.

1

See New York State, Executive Budget Briefing Book – STAR (New York State, Division of the Budget
2008); California Governor‘s Proposed Budget (State of California 2008); Georgia Law 2007 HB 95 made
an Act pp. 223; Iowa Detailed Budget Book Fiscal Year 2009 – Associated Financial Statements (State of
Iowa 2009, p. 159); Indiana Appropriation HB 1001 (State of Indiana 2008)

9

I explore these issues by investigating Georgia‘s experience with the state-funded
Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Grant (HTRC). HTRC was adopted in 1999 during a period of
state budget surpluses to return excess state funds to taxpayers. It initially gave all
homeowners a homestead exemption of $2,000 of assessed property value, but the
exemption increased and decreased multiple times between 1999 and 2008, and was
$8,000 when it was eliminated in 2008.
I evaluate the HTRC based on its effectiveness at providing property tax relief.
Does the grant actually replace property tax revenue or do local governments use
property tax relief funds to boost spending? I examine the effects of the grant on the
level of revenues, the share of revenues derived from the property tax and on the property
tax rate. I estimate the effects using a panel of county governments over a 12 year
period. The results indicate that approximately a third of HTRC funds are employed by
local governments to raise local spending.
This essay is structured as follows: The next section uses the existing literature on
the impact of intergovernmental grants on the local public sector to develop a theoretical.
Section 3 briefly reviews the empirical literature on approaches to measuring these
impacts, while Section 4 provides greater detail on the Georgia Homeowner‘s Tax Relief
Grant. I then cover the empirical strategy and discuss the data that I employ. In Section
6 I present my results; some concluding thoughts are provided in the final section.
Price Effects Created by Property Tax Relief

The median voter model assumes that the government selects the outcome
preferred by the voter with the median preference, which are largely determined by how
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the government‘s spending and taxing affect him/her. Holcombe (1989) provides a
theoretical history of the median voter.
Initial Conditions Before The Exemption
Consider a local community with n households, where each household i receives
an income of Yi which is split between private consumption (Xi) and a publicly provided
good (Gi) that is private in the sense of excludability and competitive consumption.2 Z
represents a vector of environmental and taste parameters. Taking X as a numeraire
good, each household‘s preferred G is obtained by solving the following problem:
(2.1)

represents the preferred level of G for the ith person, and

is the marginal cost (which,

for simplicity, is assumed to be constant and equal to one) of producing a unit of . The
public good is not purchased directly by households, but is funded through taxation. The
term represents household i’s share of the total tax revenue required to fund total
government spending, given by

. We assume that the property tax is the only source

of public funds. Household i‘s share of total property tax revenue is determined by its
share of all property held in the community. This is defined as
value of household i‘s property and

, where

is the total value of all local property.

is the
is

comprised of both homestead and non-homestead property.

2

This presentation of the median voter model follows the notation used in Tresch, Richard W. Public
Finance: A Normative Theory. Boston, MA: Academic Press, 2002. See Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994)
for tests of the Median Voter Model‘s validity when applied to local governments.
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Because the local government is required by law to maintain a balanced budget,
expenditures on

must equal total revenues. A government with the property tax as its

sole source of revenue balances its budget by choosing a property tax rate
total property tax receipts (
and

) equals total government expenditures (

such that

). I assume that

are given and do not depend on . Following the assumption that the marginal

cost of producing the public good is constant and equal to unity (i.e., q=1)3 the
government‘s budget constraint can be presented in a simplified form which omits q.
This is displayed in equation (2.2).
(2.2)
The homeowner pays
of

by

in property taxes. Multiplying the numerator and denominator

shows the homeowner‘s tax payment in terms of a share of the total tax

burden born by the community:
(2.3)
By substituting (2.3) into (2.2) we obtain expression (2.4), which shows that
homeowner i‘s tax payment is its share of the total cost of the publically provided good.
(2.4)

3

There are two positions on whether to use this simplification in the literature with the main distinction
being the research objective of the study. Authors focusing on the effect of intergovernmental transfers on
the level of government expenditures or taxation have assumed unitary production costs, while those
examining impacts on production efficiency, especially in the public education, have explicitly modeled
how the marginal cost of can change. As an example of the former category, Filimon, Romer and
Rosenthal (1982) frame their discussion in terms of government expenditure and do not address the actual
production of the public good in their theoretical model. Alternatively, in their studies of the impact of
New York‘s state-funded homestead exemption on the efficiency of public schools, Duncombe, Miner, and
Ruggiero (1997), Eom, Duncombe, and Yinger (2005), and Eom and Rubenstein (2006) have each modeled
the production cost. The objectives of this paper align more closely with the former category.

12

The homeowner‘s tax price is the increase in property taxes associated with a
marginal increase in public production. Taking the first difference of the right-hand side
of (2.4) with respect to G shows that the tax payment will increase at the rate of the tax
share. Because the marginal cost of production for G is assumed to be a constant rate of
q, the marginal tax price will also be the average price. Therefore the tax price of local
services for household i can also be obtained by dividing both sides of (2.4) by G. This is
displayed in equation (2.5). This shows that the

term from equation (1) is also the

homeowner‘s tax price.

(2.5)

Effect of State-Funded Homestead Exemption
When the state implements a fully-funded homestead exemption, the taxable
value of the homeowner‘s property is reduced by the value of the exemption ( ) and the
property owner‘s new tax payment is determined by applying the millage rate to this
reduced value. To compensate the locality for the loss of revenue due to the exemption,
the state government provides a grant that is equal to

, where

is the number of

recipient homesteads.
The revenue replacement grant enters into the local government‘s budget
constraint as a direct match for the taxes that the locality would have collected on the
exempted property value. This relationship is depicted in equation (2.6). If the entirety
of the state grant is applied to tax relief, then the local government does not change its
property tax rate or level of spending.
(2.6)
13

or,

(2.7)

The replacement grant reduces the share

that must be financed through the

property tax. If we represent the homeowner‘s tax payment as a share of the revenue
required to fund , similarly to equation (2.4), we see that the exemption also reduces the
individual homeowner's proportionate tax burden. The new individual tax share is the
ratio between the taxable value of the homeowner‘s property after the exemption
relative to the sum of the total taxable value of the property base and the total property
tax exemption

, because the replacement grant compensates local

government for the reduction in their tax base due to the property tax exemption.
Equation (2.8) shows this relationship between the homeowner‘s new property tax
payment

, and the new tax share.
(2.8)

There are at least two factors that may induce local governments to change the
property tax rate in response to the homestead exemption. First, the exemption changes
the tax price of local public services and would induce a substitution response on the part
of the median voter. Dividing equation (2.8) by

yields the post-exemption tax price

shown in equation (2.9), which is less than initial tax price

,

.
(2.9)

I use the standard assumption that the median voter is also the owner of the median value
home for a given jurisdiction. Thus, the median voter, facing a reduced price for public
services provided by the local government, will prefer a higher share of public goods in
her consumption bundle, the magnitude of the change being determined by the price
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elasticity of demand for the public good. This increase in G will require an increase in t.
Note that the percentage change in the tax price depends on , in particular it equals
.
Second, local officials may raise property tax rates because a fiscal illusion effect
hides the true level of taxation from the median voter. Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal
(1982) develop this argument with a grant illusion model in which taxpayers have
imperfect information regarding the true value of the transfers their government receives
and officials exploit this ignorance to pursue a budget maximizing strategy. In their
model, local taxpayers base their voting behavior on perceived aid

and perceived

government spending , rather than the actual values, which are denoted A and G. In
their model Filimon et al. frame the relationship between real and perceived aid as a
proportion determined by a fiscal illusion parameter
(2.10)
The

term is a measure of the degree of fiscal illusion associated with

intergovernmental transfers. I deviate from their approach, in which government aid is a
lump-sum transfer, by adapting it to the case of a state-funded homestead exemption. In
this case, the taxpayer will respond to a tax price based on her perception of the
exemption amount. I follow the notation of Filimon et al. by denoting the perceived
exemption

as a share of the true exemption.
(2.11)

Substituting

into equation (9) results in a new tax price,

, that is less than

,

for

(2.12)
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For the case where
equal to

then the perceived post-exemption tax price,

, the true post-exemption price 4. If

, is

, the taxpayer will undervalue the

homestead exemption, allowing the government to increase G. One possible cause for
this form of fiscal illusion is if taxpayers are only attentive to the actual tax payment that
they must make and ignore the property tax rate. Officials could then raise the property
tax rate when E is set without increasing the taxpayer‘s tax payment relative to the preexemption levy, and thus capture the unobserved portion of E.
At least two studies within the public choice literature find that taxpayers have
imperfect information regarding the property tax. In a survey of residents of three cities,
Ordeshook (1979) found that citizens were significantly more accurate in estimating the
amount they paid in property tax the previous year than the amount their tax bill would
increase if their property tax rate increased by 5 mills.

Lankford (1986) found that

taxpayers voting on a property tax referendum in one school district believed the tax cost
of services were higher than the true cost¸ which may have induced them to oppose the
referendum more than they would have in the absence of fiscal illusion.
To see this how this type of fiscal illusion can be expressed in a model, consider
the extreme case in which the taxpayer is completely unaware of the exemption, i.e.,
. In this case the taxpayer‘s perceived tax price for the publically provided good
will be equal to the initial pre-exemption price
preferred level of

. Thus, the median voter‘s

will remain unchanged when E is set and the property tax bill for that

4

For the sake of clarity in distinguishing among different perceived tax prices, I denote the perceived tax
price with
as
and perceived tax prices at other levels of similarly.
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year will also remain constant. The household‘s property tax base, however, has been
reduced to

. Given

rate, , to a higher rate,

, local officials can raise the tax rate from the original
, in order to maintain a constant tax levy, as depicted in

equation (2.13).
(2.13)
At this higher rate of

total revenue (15) will be the sum of the original property tax levy

plus the revenue replacement grant

.

The entire grant would be dedicated to

expanding public expenditures rather than replacing property tax revenue, as seen in
(2.14).
(2.14)
Taxpayers‘ perceived level of spending,
exemption level of spending,

, will remain at the initial pre-

, because their perception is based on the actual property

tax bill, which has remained unchanged5. By rearranging terms of equation (2.13) it is
possible to express the increase in the rate associated with the fiscal illusion effect, as
seen in (2.15).
(2.15)
I depict the two extreme scenarios of perfect information
fiscal illusion

and complete

in Figure 2.1. The initial public supply line is S1 as seen from the

median voter‘s perception. S1 is horizontal given the constant marginal cost of the public
expenditure function, reflecting that it costs the government one dollar of tax revenue to

5

Within this framework taxpayers would not notice any increase in services associated with the higher true
level of spending.
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finance one dollar of public expenditures, and the median voter‘s tax share is constant.
D1 is the median voter‘s initial demand for the level of public services. At the initial preexemption tax price

the median voter selects

perfect information

as the preferred public supply. With

the exemption causes the tax price to decline to

, reflecting

that with the grant revenue the government can finance a dollar of expenditures with less
than a dollar of tax revenue. In this case the actual tax price is equal to the perceived tax
price at full information

. Voters, aware of the state subsidies to their

consumption of public services, demand a new level of expenditures,
further along their initial demand curve, D1. With full fiscal illusion,

, which lies
, taxpayers

believe that they bear the full cost of funding public expenditures and the perceived tax
price therefore remains equal to the pre-exemption price
however, is able to capture the grant and raise spending to

. The government,
. I depict the budget-

maximizing bureaucrat‘s behavior as an outward shift in the demand curve, with the
bureau as an additional consumer of public spending.
The graphical representation given in Figure 2.1 of the grant‘s effect allows for a
refinement of the distinction between the rational price effect and the full flypaper effect.
The segment AC represents the flypaper effect. The extent to which

exceeds

represents the spending in excess of what the median voter would have preferred to spend
given full information of the true price

and given her income elasticity of

demand for public consumption. This spending in excess of what would have been spent
under full information is what I define as the net flypaper effect. The difference between
and

represents the total spending captured by the government due to the median
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voter‘s ignorance of the replacement grant. This is equal to the sum of the rational price
effect and the net flypaper effect.
Figure 2.1 Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures

Tax Price

D1

D2

A

B

C

Quantity of Public
Expenditures

Figure 2.2 Fiscal Illusion Effect on Public Expenditures
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Partial awareness of the grant results in a combination of both the price and fiscal
illusion effects. I depict this outcome in Figure 2.2. The median voter perceives that the
homestead exemption has lowered the price for public expenditures to

and,

assuming that public services are normal, will demand an increased level of service along
the original demand curve to

. The full exemption has been granted, however, and the

government‘s true cost of public expenditures remains

. The government is able to

capture the unobserved portion of the grant by raising the rate to
level

and achieve spending

, where:
(2.16)
The difference between

and

effect, while the difference between

, or segment EG, represents the full flypaper
and

, or segment FG, is the net flypaper effect.

To model how the flypaper effect is expressed through the tax rate in the partial illusion
case, consider a hypothetical tax rate

that would fund

if applied to the unexempted

tax base and to the replacement grant. This would be the rate that produces the perceived
level of revenue.
(2.17)
The taxpayers only recognize part of the exemption, but the government must still
exempt the entire value of nE from the base. It can choose
revenue derived from the true taxable base

, however, such that the

is equal to the revenue that would be

raised from the perceived base taxed at rate

This is depicted in (2.18) and is the same

concept as given in (2.13) for the initial case of complete illusion.
(2.18)
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Rearranging the terms of (2.18) yields for any value of

the change in the tax rate

a government could enact to capture the entire unperceived portion of the replacement
grant.
(2.19)
The ratio within the parentheses on the right-hand side of equation (2.19) compares the
unobserved exemption to the taxable property base. This ratio depicts the percentage
increase in the property tax rate enacted by the public officials to capture the unobserved
portion of the grant. That term also describes the percentage increase in government
expenditures caused by the fiscal illusion effect.
Because the value of the exemption, E, is set at the state level and is uniform
across jurisdictions, the exemption will exclude a larger proportion of assessed value in
localities with lower property values. While this means that the grant is progressively
distributed, it also suggests that lower income jurisdictions may also be subject to a larger
flypaper effect, given equal degrees of fiscal illusion

across all jurisdictions.

The median voter price effect and the fiscal illusion effect both operate to place
upward pressure on property tax rates and the level of local public expenditures. These
effects reduce the degree of tax relief achieved through a state-funded homestead
exemption. The objective of this study, however, is to evaluate whether this class of
exemption effectively delivers tax relief. While shifting the vertical alignment of the
responsibility for generating revenues from local governments to the state can be a valid
policy objective, the states that have implemented state-funded exemptions did so to
relieve the property tax burden for the existing level of spending, not to subsidize further
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public expenditures67. If state funded exemptions fail to meet their intended policy
objectives, then states may be better off pursing alternative relief programs8.
Other Impacts of State Funded Exemptions on Fiscal Structure
State funded exemptions may impact local fiscal structure in other ways. Several
authors have explored the determinants of the mix of revenues that local governments
use, looking particularly at the factors which drive dependence on the property tax (e.g.
Sjoquist 1981). Hettich and Winer (1984) propose a political cost model which depends
on the median voter to determine the preferred level of expenditures, but which leaves the
choice of revenue structure to rational officials that seek to minimize the political and
administrative costs associated with generating revenue. Gade and Adkins (1990) apply
this strategy in their analysis of state fiscal structures. State-funded exemptions may
change the political cost of generating revenue through the property tax and thus induce
officials to alter the tax structure.
The term ―revenue structure‖ conveys two meanings in a political cost model.
First, it applies to the specific characteristics of each individual source, such as its yield,
political visibility, and administrative costs. Second, the tax structure refers to the

6

In his 2001 State of the State address Governor Roy Barnes advocated for expansion of the HTRC, ―Last,
but certaintly not least we must continue to cut the taxes that Georgians pay, by increasing the homestead
exemption on homes and family farms.‖ (Barnes 2001) The language Barnes uses emphases that the goal
of the policy was to reduce actual property tax payments.
7
It has been suggested by a reviewer that the taxpayer may notice the additional state taxes that are
required to cover the cost of the exemption. I assume that this is not a significant factor for this analysis for
a few reasons. First, it would require a greater degree of price sensitivity to respond to a second-order price
effect like this. Second, the argument assumes that if the grant went away that state taxes would be reduced
accordingly. Rather, I assume that the grant is an allocation of state funds that would otherwise be spent on
state programs or a different form of intergovernmental aid.
8
One alternative policy would have been to create a state income tax credit for property tax payments.
This was proposed by Jerry Griffin, the executive of the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia.
(Smith, 1999)
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features of the overall system of different revenue sources. This includes the economies
of scale in administering a larger and more complex tax system. It also refers to the
cross-correlations in yield of different revenue sources across macro-economic cycles
that reduce the overall variability in total revenues (Misiolek and Perdue 1987b; White
1983b).
The cost minimization process that political officials pursue can be expressed in
the following fashion:
(2.20)

where C is a cost function inclusive of all political and administrative costs associated
with generating total revenue R. The cost function is dependent upon the revenue shares
obtained from each individual source

. The X term is a vector of exogenous factors

that will determine the political costs associated with a given tax structure. Hettich and
Winer (1984) include in this term the size of the potential tax bases, the costs to
taxpayers in organizing opposition to the tax regime and the scale of the public sector.
Government officials pursue their cost minimization objective by adjusting the
revenue shares until the marginal political cost of obtaining an additional dollar of
revenue is equalized across all sources. The optimal revenue shares are defined as those
which minimize total political cost for a given level of total revenue. Hettich and Winer
do not specify an explicit cost function, but instead provide a reduced-form equation
(2.21) in which the optimal shares, denoted with an asterisk, are influenced by the
exogenous environmental factors. The authors then proceed to develop several
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hypotheses about the direction of the effect of the various elements of the vector X on the
optimal tax structure.
(2.21)
It may be useful to provide a graphical description for this optimization procedure
and how it can relate theoretically to intergovernmental tax policy. For the purposes of
simplicity, define two revenue sources, the property tax (P) and an aggregate revenue
source composed of all other taxes, charges and transfers (O). Let the cost function C
shown in equation (20) describe a cost curve for a given level of expenditures. Following
Hettich and Winer‘s hypotheses about political costs, the marginal costs associated with a
given revenue source will increase as the proportion of revenues to the total revenue
rises. This assumption will give the isocost curves the necessary concave shape.
The slope at any point along this curve represents the ratio of marginal political
costs between the property tax (MCP) and the other revenues (MCO). Define this ratio to
be the Marginal Rate of Revenue Substitution.
(2.22)
Now denote

and

as the tax prices for the two revenue sources. These prices

represent the amount of revenue that must be generated from a given source in order to
fund an additional dollar of public expenditure. In the absence of any matching
intergovernmental grants , one dollar of tax revenue is necessary to fund one dollar of
expenditure and thus the price ratio (

) will equal unity. The ratio of the revenue

prices is the slope of the revenue isoquant for a given level of total revenue. This revenue
isoquant reflects the government‘s budget constraint in which all spending must be
financed through the two sources. To minimize the cost of financing a given level of
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expenditures, the government will choose the revenue structure in which the MRRS is
equal to the slope of the revenue price isoquant for the current level of total revenues (R).
This structure is depicted in Figure 2.3 as tax structure

. Note that political costs

decrease as one moves toward the origin.
Figure 2.3 Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure
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A state-funded homestead exemption will reduce the revenue price for the
property tax because the replacement grant allows the government to obtain a dollar of
revenue with less than a dollar of local taxation9.

9

To focus the analysis, I impose a

It should be noted that this framework for analyzing the supply side of public revenues could be extended
to policies that raise the revenue price. One example would be revenue sharing policies in which the
locality must rebate some revenues to the state for redistribution to less wealthy regions. This model
predicts that this would lead the locality to reduce its reliance on that source. A question for future research
that follows is whether governments that are subject to such price distortions have inefficiently designed
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constraint that the overall level of revenues will remain constant and only the revenue
structure will change. The reduction in the property tax‘s revenue price will change the
slope of the revenue isoquant to -

, where

. As a result of this change, local

officials seeking to minimize political cost will rebalance their revenue portfolio. From
their local perspective, the impact of the grant is to reduce the amount of revenue that
must be generated from local taxes to achieve a total revenue level of R. This puts the
government on a lower political cost curve.
Figure 2.4. Political Cost Minimization of the Tax Structure
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Figure 2.4 depicts the effect of the exemption on local officials‘ cost minimization
strategy. The government chooses revenue structure

, which is the new point of

tax structures and are more likely to suffer from the problems of poor tax structure, such as higher revenue
volatility and lower revenue growth.
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tangency between the lower revenue isoquant and the political isocost curve. The grant is
the vertical distance between the two isorevenue lines. At the original equilibrium, the
grant would equal

. But given that the state funded homestead exemption will

change the political cost minimizing tax composition, the grant in the new equilibrium is
. The effect of the homestead on the tax structure, therefore, is to increase the
proportional use of the property tax.
Note that total property taxes in the new equilibrium,

, are less than in the

original equilibrium, P1. (It is possible to draw the isocost lines such that the new
equilibrium would result in higher property taxes than in the original equilibirum.)
However, property taxes in the new equilibrium are greater than the property taxes that
would have been paid if the grant had been just used to reduce property taxes. In that
case property taxes would have fallen to

, which is less than

.

In sum, state-funded homestead exemptions create changes in local fiscal
structures across two different dimensions: the level of revenues and the mix of revenue
sources. Both a median voter analysis and a political cost model predict that local
governments will increase total expenditures and the property tax rate. Property taxes
may fall but not by the full amount of the grant calculated at the original property tax
rate. These effects would frustrate the intended purposes of providing tax relief that
motivated states to adopt this type of program. In the remainder of this paper I test
empirically whether these predicted outcomes hold for the case of a state-funded
homestead exemption in Georgia.
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Empirical Literature Review

In this section I review several empirical papers that address how to measure the
impact of state and federal policies similar to the state-funded homestead exemption on
local fiscal behavior.
Initial Empirical Studies
Two early efforts examined the effects of a property tax circuit breaker in
Michigan. The state income tax credit offset a percent of property taxes that exceeded
3.5% of personal income, up to a maximum credit of $1,200. The percent of taxes offset
by the credit (aij) was age dependent, with 100% being abated for the elderly and 60% for
the rest of the population.

This lowers the marginal tax price of local services to (1-aij)

for individuals paying above 3.5% of their personal income, up to the maximum credit
level, after which the tax price returns to 1.
Fisher and Rasche (1984) explore the incentive effects of property tax relief by
measuring the degree to which the program reduced the marginal tax price. As presented
above, the marginal tax price for a given individual is (1-aij). Using a 1% sample of all
state income tax returns from 1976, 1977, and 1978, the authors computed an average
marginal tax price by county and by income class weighted by the share of individuals in
each group at each value of aij. The statewide average reduction in the marginal tax price
was 24%. Fisher and Rasche argue that this large change in the marginal tax price
creates the potential for a significant incentive for local governments to raise property
taxes. The effect on the level of the property tax is estimated analytically by reasoning
that the new level of the property tax is determined by the percent change in the tax price
and the price elasticity of demand for the property tax.
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(2.24)
Where:
is the pre-credit level of the tax
is the post-credit level of the tax
is the percent change in the net tax price
is the price elasticity of demand for the property tax

If C is the average amount of tax reduction from the credit, then the change in the level of
the tax price can be described as:
(2.25)
Because the amount of the credit is capped at $1,200, the value of C was found by Fisher
and Rasche to be 0.9. Using the calculated average change in the net tax price of 24%
and test values for

of 0.5 and 0.25, the authors predict modest changes in the level of

the property tax, ranging from a 1% increase to a 5% reduction.
The Fisher and Rasche (1984) paper uses individual tax return data to look at how
the Michigan circuit breaker changed the marginal tax price and created the incentive for
potentially higher property taxes. Their study does not, however, test their predictions by
comparing the calculated average post-credit tax prices with actual property tax receipts.
That next step is taken in a later paper by Fisher (1988) with the primary objective of
testing for a tax price effect. Fisher applies the median voter model to measure the effect
of property tax relief on the indirect demand for local property taxes. He models this
demand as a function of per capita income, the tax price of services and a vector of
environmental and other preference factors. The effect of the credit is captured by using
the average marginal tax price measure developed in the earlier Fisher and Rasche (1984)
study. The indirect demand function is expressed in log-linear form in equation (2.26).
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(2.26)
Where
Tt
Yt
Pt
Zjt

=log of property tax in year t
=log of per capita personal income in year T
=log of marginal per capita property tax price
=log of a set of j taste and cost factors in year t
=the error term in year t
Fisher differences equation (25) over time in order to focus the analysis on how
the tax price effects the change in the property tax. This comparison is made across two
years of data, 1974 and 1976. Although there was some amount of credit offered in
1975, the magnitude of the credit was increased significantly in 1976 and remained
afterwards at that higher level. By comparing these two years, Fisher argues that he
captures the effect of the full credit as it was ultimately implemented. Doing so also
removes any community-specific fixed effects that would influence property taxes. This
form is expressed by (27)
(2.27)
The cost and preference factors are implemented by using the annual number of students
enrolled in public schools within the county and county population.
In order to provide a counterfactual for estimating the impact of the homestead
credit, Fisher estimates a model of the predictors for the average county marginal tax
price for three years after the credit had been implemented (1976, 1977, 1978) and then
uses the resulting specification to forecast what the tax price would have been in each
locality in 1974. The resulting prediction of the 1974 tax price is then used in the
property tax demand function to calculate the predicted property tax level for 1974. This
allows Fisher to estimate the differential change in the property tax from 1974 to 1976
due to the adoption of the tax credit.
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Fisher estimates that the credit increased local property taxes between 1 and 8
percent. This finding suggests that a portion of the tax relief the credit offered was
transferred to higher levels of local public spending. In terms of how the credit
influenced the incidence of the property tax, Fisher argues that ―residential taxpayers who
did not receive a credit and nonresidential (except agricultural) property owners‖
experienced an increase in their share of the burden. This redistribution effect would also
apply to state-funded homestead exemptions in states that apply uniform tax rates across
all classes of property within a given jurisdiction. This point is reiterated indirectly by
Eom and Rubenstein (2006) who note that the New York state-funded property tax
exemption will cause ―no change in the incidence of property tax in a school district,
assuming tax rates stay the same.‖ By that logic, there will be a shift in burden towards
property classes not eligible for the exemption if localities respond to state tax relief
policies by raising their millage rates.
New York School Tax Relief Program (STAR)
The New York School Tax Relief Program (STAR) has been the subject of a
series of papers that examine its impact on the level of property taxation and that have
also focused on the impact of intergovernmental aid on the efficiency of local service
production. These papers are of key interest because the STAR program is structured as
a state-funded homestead exemption and the methods applied previously to measure its
impact can be instructive to this and future studies.
In one of the earliest studies of the impact of STAR on local taxation policy,
Duncome and Yinger (2001) focus on the distribution of reimbursement grants across
jurisdictions by property value. A distinguishing feature of the STAR program is its
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―sales price differential factor‖, which gives high-property value jurisdictions higher
exemption amounts per household. Duncombe and Yinger compare the distribution of
benefits from the exemption with a power equalization grant10 by simulating the grants
that school districts would receive under each program. A standard homestead
exemption with uniform exemption amounts across the state has the potential for
increasing the progressivity of the property tax. Duncombe and Yinger found, however,
that the sales price differential factor in the STAR program increased the regressivity of
property taxes across New York school districts by targeting aid to wealthier school
districts.
Eom, Duncombe and Yinger‘s (2005) paper also explores the impact of the STAR
on local governments, with the specific objective of measuring the program‘s effect on
the efficiency of local service production. The authors test an earlier hypothesis posited
by Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) that state aid, by lowering the tax price of
services, reduces local taxpayers‘ incentive to monitor the efficiency of local service
production. Eom et al. test this hypothesis by measuring the degree to which the STAR
program‘s effect on the tax price impacted two measures of efficiency for local school
districts. In the course of developing their theoretical model they also model the
relationship between the tax price and the property tax rate. They employ a 2SLS panel
data model to estimate the determinants of district expenditures per pupil, treating the
determinants of production cost as endogenous variables. Using the results of their
estimates for the impact of the STAR tax price on school efficiency, they perform

10

A power equalization grant provides each school district with a minimum tax base per-pupil. The state
sets a minimum tax base per pupil These grants lower the tax price of services.
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simulations to obtain a measure of how much the tax price influenced the property tax
rate. These simulated results indicate that the STAR program resulted in an increase in
the property tax rate of approximately 21.33% for the average county in New York. This
result is interesting for this analysis because increasing the rate in response to a tax relief
program confounds the goal of lowering the property tax burden.
One empirical challenge that Eom et al. faced was that the estimates of the cost
drivers were statistically insignificant in the fixed effects version of their model. Because
these cost terms were necessary for the estimation of their demand equation, they reestimated the model using random effects. While this approach yielded statistically
significant estimates for the cost drivers, a Hausman specification test for fixed vs.
random effects rejected the random effects model. This indicates that there is a
statistically-significant degree of correlation between the jurisdiction-level random
effects and the other regressors, potentially leading to inconsistency of the estimates.
In a subsequent paper, Eom and Rubenstein (2006) return to the issue of
estimating the effects of the STAR program on school efficiency, but in this paper they
employ the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique to estimate the determinants of
school efficiency, rather than the 2SLS panel regression approach used in the earlier
paper by Eom, Duncombe and Yinger (2005). This DEA technique allowed them to
obtain a direct measure of elasticity and so they did not need to estimate the STAR
program‘s effect on the rate of the tax or on the level of property taxation.
The takeaway from these papers is that there hasn‘t been a reliable estimate of the
tax price elasticity of a state funded homestead exemption in any of the papers evaluating
the STAR program.
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Tax Rate Analysis
The property tax rate has been another focus in the study of how
intergovernmental policies influence local fiscal behavior. One paper of particular
interest is Holtz-Eaken and Rosen‘s (1990) investigation into the mechanism through
which local governments respond to the federal income tax deduction for property taxes.
Specifically, they ask whether governments respond to deductibility by changing the tax
rate. The authors develop a model with two types of actors: voters which maximize
utility through consumption of private goods and public services and elected officials
which set the property tax rates to maximize their expected votes. Their analysis gives
evidence that federal deductions for property tax payments reduce the average tax price
and result in increases to the average property tax rate, property tax revenues and local
spending on public services. They achieve this result using a model of rate determination
in which the property tax rate is a function of the average tax price in the jurisdiction,
individual income, population, federal grants and other environmental factors. The tax
price parameter controls for the effect of the federal income tax deduction for property
taxes. This function is displayed below in equation (2.28).
(2.28)
Where:
is the effective tax rate
P is the tax price
Y is income per capita
G is external government aid
N is population
X is a vector of j environmental controls
c represents communities
t represents time periods
is a vector of fixed community-specific effects
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Holtz-Eaken and Rosen difference (2.28) across time in order to estimate the
effect of changes in the tax price variable on changes in the property tax rate. This
approach has the benefit of eliminating the community-specific fixed effects. It also
focuses the analysis on community-level responses to changes in the tax price rather than
cross-sectional differences in price and rate.
The authors obtain an estimate for the price elasticity of -2.67 which they convert
to the average change in the millage rate associated with federal deductibility. They do
this by taking the mean change in the tax price due to federal deductibility, -7.9%, and
multiplying it by their elasticity estimate to obtain the average percent increase in the
property tax rate: 21.1%. This translates to a 7.15 mill increase in the average property
tax rate associated with the federal deductibility of property taxes.
An earlier analysis of how property tax rates can be affected by intergovernmental
fiscal policies is found in Strauss‘ (1974) study of federal block grants. In that study,
Strauss develops a system of equations to model simultaneously the grants‘ effects on
local expenditures and property tax rates. The structural forms of these equations are
given in (2.29) and (2.30).
(2.29)
(2.30)
Where:
gives localities
gives time periods
is Expenditure demand
Y is income
P is population
Trans is block grant revenue
is the property tax rate
W is the property tax base
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R is total local revenue
Strauss‘s model does not explicitly reference the political processes that guide
public a
llocation decisions. His paper was published just one year after Bergstrom and
Goodman‘s (1973) development of the empirical median voter model.

Consequently,

the concept of a tax price and an analysis of how block grants affect the demand price of
public goods are not expressed in Strauss‘ equations. The value of the transfers instead
appears in the equations directly.
Strauss obtains the reduced form versions of the structural equations and
estimates the tax rate model using OLS and the expenditure demand equation using a
non-linear Gaussian method. The data used for his analysis consist of a one-year crosssection of Wisconsin counties. His results therefore emphasize inter-jurisdictional
differences rather than within district responses to changes in intergovernmental aid.
Strauss estimates that a 1-percent increase in the block transfers were associated with a
0.06% to 0.32% increase in the property tax rate and a 0.55% to 0.82% increase in overall
local expenditures.
Revenue Structure Effects

In addition to affecting the level and the rate of the property tax,
intergovernmental aid programs can also influence the mix of revenue sources in the
local fiscal structure. The determinants of local revenue structure have been a topic of
public finance research for several years (see for example Hettich and Winer‘s (1984)
application of the political cost model and Sjoquist‘s (1981) use of the median voter
model). While the focus of this study is to determine whether tax relief policies had an
36

impact on the level of the tax, accounting for changes in the revenue structure becomes a
concern if the endogenous relationship between total receipts and tax structure biases
measures of the level effect. Unfortunately, there have been no studies to my knowledge
that have examined local fiscal behavior using a simultaneous model that captured how
both the level and the mix of revenues were affected by state or federal tax policies. Both
Sjoquist (1981) and Hettich and Winer (1984) make the simplifying assumption of fixed
revenue levels in their studies of revenue structure. Conversely, existing studies of how
the level and rate of the property tax are influenced by state and federal policies do not
control for revenue mix effects. For example, Eom and Rubenstein‘s (2006) study of the
New York STAR program is based on an explicit assumption of fixed revenue shares.
Gade and Adkins (1990) examines the impact of federal income tax deductibility
rules for state revenue structures by employing a system of equations that allow both the
level and the mix of revenue to be affected. They apply Hettich and Weiner‘s (1984)
framework by using a political cost model to understand the determinants of the mix of
revenues used in state tax structures and a median voter model to determine the level of
total state taxation. This framework is implemented in their study by specifying a system
of seven equations with six of them each modeling the determinants of the share of state
revenue obtained from a given source and the seventh modeling the determinants of total
state receipts.
The revenue share equations are derived from a political cost framework in which
the local officials seek to minimize the cost of generating revenue. Gade and Adkins
predict that tax exportation capacity, vertical fiscal balance and the manufacturing and
mining sectors of the economy would be key environmental factors that would impact the
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political cost of local revenues. They argued that the share of manufacturing activity and
the share of natural resource extraction in the state economy both have a positive
relationship to the state‘s ability to export taxes to non-residents. States with significant
tourism industries were also predicted by the authors to have a greater capacity to export
sales and excises taxes and would therefore rely on them more heavily.
They test their hypotheses on the impact of federal income tax deductibility by
creating tax prices for state income, sales and motor fuels taxes and including these prices
in the revenue share equations. These tax prices consist of weights for the state-average
marginal federal income tax rate that are based on the ratio of the total state deductions
for state-income, sales and motor fuels taxes relative to the ACIR estimates of statecapacity for each of those revenue sources. The authors use these weights as a measure
of the relative cost of using each revenue source and should therefore perform in the
estimating equations as a measure of the tax price. In addition, each revenue share
equation also includes the total per-capita state revenue as an endogenous variable which
is intended to capture the effect of the scale of the public sector on the revenue structure.
The seventh equation uses per-capita revenue as the dependent variable and
includes the tax shares from the revenue categories as endogenous variables. The authors
use median household income and real dollar federal aid per family as instrumental
variables to measure the median voter‘s preferences. Interestingly, they do not include
their tax price variables in the second equation for the scale of the public sector. They
were therefore unable to comment on the impact of their price terms on the level of state
spending. The full system of equations used by Gade and Adkins is displayed below in
(2.31) and (2.32).
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Revenue Share Equations

(2.31)

i=1…50 states
t=1…5 years

Each dependent variable is the share of total state revenues derived from that source.
X is a vector of the following:







manufacturing added value share
mining added value share
tax price of state income tax
tax price of state general sales tax
tax price of state motor fuels tax
ratio of state share of national retail sales to state share of national
population
 state share of total state and local revenue

TX is total revenue per capita in the state i in year t

Total Revenue Level Equation

(2.32)

Where:
Y is a vector of 5 of the 6 revenue shares (Other omitted)
INC =median family income
Z=Real federal aid to state government per family

The authors estimate this system using 3SLS. They obtain statistically significant
price elasticities and cross-price elasticities with respect to the set of revenue sources and
found results that met their expectations of revenue substitution. They find an own-price
elasticity for the share of state income tax funds of -1.131 and cross-price share
elasticities with general sales and motor fuels of 0.613 and 0.209, respectively. These
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findings depict a pattern of significant revenue substitution of sales taxes in place of state
income taxes as a result of federal deductibility.
The empirical approach applied by Gade and Adkins to study state tax structures
could be applied to local governments for the purpose of analyzing the impact of statelevel policies. At this point, no other author has attempted to perform a simultaneous
approach to examining the impact of property tax relief programs on both the level and
the mix of local revenues. One issue with that methodology, however, is that the level
equation estimates the impact on total local revenues, rather revenues derived from a
single source. That distinction makes Gade and Adkins‘ approach less precise for
determining whether tax relief policies had an unintended effect on the level of property
taxes.
The Georgia Homeowner’s Tax Relief Credit
Georgia adopted The Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Credit (HTRC) in 1999 as a
means of reducing the burden of property taxes on homeowners. At the time, the state
government was experiencing a budget surplus due to rising assessed property values
and, subsequently, property tax payments. Governor Roy Barnes supported the creation
of a state funded homestead exemption to transfer surplus state funds to local
governments to offset rising property taxes (Tilley 1999).
The Homeowner‘s Tax Relief Credit exempts a fixed amount of the assessed
value of qualified owner-occupied residential property from local property taxes.
Homeowners receive a credit on their property tax bill equal to the property tax rate times
the homestead exemption. The size of the homestead exemption is specified annually in
the General Appropriations Act for the state budget. At the time of its initial enactment,
40

the grant provided a tax credit equal to the reduction in taxes from an exemption of
$2,000 for each eligible homestead. The size of the funded exemption has been
regularly changed and was set in 2008 at a value of $8,000 per homestead. In 2009, due
a state budget shortfall the grant was eliminated.
Several other features of the way the property tax is administered in Georgia
affect the administration of the HTRC. Local governments in Georgia apply a 40%
assessment ratio. This makes an $8,000 property exemption against assessed value
equivalent to an exemption of $20,000 of the property‘s market value. The credit is nonrefundable; that is, the credit cannot exceed the tax liability after all other homestead
exemptions have been accounted for.
Table 2.2 History of HTRC Exemptions and Appropriations11
Year
Statutory Exemption
State Appropriation
Value
for HTRC Grants (in
millions)
2007
$8,000
$432.3
12
2006
$10,000 ($12,750 )
$567.7
2005
$10,000
$432.3
2004
$10,000
$380
2003
$10,000
$380
2002
$8,000
$353
2001
$6,000
$249
2000
$4,000
$166
1999
$2,000
$83

11

See Georgia Law 2000 pp. 323, 1769; Georgia Law 2001 pp. 661; Georgia Law 2002 pp. 709; Georgia
Law 2003 pp. 748; Georgia Law 2004 pp. 1028; Georgia Law 2005 pp. 1400; Georgia Law 2006 pp. 145;
Georgia Law 2007 HB 95 made an Act pp. 223
12
Amended. The FY 06 allowable exemption was initially set at $10,000 and the appropriation was
$432,209,501. It was subsequently amended to provide a one-time increase to the exemption in order to
return surplus FY07 funds to taxpayers. See amendment to Appropriations in HB 94. Ga. Law 2007 pp.
119
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Table 2.2 presents a history of the allowable exemption amounts and the annual
state appropriation for funding the grant. Initially, the grants only funded exemptions for
county and school governments, but in 2002 the HTRC was amended to cover municipal
property taxes .
The exemption is administered by local governments. The statements mailed to
each homeowner indicates the amount of tax savings they receive through the HTRC
program. The state provides a grant to each jurisdiction to offset the revenue local
governments forgo as a consequence of providing the exemption.
Consider the following example for a homestead with a market value of $250,000.
Because of the 40% assessment ratio, its assessed value would be $100,000. If in 2008
the home was located in unincorporated Cobb County, Georgia, it was taxed by the
county at a rate of 6.82 mills and by the school district at a rate of 18.9 mills. Cobb
County provides its own standard exemption of $10,000 against both county and school
district property taxes. This reduces the taxable value to $90,000. Therefore, the initial
combined property tax liability before the HTRC is applied is $2,314.80. In 2008 the
State of Georgia set the allowable HTRC exemption at $8,000. The homeowner would
get credits of $54.56 for county taxes and $151.20 for school taxes for a total credit of
$205.7613. The credit has the same effect as a $8,000 homestead exemption, which
would reduce the taxable value of the property to $82,000 and lower the total tax
payment to $2,109.04, a reduction of $205.76. The HTRC law requires that the state
provide a grant to the local government equal to the revenue lost from the credit. If there

13

Credit = (.00682 + .0189)*($8,000)=$205.76
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were 5,000 properties in that county that received the credit then the grant from the state
would be equal to $1,028,800. This grant would be allocated across the county
government and the school district in proportion to their millage rates.
Preliminary Investigation of the HTRC Program

The theoretical models predict that a state-funded homestead exemption will
induce substitution effects that increase the property tax rate and the level of property
taxation. A graphical examination of trends in average property tax rates and per-capita
property tax receipts across Georgia counties suggests that the HTRC may have had such
an impact. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 compare the allowable state funded exemption with the
aggregate14 property tax rates in Georgia counties. Figure 2.5 presents the average
aggregate county millage rates for all counties from 1990 through 2007. Figure 2.6
breaks the millage rates into quartiles that are recomputed annually. Figure 2.5 shows an
overall trend in which average millage rates increased during the early 1990‘s and then
leveled off around the middle of the decade. Then in 2000, a year after the HTRC was
first implemented, average rates began to climb again. Figure 2.6 shows the overall
pattern of rising average millage rates is present across all millage rate quartiles.

14

For the purposes of this example, these rates are the combined rates levied by the county governments,
the school districts and any special purpose service districts, but exclude municipal tax rates.
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Figure 2.515

Average County Millage Rates 1990-2007
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Source: Georgia Department of Revenue
Ibid.
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Figure 2.7 depicts the trend in property tax revenues per capita, net of the HTRC
credit, between 1990 and 2007. This figure is based on a subset of 15617 out of the 159
counties in Georgia. The amounts have been converted to real dollars using the Southern
urban consumption CPI from the BLS. This period exhibits an overall upward trend in
per capita property taxes, but the rate of growth increases in the years following the
introduction of the HTRC. This finding is interesting because, while the predicted effect
of a state-funded homestead exemption is upward pressure on the property tax rates, the
effect on gross property tax receipts, net of the credit, is ambiguous. The substitution
effects should unambiguously raise the combined revenue from the property tax plus the
replacement grant, but it would be a sign of a large combined effect for property tax
receipts alone to increase as a result of the grant. For property tax revenue alone to rise
as a result of the HTRC the effect would have to more than compensate for the property
tax revenue lost due to the exemption.
Figure 2.8 shows that the share of total revenues derived from the property tax
declined from 1991 through 1998 . This trend appears to halt in 1999 and from that point
the property tax share even exhibits some slight gains. This is consistent with the
prediction made by the graphical analysis shown in Figure 2.4 and its corresponding
discussion. The property tax revenue share would be expected to increase following the
implementation of the grant program.

17

The consolidated city-county governments of Clarke/Athens, Richmond/Augusta and
Cusetta/Chattahoochee were not included in this table due to limited availability of their property tax data.
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Figure 2.718

Figure 2.8.19

18
19

Georgia Department of Community Affairs. Report on Local Government Finance
Ibid.
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The graphical analyses suggest that the HTRC may have increased both property
taxes and millage rates . the share of revenue derived from the property tax rose
modestly when the HTRC was implemented. This initial look at the data, however, does
not control for other factors that could also influence revenue patterns over this period.
The preliminary evidence warrants further investigation with more sophisticated models
and methods.
Empirical Strategies

My research objective is to evaluate degree of tax relief provided by a statefunded homestead exemption. If the sum of property tax revenue and the replacement
grant is greater than the level of property tax revenue that would be collected if the grant
did not exist then that is evidence that some of the grant is being used to increase local
spending. Another indication that the HTRC is increasing local revenue is local officials
respond to it by increasing their property tax rates. I confine this empirical exercise to
testing for an impact on the level of property revenues and on the property tax rate. I do
not consider the possible effect on non-property tax revenue.
One of the challenges of evaluating the effect of a state-funded homestead
exemption is the difficulty in using tax price elasticity estimates to assess the effect of the
grant on the level of property taxes. If property taxes are determined by the median voter
and voter behavior is based on the tax price given by

, then the coefficient on the

tax price can be used to measure the effect of the HTRC program on property taxes.
However, our supposition is that the effect of the HTRC program on property taxes may
not conform to the theory as described.
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The grant affects property tax receipts in two ways: by changing the median
voter‘s tax price, and thus inducing a price substitution effect, and by shrinking the
taxable base through the exemption. Observe Figure 2.9 in which I depict three potential
outcomes of a state-funded homestead exemption. The top row contains pie charts which
illustrate the taxable share of the property tax base, the middle row indicates the tax rate
and the third row depicts the combined revenue from the property tax and the
replacement grant. The first column, A, depicts the pre-exemption situation in which the
entire property base is taxed at an initial rate denoted as . Column B depicts the
politically intended outcome from the exemption in which the rate remains at

and total

revenue remains constant, with the funds from the grant merely replacing a share of the
local revenue. Total combined revenue from the tax and the replacement grant remains
equal to the initial property levy depicted in Column A. The bar graph in the 3rd row of
Column B shows that the property tax exemption reduces the property tax dollar for
dollar of the grant. In this case, the tax price elasticity with respect to the property tax
grant program would be zero.

Column C depicts a degree of price substitution, but the increase in the tax rate
from

to

is small enough that the locally-obtained property tax revenue remains less

than the original level depicted in A. Combined revenue from the tax and the
replacement grant does, however, exceed the initial level of revenue in Columns A and B.
The tax price-revenue elasticity would also be positive in this case, the substitution effect
being overwhelmed by the revenue loss from the exemption. Only in Column D, in
which the tax rate,

, becomes high enough to make the level of property tax revenues

derived from the smaller base exceed even the initial property tax levy, would the
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exemption price-revenue elasticity be expected to show the negative sign that is
consistent with predictions from the median voter model of tax demand.
Figure 2.9. Mechanics of the Homeowner's Tax Relief Credit

Base

Rate

Revenue

This line of argument suggests two alternative empirical approaches. The first
would be to use the sum of property tax receipts and the replacement grant as the
dependent variable and estimate the combined revenue-price elasticity. The second
would be to use the tax rate as the dependent variable in order to measure the change in
the rate in response to changes in the tax price. I shall employ both approaches. They are
developed in the remainder of this section.
Approach I: Sum of Property Taxes and Replacement Grant Per Capita
My first empirical approach employs the sum of property taxes and the
replacement grant revenue as the dependent variable. I estimate several variants of
different models with this structure in order to explore the sensitivity of my findings to
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the model design. I begin with an estimation strategy similar to that taken by Fisher
(1988), but with some adjustments to reflect the longer time period spanned by my data.
Following Fisher, I model the demand for local revenue as a function of personal
income, the local tax price and other environmental taste parameters. The demand for
property tax revenue is derived from the public‘s demand for public and private goods,
depicted in (1), and is expressed as equation (2.33). The null hypothesis for this analysis
is that local governments do not change their fiscal behavior in response to the tax relief
program. That is the outcome described by Column B in Figure 8 in which the tax rate
remains at

and total revenues remain at the pre-exemption level. If that were the case

then the exemption tax price would not have a significant association with the dependent
variable because the replacement grant is merely replacing property tax receipts without a
net impact on total revenue. On the other hand, if there is a tax price substitution effect
that foils the revenue-neutral intent of the policy, then it would be expected that the
exemption price elasticity with respect to the sum of property tax revenue and the
replacement grant would be negative. However, the coefficient on tax price could be
negative because of variation in

and have the same value if tax price is measured as

.
Expressing the demand for combined property and replacement grant revenue as a
log-linear relationship yields equation (2.33).
(2.33)
Where
=log of the sum of property tax and replacement
grant revenue per capita for county in year
Yit = log of per capita personal income for county
in year
Pit = log of tax price in county in year
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Zjt = set of j taste and cost factors for county in
year
an error term more clearly defined as:
I operationalize the tax price using the perfect-information median voter approach
discussed in the previous sections. I test three different versions of the tax price (

) and

compare their impacts on combined revenues per capita.
In the first version I use the general tax price with no control for the state-funded
homestead exemption, following the structure given in equation (2.5):
(2.34)
Where:
is the General Tax Share
it is the value of the median value home for county
i in year t
Vit is the total assessed property value for county in
year t

In the second specification I introduce the effect of the homestead exemption
using the same tax price form given in equation (2.9). This specification uses one price
variable that combines the effect of the HTRC exemption and other changes to the tax
price driven by economic conditions.
(2.35)
Where:
is the Post-Exemption Tax Share
Et is the allowable state-funded exemption per
household in year t
Because the value of the allowable exemption changes several times over the period of
analysis, the value of the tax price varies both within cross-sections across counties and
within individual counties over time. To illustrate the impact of the exemption on the tax
price, Figure 2.10 compares the general tax share with the post-exemption tax share for
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the year 2005. These tax shares are graphed against the log of county income per capita.
In this year the size of the state-funded homestead exemption was $10,000. In this figure
I observe that the effect of the exemption was to generally reduce the tax share, with the
largest changes in tax price occurring among the lowest income counties.
Figure 2.10 Graph of Tax Share against Log of Per Capita Income

The third specification includes two measures of the tax price so that the effect of
the homestead exemption on combined revenues is estimated separately from the effect
of other economic factors which would alter the tax price. The new measure of the
HTRC program‘s effect, rather than being structured as a tax price, is the percent change
in the median voter‘s tax share caused by the homestead exemption. This term is
structured by taking the ratio of the median voter‘s allowable exemption (which is the
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same amount for all taxpayers in year t) with the tax base and dividing that by the median
voter‘s tax share.
(2.36)
The coefficient on this term should measure the effect of a percent reduction in
the median voter‘s tax share due to the homestead exemption on dependent variable.
I test several specifications of (2.33) in order to compare their goodness-of-fit to
the data. These specifications vary in form that P takes and the approaches used to
control for confounding factors. Using multiple approaches to testing the model reveals
how sensitive the results are to the features of a given specification. I conduct the first set
of estimates of (2.34) using a fixed-effect panel regression model and with county-level
clustered standard errors. I test this model using each of the three price structures
separately.

For my second set of specifications I difference equation (2.34) over time by one
year. This approach highlights the effect of within-county changes in the tax price on
changes in combined property-tax and replacement grant revenue. The structure of these
specifications is shown by equation (2.37). I test each of the three price variable
structures using this differenced approach. I estimate these equations using clusteredstandard errors regression.
(2.37)

The third approach that I take abandons the tax price variables and replaces them
with the actual replacement grant revenue received through the HTRC program on a per-
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capita basis. This approach tests for a significant relationship between a dollar of grant
revenue per-capita and a dollar of combined property tax and replacement grant revenue.
If, as the null hypothesis maintains, there is no price effect then the replacement grant
revenue would replace property tax receipts on a dollar-per-dollar basis and there should
not be a significant relationship between grant receipts and combined revenue. On the
other hand, a positive significant relationship between the two would be consistent with a
price effect.
Unfortunately, using the revenue from the grant as an explanatory variable is
problematic because it is endogenous with the dependent variable. Both the level of
revenue from the property tax and the size of the replacement grant are determined in part
by the jurisdiction‘s property tax rate. The simultaneous determination of the two
variables would cause the value of the grant to be correlated with the error term in the
estimating equation. Because of this relationship between the two variables I present an
additional model which instruments for the amount of the grant by replacing it with what
the grant would have been if the prior year‘s millage rate had been maintained at the
same level. This gives a measure of what the grant would have been if the rate were not
changed in response to the current year‘s homestead exemption.
The next set of equations combines the second and third approaches by using the
instrument for the size of the grant in a differenced model design. This model highlights
how changes in the level of the predicted grant are associated with changes in combined
property tax and replacement grant revenue.
The final set of equations abandons the median voter approach and examines how
the HTRC program changes the total taxable value in the jurisdiction. Instead of the
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median voter‘s tax price, this set of equations uses the ratio of the net taxable property
base to the gross property tax base, depicted in equation (2.38). Although this empirical
approach lacks the theoretical connection between the median voter‘s preferences and the
public choice mechanism, it reflects the magnitude of the overall exemption relative to
the tax base.
(2.38)

Approach II: Property Tax Rate
The second approach I take to measure the impact of the state-funded exemption
uses the millage rate as the dependent variable. Following the approach used by HoltzEaken and Rosen (1990), this strategy will seek to measure the substitution effect directly
on the chief policy instrument that local officials use to control the size of the property
levy20. An increase in the property tax rate in response to the exemption would be the
predicted local response if the replacement grant is used to raise local expenditures as
opposed to reducing the property tax burden. This strategy shares with Approach I the
strength that measurements of changes to the rate in response to the exemption would not
be confounded by reductions to the tax base. Referring back to Figure 8, the tax price
coefficient for the millage rate regressions would be expected to be statistically
insignificant if Column B were the case and negative for the cases of C and D. Similarly,

20

There is the potential for officials to change assessment practices to capture the grant,
but because the level of the exemption was changed on almost an annual basis over this
period it is unlikely that local officials would have employed that strategy.
55

the expected coefficient of the

variable would be positive if there is a significant

substitution effect.
I follow Holtz-Eaken and Rosen‘s (1990) empirical approach in which the tax rate
is a function of personal income, the tax price, population, other intergovernmental aid
and other environmental controls. I also difference the data across time in order to
eliminate the effect of fixed county-level factors that would influence the rate and to
focus the analysis on the determinants of changes in the millage rate over time. The
equation for the tax rate in levels is given in (2.39) and the differenced model that will be
estimated is given in (2.40). I employ the same structures for the tax price as I presented
for Approach I.

(2.39)
Where
= log of the property tax milllage rate for county in year
Yit = log of per capita personal income for county in year
Pit = log of tax price in county in year
Zjt = set of j taste and cost factors for county in year
= the error term in year
and
(2.40)
I estimate equation (2.40) using a clustered standard error panel regression model.
Data
I perform this analysis using data on Georgia county governments. All data used
are taken at the county level. The property tax revenue data for the dependent variables
come from the Report on Local Government Finances collected by the Georgia
Department of Community Affairs. This is an annual report completed by local
governments in Georgia that collects detailed information on revenues and expenditure
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data. I also rely on tax digest data collected from the Georgia Department of Revenue.
Economic indicators on the components of the local economy come from the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. County level
personal income comes from the Bureau of Economic Accounts Local Area Personal
Income tables. Of the 159 counties in Georgia, I possess complete data for 137 counties
over the 12-year period of 1996 to 2007 and adequate partial data for another 21 counties.
The one county I have excluded is the consolidated city-county government of CussetaChattahoochee which did not participate in the RLGF survey until 2004.
I follow the standard assumption that the median voter in a given locality also
owns the median value home. By using the median home value in the various tax price
equations I have presented, my estimates represent the median voter‘s tax price. Median
home value at the county level is not readily available except for the decennial census
year. I approximate median home values for the rest of my panel by weighting the 2000
median home value from the US Census by annual growth in the residential tax base, per
capita. This value is used as the

term in each of the tax price specifications.

I use several measures of the environmental and demographic characteristics that
control for other determinants of the indirect demand for property taxes. I include
population density as a measure of demand under the expectation that more concentrated
populations will have a higher per-capita demand for public services. Population is also
included in the equation as a control for scale effects on cost of public services. I also
control for the share of county wages derived from agriculture and from the service sector
in order to measure any impact that the local economy would have on fiscal structure. To
control for other county-level features of the tax structure on the level of property tax I
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include measures of transfer revenue from the state and national government and the
value of other property tax exemptions provided by the state and local government. I also
include the aggregate rate for the county sales tax. This rate is the sum of all local-option
type sales taxes that voters in the county have approved at that time. Counties adding
local option sales taxes in Georgia for certain purposes have been required to offset the
additional sales tax revenue with reductions in property tax levies. Measuring the
aggregate sales tax rate is a means of controlling for this behavior. I also include the
share of the property tax base that consists of residential property. Summary statistics for
the variables included in the models are displayed in Table 2.3. The first-difference
forms of the same variables are displayed in Table 2.4.
The difference in logs over time can be interpreted as the average annual growth
rate across counties. The figures given in Table 4 indicate that from 1996 through 2007
county property tax millage rates increased at an average rate of 1.3% per year, while
median tax shares declined on average by 1.9% annually. The standard deviations of the
growth rates, however, are larger than the means, indicating that the high degree of
variability across counties and across time in the changes in these variables. Another
feature of the data revealed in the summary tables is the significantly greater degree of
variation in the tax share after the effect of the exemption has been taken into effect. The
naïve tax share exhibits a mean annual reduction of 1.9%, while taking the tax share into
account yields a tax share declines on average by 4% annually. This effect is even more
pronounced when looking at some of the lowest property value counties rather than at the
central tendency of the sample. In 2006, the median home value at market price for
Calhoun County, after converting to real 1983-1984 dollars was $24,448.67. After
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applying the 40% assessment ratio, this becomes $9,779.47. The value of the HTRC
exemption in that year, converted to real dollars is $6,548.54. The exemption therefore
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics for Level Variables
Log of Property Tax and Replacement Grant Revenue Per Capita
Log of tax share
Post-Exemption Tax Share
Percent Reduction in Tax Share Due to Exemption
Log of Median Home Value
Log of Income Per Capita
Log of Population
Density - 100 people per Square Mile
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate
Log of Other Transfer Revenue Per Capita
Service Sector Share of Local Wages
Agriculture Sector Share of Local Wages
Residential Share of Property Tax Base
Number of Records

Mean
4.873
-9.699
-9.891
16.326
9.892
9.441
10.092
1.712
6.636
3.202
0.414
0.021
0.346
1,859

Std Dev
0.379
1.023
1.002
13.516
0.363
0.175
1.124
3.486
0.554
0.759
0.14
0.055
0.135

Mean
0.035

Std Dev
0.163

0.013

0.159

-0.019
-0.040
1.811
0.029
0.007
0.015
0.037
0.101
0.020
0.004
0.000
0.006

0.061
0.106
6.178
0.097
0.026
0.019
0.094
0.347
0.653
0.029
0.015
0.024

Table 2.4 Summary Statistics for Differenced Values
Change in Log of Property Tax and Replacement Grant Revenue
Per Capita
Change in Log of Millage Rate
Change in Log of Tax Share
Change in Log of Post-Exemption Tax Share
Change in Percent Reduction in Tax Share Due to Exemption
Change in Log of Median Home Value
Change In Log of Income Per Capita
Change in Log of Population
Change in Population Density: 100 per square mile
Change in Aggregate Sales Tax Rate
Change in Log of Transfer Revenue Per Capita
Change in Service Sector Share of Local Wages
Change in Agricultural Sector Share of Local Wages
Change in Residential Share of Property Tax Base
Number of Records

1693
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reduces the taxable value of the median property valued parcel in that county by nearly
70%. In that year the tax share, without accounting for the exemption, declined by 3.3%,
while the post-exemption tax share declined by 41%. The magnitude of the change in the
tax price suggests that there may be a non-linear relationship between the exemption and
the level of revenue. I address this by testing a model in which the percent reduction in
the tax share due to the exemption (

) is paired with a squared term.
Results

Approach I: Property Taxes and Replacement Grant Revenues Per Capita
I use the sum of property tax receipts and replacement grant revenue per capita as
the dependent variable in several different estimating equations.

The first set of

estimates comes from a fixed-effects panel regression model using standard errors that
are clustered at the county level. I display two sets of equations in Table 5 which are
identical in structure except that the second set includes county-level median home value
as an additional control for the effect of wealth on revenues. Columns 1 and 4 of Table
2.5 depict a naïve model which measures the effect of the homeowner‘s tax share,
without controlling for the HTRC program. Columns 2 and 5 use the

,

measure of the

tax price which reflects the tax share after the exemption has been taken into account.
Columns 3 and 6 separate the exemption‘s effect on the tax share from other factors that
influence the share by including both
the exemption,

and the percent change in the share caused by

.

The coefficient of

can be interpreted as the general tax-price revenue elasticity.

The estimates of this elasticity found in Columns 1 and 3 range between -0.263 and -
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0.295, but they are not statistically significant. The elasticity estimates in Columns 4 and
6 range between -0.375 and -0.474 and are both statistically significant.

These results

can be interpreted to indicate that, ceteris paribus, a one percent reduction in the tax
share for reasons other than the state-funded exemption would yield an increase in
combined property tax and replacement grant revenue somewhere between 0.38% and
0.47%. These estimates are similar to Bergstrom, Rubenfeld and Shapiro‘s (1982)
estimates of price elasticities for local school expenditures which ranged from -.43 to .57, and also fall within the range of the several single-state estimates performed by
Bergrstrom and Goodman (1973) for general municipal expenditures.
Columns 2 and 5 display the elasticity estimates of the post-exemption tax price,
, and combined revenues. Both estimates are statistically significant and their values
alternate between -0.128 without the control for median home value and -0.222 with it.
Comparing the tax price estimates of Columns 1 and 2 is difficult because the
naïve model‘s coefficient is not statistically significant. Both elasticities are significant
in Columns 4 and 5 and comparing the two point estimates indicates that controlling for
the exemption‘s effect reduces the tax price elasticity. The 95% confidence intervals,
however, reveal that the difference between the two variables is not statistically
significant.
Columns 3 and 6 separate the post-exemption tax price into two components, the
median homeowner‘s tax share before the exemption and the percent change in the tax
price due to the HTRC program. The measure of the exemption‘s effect is significant in
both equations and the value of its coefficient alternates between -0.133 without the
median home value control and -0.253 with it. This indicates that a 10% reduction in tax
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share due to the HTRC program is associated with an increase in aggregate property tax
and replacement grant revenue per capita somewhere between 1.3 and 2.5%. This
finding is evidence that there is significant ‗capture‘ of the tax relief grant by local
governments. If the program were ‗revenue neutral‘ as the program was advertised then
there should have been no statistically significant effect.
Several other parameter estimates are interesting. Coefficients for the log of
median home value in Columns 4-6 range from 0.180 to 0.235. This indicates that,
controlling for all other factors, a 10% increase in median home value would be
associated with approximately a 2% increase in combined property tax and replacement
grant revenue per capita. Surprisingly, the income per-capita term was not statistically
significant in these and several other specifications that I examined. Median home value
is likely capturing the level of wealth in the county, which may have a stronger tie to
fiscal behavior than income. Income per capita fails to achieve significance even when
the median home value term is dropped.
The population density term is significant in all four equations and ranges from 0.052 to -0.064. This term is the raw value rather than the natural log so the coefficient
must also be multiplied by 100 to interpret it in terms of percent changes. The estimate
indicates that an additional one hundred people per square mile is associated with
approximately a 6% reduction in property-based revenue per capita, ceteris paribus. This
appears to indicate that the dense urban areas of the Atlanta metropolitan region are able
to rely more heavily on alternative revenue sources, while the lower-income agricultural
counties have a higher level of property taxation.
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Table 2.5 Fixed Effects Regression with Clustered Standard Errors
Column
1

Column 2

Column
3

Column
4

Column 5

Column
6

Dependent Variable: Aggregate Revenue per capita

Naïve

Combined
PostExemption
Price

Separated
Price
Variables

Naïve

Combined
PostExemption
Price

Separated
Price
Variables

Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share

-0.263

-0.295

-0.375**

-0.474**

(-1.441)

(-1.611)

(-1.986)

(-2.503)

Log of Post-Exemption Tax Share

-0.128**

-0.222*

(-2.171)

(-3.313)

Percent Change in Tax Share From Exemption^

-0.133+

-0.253*

(-1.936)

(-3.503)

Log of Median Home Value

0.180*

0.205*

0.241*

(3.233)

(4.134)

(4.191)

0.107

0.143

0.116

-0.016

0.026

-0.040

(0.836)

(1.104)

(0.890)

(-0.123)

(0.197)

(-0.300)

-0.041

0.142

-0.032

-0.224

0.007

-0.269

(-0.214)

(1.225)

(-0.169)

(-1.077)

(0.056)

(-1.321)

-0.067*

-0.060*

-0.066*

-0.064*

-0.052*

-0.060*

(-3.825)

(-3.513)

(-3.754)

(-3.659)

(-3.029)

(-3.449)

-0.011

-0.020

-0.015

-0.008

-0.022+

-0.015

(-0.865)

(-1.557)

(-1.170)

(-0.617)

(-1.664)

(-1.151)

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.006

(-0.816)

(-0.812)

(-0.755)

(-0.867)

(-0.833)

(-0.761)

-0.047

-0.056

-0.055

-0.064

-0.082

-0.085

(-0.336)

(-0.393)

(-0.396)

(-0.457)

(-0.587)

(-0.618)

0.350

0.270

0.304

0.418

0.297

0.354

(1.068)

(0.815)

(0.907)

(1.294)

(0.905)

(1.063)

0.383

0.171

0.493

0.353

0.113

0.553

(0.948)

(0.779)

(1.205)

(0.945)

(0.516)

(1.431)

0.035*

0.032*

0.030*

0.031*

0.024*

0.020*

(7.889)

(7.749)

(6.426)

(6.415)

(5.092)

(3.653)

1.594

0.839

1.113

1.743

0.439

0.875

(1.044)

(0.533)

(0.712)

(1.184)

(0.287)

(0.580)

Observations

1,859

1,859

1,859

1,859

1,859

1,859

R-squared

0.475

0.474

0.477

0.483

0.483

0.489

Number of id

158

158

158

158

158

158

Log of Income Per Capita

Log of Population

Population density (100/sqmi)

Aggregate Sales Tax Rate

Log of Other Transfer revenue Per Capita

Service Sector Share of Local Wages

Agricultural Sector Share of Local Wages

Residential Share of Tax Base

Time Trend

Constant

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
County-Level Fixed Effects Included in all equations
Residual Sum of Squares

35.57

35.668

^Already scaled by 100 to convert to elasticity
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35.447

35.077

35.081

34.662

The only other term that is statistically significant is the time trend, which enters
into all six equations. Its estimates range from 0.02 to 0.034. Holding all else constant,
combined property tax and replacement grant revenues per capita were increasing at a
rate of approximately 2 to 3 percent annually.
I also test whether adding the control for the HTRC program improves the fit of
the model to the data. I perform a set of goodness-of-fit tests in order to measure whether
controlling for the state-funded homestead exemption significantly improves the fit of the
model. The key determinant in selecting which goodness-of-fit test to use is whether the
initial model is nested within the alternative models. If it can be shown that the models
are nested then traditional hypothesis testing methods can be used; otherwise more
advanced econometric techniques are necessary (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The
following discussion shows that the models are in fact nested and that a standard F-test
can be used to test the goodness of fit.
Although it is apparent that the equation of Column 1 of Table 2.5 is nested
within the equations for Column 3, it is not obvious whether Column 1 is nested within
Column 2. The key issue is that the price variable in Column 1,
post-exemption tax price,

, is replaced by the

. A simple algebraic transformation of

shows,

however, that in this log-linear model the equations are nested.

(2.41)
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Equation (41) shows that the post-exemption tax price is equal to the product of the initial
homeowner‘s tax share,

, and the term

. This latter portion of (2.41)

is reduction in the homeowner‘s tax share caused by the state-funded homestead
exemption. Eom and Rubenstein (2006) perform this same transformation in their
analysis of the New York STAR program, another example of a state-funded homestead
exemption. Another feature of Equation (2.41) is that it highlights the relationship
between Column 2 and Column 3 in Table 5. The enclosed term in (2.41) is simply one
minus the tax price variable used in Column 3

. Although there is a

difference in the arrangement of the terms, the same information is present in both
equations.
Because the equations are nested a simple F-test for goodness-of-fit is appropriate
for comparing the models. Unfortunately, the Residual Sum of Squares in Column 2 is
larger than the RSS from Column 1, suggesting that the post-exemption tax price may
actually worsen the fit to the data. One possible explanation for this outcome is that the
HTRC program causes much greater changes in the tax share than other economic
determinants of tax price and that there are different price responses to the different
factors. Using one variable to measure both factors may cause a loss of information.
I find more supportive results when I separate the HTRC‘s effect from the tax
share. An F-test comparing Columns 1 and 3 indicates that Column 3 yields a
significantly better fit to the data than the naïve model. Similarly, Column 6 is a
significant improvement over Column 4. I also perform a test comparing Columns 3 and
6 to test for the improvement to the fit generated by the median home value parameter.
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This test indicates that the 6 is a better fit than 3. The results of these tests are displayed
in Table 6.
Table 7 shows the second set of estimates which are obtained from differenced
model displayed in equation (2.37). The estimates from this set of equations were
obtained using OLS with clustered standard errors. The difference-over-time estimates
fail to provide any additional evidence that the HTRC program is associated with a price
effect that increases the total level of revenues. The only variable that is statistically
significant in any of the equations is the population density term. Also the F-test for joint
significance of all the coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis that any of the
estimates are significantly different from zero.
Table 2.6. Goodness of Fit Tests
Test1: Column 1 vs. Column 3
A
RSS1-RSS3
0.123
B
# of parameters
1
C
RSS3
35.45
D
1859-(11+157)
1691

F-statistic
(A/B)/(C/D)
5.87

A
B
C
D

Test2: Column 4 vs. Column 6
RSS4-RSS6
0.415
# of parameters
1
RSS3
34.66
1859-(12+157)
1690

F-statistic
(A/B)/(C/D)
20.23

A
B
C
D

Test3: Column 3 vs. Column 6
RSS3-RSS6
0.785
# of parameters
1
RSS3
34.66
1859-(12+157)
1690

F-statistic
(A/B)/(C/D)
38.27

The next set of estimates use the revenue derived from the replacement grant to
control for the HTRC program‘s effect on the dependent variable. Table 2.8 provides the
outcomes of these estimates. No naïve-model estimates are included in this table because
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they would be identical to Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.5. Column 1 of Table 2.8 uses the
actual revenue from the replacement grant as a control for the HTRC program, while the
Column 2 uses a counterfactual level of grant revenue that is calculated using the HTRC
exemption from year , but the millage rate from year

.

The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8 are very similar to each other. The
coefficient on the general tax share in both cases is approximately -0.36. This elasticity
estimate is within the ranges of the price elasticity estimates found in Table 5. The
coefficients on the population density and the time trend variables are of similar
magnitude and statistical significance to the previous models‘ estimates. The
replacement grant revenue variables are statistically significant in both Columns 1 and 2.
The coefficient on the revenue coefficient from Column 1 is interpreted to indicate that a
one percent increase in replacement grant revenue per capita is associated with a 0.056
percent increase in combined property tax and replacement grant revenue. Similarly, the
counterfactual revenue coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in grant revenue is
accompanied by a 0.062 percent increase in combined revenue. These values can be put
into greater context by considering the share of combined revenue obtained from the
replacement grant. Across all counties in the dataset, the mean proportion ranged from
1.9% in the first year the program, when the exemption was set at $2,000, to 6.8% of
revenues in 2003, when the exemption was raised to its all-time high of $10,000. If the
elasticity between the replacement grant revenue and combined revenues approaches the
average proportion of revenues derived from the replacement grant then it suggests that
on average, the level of combined revenues are increasing by nearly the entire amount of
the replacement grant.
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Table2. 7 Difference Form Equations

Naive

-0.018

-0.025

-0.000

-0.029

(-0.231)

(-0.330)

(-0.001)

(-0.318)

Change in Log of Post-Exemption
Tax Share

-0.043

-0.043

(-0.826)

(-0.682)

Change in Log of Percent Change
in Tax Share from Exemption
Change in Log of Income Per
Capita

Change in Log of Population

Change in Population Density

Change in Sales Tax Rate

Change in Transfers Per Capita

Change in Service Sector Share of
Local Wages
Change in Agricultural Share of
Local Wages
Change in Residential Share of
the Tax Base

Separated
Price
Variables

0.001

0.001

(1.296)

(1.180)

-0.219

-0.210

-0.209

-0.216

-0.210

-0.210

(-1.411)

(-1.354)

(-1.350)

(-1.391)

(-1.356)

(-1.354)

-0.040

-0.054

-0.036

-0.024

-0.054

-0.039

(-0.202)

(-0.270)

(-0.179)

(-0.109)

(-0.260)

(-0.179)

-0.061*

-0.061*

-0.059**

-0.061*

-0.061*

-0.059**

(-2.687)

(-2.722)

(-2.586)

(-2.690)

(-2.694)

(-2.594)

-0.008

-0.009

-0.009

-0.008

-0.009

-0.009

(-0.950)

(-0.982)

(-1.000)

(-0.945)

(-0.986)

(-1.004)

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

-0.007

(-0.775)

(-0.740)

(-0.728)

(-0.775)

(-0.739)

(-0.725)

0.008

0.004

-0.001

0.009

0.004

-0.001

(0.058)

(0.028)

(-0.006)

(0.060)

(0.028)

(-0.008)

0.001

-0.007

-0.009

-0.000

-0.007

-0.009

(0.005)

(-0.031)

(-0.043)

(-0.000)

(-0.031)

(-0.043)

0.194

0.227

0.201

0.177

0.227

0.204

(1.211)

(1.603)

(1.286)

(1.103)

(1.586)

(1.241)

-0.019

0.000

0.003

(-0.467)

(0.007)

(0.073)

Change in the Log of the Median
Home Value

Constant

Combined
PostExemption
Price

Separated
Price
Variables

Naive
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption
Tax Share

Combined
PostExemption
Price

0.039*

0.038*

0.037*

0.040*

0.038*

0.037*

(11.608)

(9.500)

(9.236)

(11.411)

(8.033)

(7.835)

Observations

1,692

1,692

1,692

1,692

1,692

1,692

R-squared

0.004

0.005

0.006

0.004

0.005

0.006

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 2.8 Fixed-Effect Clustered Regressions Using The Grant Size As Control For
HTRC

Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share
Log of Weighted Replacement Grant
Revenue Per Capita

Actual Grant
Amount

Counterfactual
Grant Amount

-0.362**
(-2.016)

-0.365**
(-2.034)

0.056*
(5.308)

Log of Counterfactual Replacement
Grant Revenue Per Capita
Log of Income Per Capita

-0.044
(-0.324)
Log of Population
-0.149
(-0.772)
Population density (100/sqmi)
-0.069*
(-3.798)
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate
-0.029**
(-2.254)
Log of Other Transfer revenue Per Capita -0.007
(-0.833)
Service Sector Share of Local Wages
-0.032
(-0.234)
Agricultural Sector Share of Local
Wages
0.252
(0.755)
Residential Share of Tax Base
0.625
(1.477)
Time Trend
0.022*
(4.185)
Constant
3.181+
(1.967)
Observations
R-squared
Number of id
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

1,859
0.491
158
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0.062*
(5.691)
-0.056
(-0.408)
-0.151
(-0.784)
-0.069*
(-3.755)
-0.030**
(-2.321)
-0.007
(-0.888)
-0.026
(-0.196)
0.235
(0.708)
0.641
(1.508)
0.021*
(3.933)
3.279**
(2.035)
1,858
0.494
158

Table 2.9 Clustered Regressions Using Differenced Form Equations on the
Counterfactual Grant
Differenced
Counterfactual
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption
Tax Share
Change in Log of Counterfactual
Grant Revenue Per Capita
Change in Log of Income Per
Capita
Change in Log of Population
Change in Population Density
Change in Sales Tax Rate
Change in Transfers Per Capita
Change in Service Sector Share of
Local Wages
Change in Agricultural Share of
Local Wages
Change in Residential Share of the
Tax Base
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

-0.081
(-1.069)
0.079*
(6.074)
-0.365**
(-2.270)
-0.141
(-0.674)
-0.053**
(-2.186)
-0.006
(-0.681)
-0.006
(-0.646)
-0.013
(-0.091)
-0.055
(-0.252)
0.252
(1.581)
0.024*
(6.040)
1,691
0.034
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Table 2.10 Fixed-Effect Clustered Regression Using Percent Reduction in Total Tax
Base as HTRC Control

VARIABLES

Average

Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share

-0.330+
(-1.789)

Percent Reduction in Total Tax Base
Due to HTRC
Log of Income Per Capita
Log of Population
Population density (100/sqmi)
Aggregate Sales Tax Rate
Log of Other Transfer revenue Per
Capita
Service Sector Share of Local Wages
Agricultural Sector Share of Local
Wages
Residential Share of Tax Base
Time Trend
Constant

Observations
Number of id
R-squared
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

-0.011*
(-2.860)
0.063
(0.468)
-0.097
(-0.498)
-0.066*
(-3.825)
-0.021
(-1.581)
-0.007
(-0.794)
-0.038
(-0.282)
0.291
(0.837)
0.516
(1.244)
0.028*
(5.050)
3.073+
(1.816)
1,859
158
0.482
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Table 2.11. Regression on the Differenced Log of County Millage Rates
Dependent Variable is the Change in Millage Rate
(1)
Change in Log of Pre-Exemption Tax Share

(3)

(4)

0.552*

0.493*

0.496*

(4.304)

(4.014)

(4.011)

0.002*

0.0036*

(4.818)

(3.349)

Change in Log of Post-Exemption Tax
Share

(2)

-0.048
(-1.526)

Change in Percent Reduction in Tax Share
Due to Exemption
Change in Square of Percent Reduction in
Tax Share

-0.000
(-1.529)

Change in Log of Median Home Value
Change in Log of Income Per Capita
Change in Log of Population
Change in Population Density (100/sqmi)
Change in Aggregate Sales Tax Rate
Change in Log of Transfer Revenue Per
Capita
Change in Service Sector Share of Local
Wages

-0.625*

-0.478*

-0.579*

-0.580*

(-11.672)

(-8.935)

(-10.819)

(-10.833)

0.165

0.171

0.178

0.163

(1.081)

(1.100)

(1.165)

(1.061)

0.361+

-0.142

0.330+

0.325+

(1.878)

(-0.966)

(1.750)

(1.707)

0.032

0.015

0.036

0.037

(1.229)

(0.581)

(1.363)

(1.431)

-0.003

-0.002

-0.004

-0.004

(-0.195)

(-0.155)

(-0.244)

(-0.231)

-0.006

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

(-1.219)

(-0.923)

(-1.038)

(-1.019)

-0.005

0.010

-0.025

-0.026

(-0.044)

(0.088)

(-0.251)

(-0.257)

0.216

0.178

0.197

0.195

(1.267)

(0.902)

(1.131)

(1.120)

-0.530

0.281

-0.475

-0.474

(-1.334)

(1.060)

(-1.241)

(-1.229)

0.037*

0.024*

0.031*

0.030*

(8.899)

(7.362)

(7.426)

(7.036)

Observations

1,692

1,692

1,692

1,692

Number of id

158

158

158

158

0.155

0.126

0.163

0.163

Change in Agricultural Share of Local
Wages
Change in Residential Share of Property
Tax Base
Constant

R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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Combining both the differenced model approach with the counterfactual grant
revenue as a control from the HTRC program performs better than the previous
differenced model approaches that used the tax price. These results are displayed in
Column 1 of Table 2.9. While the tax share variable still fails to reach statistical
significance, the grant revenue term, income per capita and population density are all
statistically significant in this model. The value of the grant revenue estimate is 0.079,
indicating that a one percent increase in grant revenue over time is associated with a
0.079 percent increase in combined revenues.
For the final approach to measuring the effect of the HTRC program on combined
property tax and grant revenues I employ an alternate measure of the exemption‘s effect
on the county tax base. Rather than looking at the effect of the grant on the median
voter‘s tax price, I measure the proportion of the entire county tax base that becomes
exempt from the property tax. I still use the ratio of the median value home to the county
tax base to capture the median voter‘s share of spending. Column 1 of Table 2.10
contains the results of this modeling approach. I have already adjusted the coefficients to
reflect that the dependent variable is log-transformed while the key explanatory variable
is a raw percent. The estimate can be interpreted to indicate that a one percent reduction
in the post-exemption share of the tax base due to the HTRC would be associated with a
0.01 percent increase in combined revenues.
Approach II: Difference in Log of Property Tax Rate
The results from the second set of equations, which use the first difference in the
log of the property tax millage rate as the dependent variable, are displayed in Table 2.11.
I include fixed effects in the equations, despite taking the first differences of the
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variables, to control for factors that do not change over time that might have a consistent
effect on how much millage rates change from year to year. These factors would be
county characteristics that influence the responsiveness of local government to changing
economic conditions. One example may be variation in property tax assessment practices
based on the technical capacity of the local government.
The equations in Table 2.11 are ordered by their controls for the tax share.
Column 1 displays a naïve model that includes the change in the log general tax share
and does not measure the effect of the replacement grant. Column 2 uses the change
in the log of the post-exemption tax price
while Column 7 includes both
due to the homestead exemption

as the primary explanatory variable,

and the differenced percent change in the tax share
, and Column 8 adds a square term of

to

the structure of Column 7.
The most striking aspect of this set of estimates is that the sign on the preexemption tax share variables shown in Columns 1,3 and 4 are all positive. This is the
opposite of the expected sign for a tax price. A positive elasticity estimate indicates that,
holding all other factors constant, growth in the tax share is associated with increasing
millage rates. It would be expected, instead, that as the tax price increases the median
voter would prefer lower taxes and a lower level of public services. One likely cause for
this result is the relationship between the explanatory variables. Median home value
enters into these equations in three places: through the numerator of the general tax share,
the denominator of the percent reduction in tax share due to the homestead exemption,
and as a scale variable on its own. A marginal increase in the general tax share while
holding the median home value constant would require a reduction in the gross tax base.
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The positive sign on the general tax share variables may therefore be due to smaller-taxbase counties relying more heavily on the property tax. The significant and negative sign
on the change in the median home value variables appears to support this interaction
between the elements of the estimated model.
In contrast, the estimates of the homestead exemption‘s effect on the millage rate
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model. From Column 4 of Table
2.11, a one percent reduction in

is associated with a 0.36 percent increase in the

millage rate. The statistically significant relationship between changes in the tax rate and
suggests that local officials raised the property tax rates in order to shift some of
the tax relief grant to increase local expenditures. This result adds to the findings from
the first empirical approach because it emphasizes the responses of individual counties to
changes in the tax price over time.
Post-Estimation
Both empirical approaches rejected the null hypothesis that the exemption would
be ‗revenue neutral‘ and simply provide tax relief without any impact on revenues or on
the millage rate. At least a portion of the replacement grant appears to have been
diverted to increasing local revenue per capita. A more concrete measure of how much
of the grant was dedicated to this purpose may be obtained by applying the coefficient
estimates towards post-estimation. I first calculate the predicted value of the aggregate
property and replacement grant revenue, per capita for the 2007 year. I then compute a
second set of predicted values generated using the same coefficients, except that I replace
the estimate of the homestead exemption‘s effect on the tax price with the null hypothesis
value of 0. This quantity represents the predicted sum of property tax and replacement
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grant revenue if there had been no substitution effect associated with the state-funded
exemption. After computing both sets of predicted values21 for the log of aggregate
property tax and replacement grant revenue per capita, I reverse transform the values to
real dollar amounts by exponentiation and multiplying by county population. I perform
this procedure using the coefficients from Column 6 of Table 5.

Table 2.12 Post-Estimation For 2007 Data Using Column 6 Estimates from Table
2.5
Aggregate Predicted Revenue
$1,416,445,442
Null Hypothesis Predicted Revenue
1,367,984,384
Difference
48,461,058
Total HTRC Payments To Counties - 2007
$133,331,498
Percent
36.35%
Data from 149 Counties was used for this
Procedure

After generating the predicted values and reverse transforming them, I aggregated
the values across all counties. The results of this post-estimation procedure are displayed
in Table 2.12. 149 counties had complete data for the 2007 year. Total HTRC payments
to all 159 county governments in that year amounted to $137.6 million; the 149 counties
present for the post-estimation received $133.3 million of that total. The sum across
counties of the reverse-transformed predicted value of property and replacement grant
revenues is $1,416,445,442, while the predicted value generated with the null-hypothesis
value for the homestead exemption‘s effect is $1,367,984,384, a difference of $48.5
million. These results suggest that the substitution effected associated with the HTRC

21

I corrected for the distribution of the error term when I generated the predicted values.
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program raised aggregate revenues from the property tax and the replacement grant by
nearly $48.5 million and that approximately 36.3% of the replacement grant revenue is
shifted from reducing the tax burden to funding additional county expenditures. I
performed this analysis using the results from Column 4 of Table 5 and obtained similar
results. Extrapolating these findings to the HTRC grants provided to the other forms of
local government in Georgia would suggest that, in 2007, approximately $156.8 million
of state funds intended for tax relief were redirected to increase local spending.
Fiscal Illusion
The key issue in estimating the impact of fiscal illusion on the local response to
the exemption is determining how much of the shift was due to the median voter‘s
informed price response and how much can be attributed to local officials capturing the
unobserved portion of the grant. I argued above that if the price response to changes in
tax share caused by the exemption is greater than the price response to changes due to
other factors, then there is evidence of fiscal illusion. This is because local officials
would be expected to engage in budget maximizing behavior and spend the entire
unobserved portion of the grant that they have captured. Alternatively, the median voter
would support higher spending in accordance with the price elasticity of demand for
public goods. There is no room in the model for a public official that chooses to raise
revenues net of an unobserved grant at the same ratio as the median voter would have
chosen were she aware of the funds. This is because the key assumption of the model is
that the public official seeks to maximize their budget. Empirically, however, this latter
scenario cannot be distinguished from an outcome driven by a fully informed median
voter.
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The point estimates of the coefficients on Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.5 for the
HTRC‘s effect on tax price are smaller than the coefficients on the general tax share and
it therefore does not appear that Georgia county governments are raising revenues at a
greater rate than could be explained by the informed median voter price effect. If the
coefficients on the exemption‘s price effect had been larger than the general share‘s
effect, then an estimate of the magnitude of fiscal illusion could have been generated by
performing a post-estimation procedure similar to the one implemented above. This
would be performed by generating predicted values where the general tax share‘s
estimated coefficient is applied to the exemption‘s effect on the tax share. This predicted
value could then be compared to the predicted values from the actual coefficients to
obtain a ratio that represents the share of the substitution effect that exceeds the median
voter‘s price response. The empirical findings from this analysis, however, find no
evidence that fiscal illusion is a significant determinant of the substitution effect created
by the HTRC program.
Conclusions
This study evaluated the effectiveness of state-funded homestead exemptions in
providing property tax relief. In Georgia, a state-funded exemption increased revenues
by more than a third of the amount of the state transfer. The goal of the program was to
shift part of the cost of funding local services to the state. The increase in net property
tax revenue is an unintended consequence of the program . Judging this policy by the
criteria of providing property tax relief, the increase in net revenue represents a failure of
the policy to achieve its intended goal and a misallocation of funds.
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Other states such as New York and California may also need to consider whether
their own state-funded homestead exemptions are similarly failing to achieve their
intended purpose of reducing the property tax burden. Given the level of state funds
allocated to this type of program, these programs should be prime targets for policy
reform that would replace state-funded exemptions with more effective types of tax
relief. Georgia has already eliminated funding for the HTRC, though there is some talk
of restoring it when the state budget situation improves. Instead of returning to this
ineffective policy, it may be more effective to select an alternative form of providing
local tax relief.
The portion of the substitution effect that originates from the median voter‘s
informed preference for a higher level of services due to the lower tax price may be a
rational choice that improves taxpayers‘ welfare. From the standpoint of policy analysis,
however, this argument may be insufficient to support the use of a state-funded
homestead exemption. Facilitating additional local spending is a separate state policy
objective that could be pursued through other means that more effectively align with state
policy-makers‘ objectives. Rather than funding general local spending, state-officials are
likely to prefer specific local programs that provide benefits either regionally or at the
state level. These services can be more effectively target through restricted matching
grants that align with state-level budgetary preferences.
Within a context of limited state resources, expensive state programs that fail to
achieve their intended effect should be targets for reassessment and possible elimination.
This paper has provided some evidence that a significant share of revenue dedicated to
tax relief instead acts as a matching grant to local governments. Although the political
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objective may be to simply demonstrate that state officials are doing something to
appease voters on the issue of excessive property tax burden, there are many other means
of providing tax relief that have greater potential for actually producing the intended
results.
Circuit breakers may be more effective in ensuring that the burden of the tax does
not exceed a specific threshold for individual homeowners. Exemptions provide no such
qualification. It is also possible better target the aid to lower and moderate income
homeowners so that wealthier homeowners that are relatively in less need of state
assistance are not swept into the group of recipients. This would lower the cost of
providing tax relief. Another benefit of providing tax relief through a circuit breaker is
that by administering the tax relief through the state income tax system local government
is circumvented and the potential for a flypaper effect is eliminated. By removing a
middle agent between the originators of the policy and its intended beneficiaries the
policy may become more visible to taxpayers. As opposed to the conventional norm in
tax policymaking, increasing the visibility of this type of program may actually align with
policy-makers interests.
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CHAPTER III
MIND THE GAP: A MODEL OF PROPERTY TAX
DETERMINATION

Introduction
One of the challenges in developing a theoretical understanding of
volatility for the property tax is incorporating the degree of control that local officials
have to change the rate or the base for the tax on an annual basis. There is a fundamental
difference in the role the property tax plays in the fiscal structure of local governments
able to control the size of their annual levy versus those governments that are subject to
binding tax limitations22. In the first case the property tax can serve as the marginal
dollar of revenue that the locality raises and it is possible to offset cyclical reductions in
other revenue sources with compensating changes to the levy. Where tax limitations are
present the property tax is more likely to serve as an initial foundation for the annual
budget. In that case the levy is often set to the maximum allowed each year and other
sources such as sales receipts or revenue from fees and charges will serve as the marginal
tax dollar. There are, therefore, depending on the institutional framework of the state, at
least two different behavioral patterns that describe how local officials determine the size
of the property tax levy.

22

Joyce and Mullins (1991) define binding tax limitations as those that either limit the growth of the actual
levy or limit both the rate and the assessed value. All other forms of tax limitation can be circumvented.
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In this essay I analyze how the property tax is used by local governments in an
environment without binding tax limitations. If local officials are able to use the millage
rate and assessment practices to achieve a desired property levy, what set of rules or
behavioral patterns would they follow as they use this power? One model of property tax
rate determination is the ‗residual rule‘. Under this approach the property tax levy fills
the gap between budgeted expenditures for the year and projected receipts from all other
available revenue sources. Local officials set the property tax millage rate so that the tax
yields just enough revenue to balance the budget. An implication of adhering to this rule
is that in the event that other local revenues fall due to a recession the property tax rate
will need to be raised in order to replace the lost receipts. This behavior allows the local
government to stabilize its overall revenues by increasing the short-term volatility of the
property tax. The pursuit of stability for the local government comes at the cost of
homeowners' ability to predict their annual property tax bills.
In contrast to the ‗residual rule‘ model, an alternative model of property tax
growth predicts that receipts will grow in proportion to the property tax base. This model
predicts less volatility in the yield of the property tax and no role for the property tax in
counter-balancing cyclical volatility in the other local revenue sources.
The research objective of this paper is to compare these two models empirically in
order to determine which model more accurately describes the pattern of changes to the
millage rate and variation in the overall property tax levy. The policy implications for
following the ‗residual rule‘ approach are significant because it would demonstrate a
tradeoff between overall stability in the tax structure and the predictability of the property
tax.

Stability is a concern for ensuring the adequacy of local fiscal policy across
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economic cycles, while predictability is a concern for taxpayers who want to know their
future tax liability and for policymakers interested in the political viability of their tax
regime. The danger of following the ‗residual rule‘ is that local officials that use the
property tax to smooth their budget may surprise taxpayers with unexpected changes to
the levy and incur political costs that threaten the sustainability of financing services
through the property tax.
In this essay I focus on the volatility of the level of revenues derived from the
property tax as opposed to changes in the tax base. This differs from the traditional focus
of research into local public finance, but it is appropriate for two reasons. First, revenue
volatility is a relevant policy issue inasmuch as it becomes a source of fiscal stress during
recessions. Local control over the millage rate provides governments with a means to
compensate for cyclical drops in other revenue sources with more income elastic tax
bases. Long-term average universal assessment practices also contribute to stabilizing
local budgets by shielding the property tax base from short-term volatility in market
property values. Because the tax is only applied to the assessed value of property, the
impact of immediate spikes or drops in market values have only a muted impact on the
recognized tax base. If local officials are truly free to set any millage rate in order to
meet their budget balancing rule, then the primary consequence of a change in the base
would be a compensating change in the nominal millage rate, not a change in the level of
revenue.
A second reason to focus on the actual revenues and not the base is the issue of
tax predictability.

Predictability refers to taxpayers‘ perception of how much the

property tax levy changes from year to year and is a central factor in political opposition
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to the property tax. In Nordlinger vs. Hahn (1992), the Supreme Court case upheld
California‘s property tax because provides homeowners with greater predictability in
regards to their future property tax liability. A focus on the base would ignore the
changes to the millage rate and the levy that a budget-balancing role for the property tax
mandates. This omission consequently misses an important aspect of the tax that impacts
its long-term political feasibility.
The primary contribution of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the role
of the property tax in local tax structures during times of economic volatility. The
underlying questions asked are how do local policymakers use the property tax to
promote an adequate and stable fiscal structure and what are the implications of this
approach? The framework outlined in this paper describes an interconnected revenue
system in which the relative responsiveness of public expenditures and non-property tax
revenues to changes in personal income, along with the share of revenue provided by
property taxes, will determine the size of the shift in property levies local tax officials
will have to impose in order to comply with their budget balancing rule. This model
predicts the size and the direction of the changes to the property tax levy local officials
will make in order to offset shocks to their other revenue sources and stabilize the overall
revenue stream.
I test this budget balancing model against an alternative model that assumes that
the property levy is independent of other revenue sources and is instead determined by
growth in the tax base. Policy makers following this alternative model do not use the
property levy to stabilize their overall revenues in response to short-term economic
shocks.

I estimate both models using data from Georgia school districts and then
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generate predicted property tax levies to determine which model is able to generate more
accurate revenue projections. I find that the budget-balancing model is better able to
predict property tax revenues for the districts that have higher incomes per capita and
higher populations as well as those districts that rely on the property tax for a larger share
of their revenues.
The findings of this paper will be of interest to local tax officials because it
reveals the interrelationship and possibly a tradeoff between the pursuit of stability for
the overall revenue structure and the predictability of the property tax levy. For a local
government considering rebalancing its revenue portfolio (e.g. replacing some property
tax revenue with a sales tax) in order to pursue increased stability, this framework
provides insight into how this change will affect the future predictability of the property
tax. Voters considering such a change to the tax structure could use this information to
be better informed about the implications of the policy change on future swings in their
levies. This additional information can improve local tax design in order to better pursue
the goals of revenue adequacy and political sustainability.
Section II of this paper reviews the literature on property tax stability. Section III
develops a model of the budget-balancing role of the property tax. Section IV provides a
preliminary analysis of the pattern of property tax rate changes among counties and
school districts in the state of Georgia. Section V describes the empirical approach taken
to estimate the parameters of the framework and to test for an impact of revenue
diversification on property tax predictability. Section VI introduces the data used in the
analysis. The results of this estimation are then presented in Section VII and the post-
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estimation forecasts are discussed in Section VIII. The paper then concludes with a
discussion of future directions for this line of research.

Property Tax Stability

Several studies of the stability of state and local revenues have addressed the
property tax. The seminal paper in the stability literature is Groves and Kahn (1952), in
which the authors obtain some of the first estimates of the long-run relationship between
state revenues and personal income. The authors estimate income elasticities for various
sources of state revenue including two that are property tax related. Using Wisconsin
data, Groves and Kahn estimate the income elasticity of the general property tax base, as
well as the income elasticity of actual receipts from the property tax on utilities. The
authors report an income elasticity of .22 for the assessed values of general property and
.08 for utility property tax receipts. The authors ascribe these extremely low values to
two factors. First, they argue that changes in the value of the property tax base are due to
other causes such as population growth. Second, they argue that the effect of income on
property values will be lagged due to either deficient assessment methods or to legal
requirements that property be assessed ―at the full value which could ordinarily be
obtained therefor at private sale.‖

23

Adherence to such laws may lead assessors to

normalize their valuations of property and reduce the impact of market volatility on the
property tax base. Their results, however, were obtained using a simple log-transformed

23

Wisconsin Statues 70.31 (1). Online: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/70/32
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bi-variate regression model and no statistics on the statistical significance of these
estimates were reported.
Another early study of the stability of the property tax is found in Wilford (1965).
The author uses a regression model similar to Groves and Kahn‘s to estimate revenueincome elasticities, but employs a multivariate equation that controls for personal income
and the tax rate, rather than Groves and Kahn‘s bi-variate approach that regressed
revenues on income alone. Wilford obtains a revenue-income elasticity of 1.01 for state
property tax revenue in Texas over a period from 1947 to 1960. He also estimates
revenue elasticities with respect to per capita income. He finds that these elasticity
estimates for all the revenue sources examined are generally higher than those for
revenue alone. The property tax revenue elasticity estimate increases to 1.61 when
measured using income per capita. Wilford interprets this to indicate that ―during shortrun periods when population is relatively stable and per capita income fluctuates, the tax
structure of Texas is much less stable than one would conclude by using traditional
methods of determining stability.‖ (p. 312)

Comparing Wilford‘s results with those of

Groves and Kahn shows conflicting results on the stability of the state property tax
relative to personal income. Both studies were limited by the econometric techniques
available at the time, however, and neither set of results can really satisfy our current
questions regarding the characteristics of property taxes.
Following Groves and Kahn and Wilford, there have been many advances in the
study of stability that focused on other revenue sources.

Among these are as the

development of separate measures for short and long run income-revenue elasticities
(Williams et al. 1973; Dye and McGuire 1991), the refinement of elasticity estimation to
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account for serial correlation and asymmetric deviations from the long run equilibrium
(Sobel and Holcombe 1996; Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle 2006), and the development of a
portfolio approach to conceptualizing the overall growth/stability tradeoff of a revenue
structure (White 1983a; Misiolek and Perdue 1987a). Also important is the approach
conceptualizing revenue stability that abandons the revenue-income elasticity approach
and instead looks at the deviation of actual revenues from forecasted receipts over time
(See Dye and Merriman, 2004). The empirical content of these more recent analyses
focuses almost entirely on state-level revenue sources, particularly in determining the
relative stability of state sales and income taxes and evaluating the overall stability of the
state tax structure. These advances have not, however, been applied to examining how
overall growth and immediate shocks influence the yield of the property tax.
Multiple factors explain the relative lack of attention to the stability of the
property tax. One reason is that the frameworks used to understand revenue volatility for
sales, income and other taxes cannot be easily extended to the property tax. Gentry and
Ladd (1994) discuss this difficulty in their effort to apply the portfolio approach to
measuring the stability of alternative state and local tax structures. In their discussion of
why they exclude North Carolina‘s property tax from their analysis, they argue that
―[b]ecause local property tax revenues, especially in North Carolina, are
driven almost exclusively by the growth in local spending, our approach to
measuring growth and stability is not readily extended to local taxes. In
the context of local property taxes, the approach would yield something
close to the growth and instability of local spending rather than the growth
and instability of the tax. This link between spending growth and tax
growth presents less of a problem for state taxes…‖(p. 766)
In this statement the authors recognize one of the key features of the property tax that
distinguishes it from other local revenue sources – that in many states the tax rate on local
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property is actively changed from year to year in order to meet budgetary targets. One
way that this is done is to set the levy to be the difference between planned expenditures
for the year and expected receipts from other revenue sources. The property tax is the
revenue source that local officials have the most control over, so as expenditures grow
the property levy becomes the marginal revenue dollar used to pay for the additional
spending.

The stability of the property tax cannot be accurately studied without

accounting for way that local officials use the tax to balance their budgets.
Williams et al. (1973) discuss the property tax in their analysis of non-income
determinants of tax yield and their impact on revenue stability. They observe that in
many jurisdictions millage rates are changed almost annually. The authors argue that
there are two alternatives ways to view such a pattern of changes within the context of
stability. One approach is to eliminate the impacts of changes to the rate or the base on
the yield of a tax because they are discretionary policy changes. This view narrowly
defines stability as the variability in the yield of a fixed tax instrument with a given rate
and base with respect to income. An alternative view considers the variability of the
revenue stream without adjusting for rate changes. They observe ―that rate change may
be a frequent, acceptable practice which permits yield growth from a lagging base,
though it may cause instability. … Hence, a tax which requires frequent rate increase
ought not be judged a priori stable or slow growing if in practice such rate changes are a
regular feature of its history.‖

They support this by showing how the long-run growth

rate of tobacco and alcohol taxes was primarily the consequence of regular increases in
the respective tax rates. The essential point is that the authors recognize that for many
revenue sources, including the property tax, an analysis which only considers the base

89

misses key policy-related factors that influence the stability of the ultimate yield of the
tax.
The use of millage rate changes to compensate for slow growth in the assessed
property base is also discussed within the tax and expenditure limitation (TEL)
Literature. Some states place legal limits on the annual rate of growth for assessed
property values. Joyce and Mullins (1991) show that local officials can circumvent such
statues by regularly increasing the property tax rate. For this reason, they classify
assessment limits without accompanying limits on the millage rate or the overall levy as
non-binding constraints. Changes to the millage rate can be used to compensate for a
limited tax base, either because its growth is capped through a legal limitation or because
the income elasticity of the base is low. On the other hand, in jurisdictions with binding
tax limitations, those that either directly cap the levy or limit both the rate and the
assessed base of the tax, it is not possible for officials to adjust the millage rate to
compensate for inadequate revenues or slow growth of the tax base24.
This review of the stability literature reveals a gap in our understanding of how
the predictability of the property tax is influenced by policies which change the rate of

24

It may be necessary to use two different behavioral frameworks for viewing the stability of the property
tax based on whether the jurisdiction is subject to binding tax limitations. Whether or not a given
jurisdiction is subject to a TEL would determine whether public officials treat the property tax as their
marginal revenue dollar in their fiscal structure. A binding tax limitation, by design, leaves public officials
with little control over the yield of the tax. This lack of control would prevent local officials from
following the residual rule of levy setting. Instead, property tax revenue would be an initial ‗foundation‘
level of revenue that functions as a fixed asset in each year‘s budget. In contrast, jurisdictions that are not
subject to TELs are able to exert control over the size of the property levy each year. The opportunity to
change the millage rate annually makes the property tax the revenue source that the locality has the greatest
degree of control over and therefore causes it to become the marginal revenue dollar in local fiscal
planning.
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the tax in response to receipts from other revenues. Existing methods for measuring
revenue-income elasticities do not take this type of policy into account.
The Budgeting Role of the Property Tax

In this section I propose a model of local revenue growth that explicitly
recognizes the potential for local officials to set the property tax rate and the overall levy
in response to receipts from other revenues. I describe this behavior as adherence to the
‗residual rule‘ or the ‗budget-balancing‘ rule. As mentioned earlier, this framework
applies only to those localities that are not constrained by TEL‘s that bind the rate or the
overall property levy. The objective of this model is to depict how a change in personal
income will affect expenditures, non-property tax revenues and how the residual rule
policy then leads to a change in the property tax levy. The end result of the model is an
alternative representation of the short-run income elasticity of property tax revenue that
encompasses the pattern of rate changes that adherence to the residual rule requires.
Within this framework of property tax determination, the property levy functions
as the marginal revenue dollar used to balance the budget. Local property tax rates are
chosen so that the levy will be equal to the difference between the budgeted local
expenditures and the expected receipts from all other sources.
depicted in Figure 1.

This relationship is

This practice makes property tax growth relative to income

dependent on three factors: growth of the property tax base, the level of budgeted
expenditures, and the yield of other revenue sources.
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Figure 3.1 The Residual Rule
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The first element of Figure 3.1 is budgeted expenditures. I assume that the
budgeted level of expenditures selected by public officials is derived from an expression
of the demand for local government expenditures. The demand for local public spending
has been analyzed in the public finance literature, most notably by Borcherding and
Deacon (1972). Personal income was one of the determinants of demand they examined
and the authors reported income-elasticities for local public spending within the range of
0.2 and 1.0. These estimates indicate that local expenditures are a normal good and that
higher incomes will result in higher per-capita public spending.
The second factor in determining the budgeted property tax levy, the expected
revenues from all other sources, is also influenced by changes in real income. Local
governments with their own income and sales taxes are exposed to the revenue-income
elasticities for those sources. Intergovernmental transfers that are based on a shared and
fixed proportion of tax receipts will also vary according to these elasticities over both the
long and short run. Transfers that are determined as a local aid line item in state budgets
may be even more volatile than the overall state tax structure if local aid becomes less of
a state spending priority during periods of fiscal stress.
The difference between budgeted expenditures and expected receipts from nonproperty tax revenue sources is the budgetary gap that the property tax levy will need to
fill in order for the jurisdiction to balance its budget. The relative short-run income
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elasticities of expenditures and non-property revenue will determine how the size of the
gap changes in response to a shock to personal income. If a recession causes income to
drop and non-property revenues fall faster than the budgeted level of public spending
then the gap will widen and the property tax levy will need to be increases in order to
provide the necessary funding.
The right-hand side of Figure 1 displays the two determinants of the property
levy: the assessed property value and the property tax rate. Local officials can change
either of these two elements in order to alter the levy in response to an income shock.
Reassessing the base is an unlikely approach to respond to a short-run drop in revenue,
however, because the technical constraints of reassessing property values will take too
long to address the immediate and temporary shock to non-property tax revenues.
Another way to change the property assessment would be to alter the assessment ratio, if
the jurisdiction is legally allowed to do so under state law. An assessment ratio sets the
taxable value of a given property at a certain percentage of the market value. Changing
the ratio would be an extreme measure that would likely require a local referendum and
would likely take too long to be a suitable policy option for responding to short-run
shocks. Since the focus of the budget balancing model is on the short-run revenue
elasticity I assume for the sake of simplicity that income-driven adjustments to the tax
base occur beyond the time-horizon of the analysis.
Under the residual rule of property tax determination, the budgeted levy is the
difference between budgeted expenditures

and non-property tax revenue

This is depicted in Equation (3.1) as a balanced budget identity.
assumption of this model is that, in a given time period, both

93

and

.

The underlying
are assumed to

be functions of income

and they are independent of the property tax levy

.

After local officials have chosen their level of expenditures and have finalized their
projections of

, a millage rate is chosen that determines what the level of property

taxation will be. The short-run stability of the property tax will depend upon the relative
magnitudes of the short-run income elasticities of

and

and the resulting variation

in the budget gap.
(3.1)
Where:
is the Property Tax Levy in period t
is Budgeted Expenditures in period t
is Non-Property Tax Revenue in period t
In contrast to the budget balancing rule of property tax determination, the
alternative model that I use for comparison assumes that revenues from all sources are
determined first and then expenditures are set given the available funds. The only cause
for changing the property tax rate would be to compensate for a low long-run revenueincome elasticity of the base in order to maintain a near constant proportion of overall
revenues generated by the property tax. Local officials would not, however, adjust the
rate in response to short-term shocks to revenues. Instead they would keep the rate
constant and the short-run stability of the property tax will reflect the short-run incomeelasticity of the property tax base.
Because the budgeted levy is the difference between budgeted expenditures and
expected receipts from other sources, the impact of growth in income on the size of the
levy will depend on the income elasticity of demand for public expenditures (εBE,I) and
the income-yield elasticity of non-property tax revenues (εNP,I). The size of the change in
the levy will be equal to the difference in expenditure growth and non-tax revenue
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growth.

This occurs automatically through the local budgeting process.

The

proportional change in the levy will also depend upon the share of total revenues derived
from the property tax.
In the following discussion I demonstrate how the interaction between income
growth, expenditures and revenues operates under the budget balancing rule. I first
represent in Equation (3.2) the level of property tax in period 2 after an increase in
income relative to period 1. BE1 and NP1 represent budgeted expenditures and nonproperty tax revenues, respectively, at period 1. The percentage change in income from
period 1 to period 2 is represented as %∆I1,2. PT1 and PT2 represent the property tax levy
in each period. Equation 2 represents PT2 as the new difference between budgeted
expenditures and non-property tax revenues after both quantities have adjusted to the new
level of personal income. This adjustment is given by multiplying each by one plus the
product of their respective elasticities and the percent change in income over time.
(3.2)
To obtain the change in the property tax levy over time I subtract equation (3.1) from
(3.2) to obtain:

(3.3)
Equation (3.3) simplifies to Equation (3.4) after noting that

and

(3.4)
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I then convert to the percent change in the property tax from time period 1 by dividing
by

.

(3.5)

Dividing (3.5) by

allows us to obtain the revenue income elasticity of the

property tax for jurisdictions adhering to the budget balancing rule, as expressed in (3.6).

(3.6)
Another way of viewing Equation 3.6 is to convert the quantities to the proportion
of revenues derived from the property tax. Let S represent the share of revenues derived
from the property tax.

Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of (3.6) by

and substituting in

for S yields the following form:

(3.7)
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The property tax income elasticity described by (3.7) represents the variation in
the property tax levy caused by public officials following the budget balancing rule. The
structure of (3.7) reveals that the degree of variation is determined by the relative income
elasticities of expenditures and the non-property tax revenue. The intuition behind this is
that the relative magnitude of the elasticities determines whether the gap between
budgeted expenditures and other revenues is growing or shrinking in response to a
change in personal income. Growth in the gap would be caused either by expenditures
growing faster than the yield of non-property tax revenues, or, in the case of declining
income, other revenues falling faster than expenditures. If the gap is growing then the
property tax rate will need to be raised in order to offset the gap. The percent change in
the property tax levy required to meet the budget requirement is dependent on the share
of total revenues provided by the property tax.
Equation (3.7) enables a comparison between the budget-driven volatility of the
property tax with the stability of non-property tax revenues.

When

officials‘ budget balancing behavior will cause the property tax levy to be more elastic
than non-property tax revenues. Alternatively, if

then the property tax will

be less elastic than other revenues. This latter case is interesting because it predicts that
local governments would use the growth in their non-property tax revenues to reduce
their reliance on the property tax. This would partially negate the overall budgetary
impact of the ―automatic‖ tax increases generated by the income elastic portion of the tax
structure described by Oates (1975). Expenditures would increase with an increase in
income, but would do so according to the income elasticity of demand for public
spending, rather than the income elasticity of the non-property tax revenue sources.
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The direction of the effect of the property tax share of revenues (S) on
inverse to the relationship between
effects. If

and

is

. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the

then an increase in S reduces

. In this case, an increase in

income widens the gap between expenditures and non-property receipts. Jurisdictions
that rely on the property tax for a large share of their budget make a proportionally
smaller adjustment to the property levy to compensate for the other slow-growing
sources. Governments that have diversified away from the property tax would need to
make a larger percent change to the property levy to compensate for the drop in other
revenues. As S approaches unity

converges on a lower limit of

.

Table 3.1 Effect of the Tax Share (S) on
Direction of Change in S (εE,I> εNP,I)
Increase S
Reduce εP,I
Decrease S
Increase εP,I

(εE,I< εNP,I)
Increase εP,I
Reduce εP,I

Reversing the relationship to

(εE,I= εNP,I)
Share is irrelevant
Share is irrelevant

causes an increase in S to raise the

income elasticity of the property tax. For values of S less than 1

will be less than

, but it will converge on the budgeted expenditure elasticity as S goes to 1. More
interestingly, as S decreases the income elasticity of the property tax declines and at a
certain point can become negative. In this case a drop in income may result in officials
raising the property tax levy in order to compensate for a drop in other revenues. For
example, a school district that is highly dependent on state grants may need to
significantly raise the property tax rate if the grants are drastically cut during a recession
if it is to avoid major spending reductions.
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Lastly, if εE,I is equal to εNP,I then the property tax share falls out of Equation 3.7
entirely. In this case the other revenues grow in proportion to expenditures and the rate
of the property tax is managed such that the revenue shares are held constant.
This model of property tax determination describes how local officials would set
the levy if they follow the budget-balancing rule. The remainder of this paper seeks to
test empirically whether there is any supporting evidence that this type of behavior
actually exists.
Preliminary Analysis
The previous discussion outlined one possible model for determining the rate and
the overall levy of the property tax. The key feature of the budget-balancing model is
that the level of the tax is set in response to budgeted expenditures and expected receipts
from other revenue sources. The alternative hypothesis that I consider in this analysis is
that the property tax is set independently of other factors. Instead, the primary factor in
changing the millage rate is to offset a relatively income-inelastic property base.
Williams et al. (1973) indicate that an income inelastic revenue source would require
regular rate increases in order to maintain adequate yield in proportion to the long-run
growth of the fiscal structure. In contrast, the millage rate of the tax in a jurisdiction
adhering to the budget-balancing rule would be expected to show a greater degree of
variation as officials respond to short run shocks to income.
A visual inspection of the pattern of property tax rate changes in Georgia shows a
considerable variation in millage rates over time. Figure 3.2 displays data from 185
school districts in Georgia from 1999-2007. There are actually only 180 school districts
in Georgia, but five independent school districts span two counties and assess different
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property tax rates in each. This graph is a histogram of the number of times each county
changed its millage rate over the nine-year period. Twenty-four school districts changed
their millage rate all eight years over this period. Thirty-two districts changed the rate all
but one of those years and another thirty districts changed their rate in all but two of these
years. Three districts kept their rates constant over the entire period. Regular changes to
the millage rate are not necessarily evidence that the property tax is used to adjust for
expenditure growth if these changes are done merely to compensate for a slow growing
base, as described by Joyce and Mullins (1991). It would be expected, however, that if
compensating for an inelastic base were the primary motivation for changing the rate then
most rate changes would be positive.
Figure 3.2

Frequency of Property Tax Rate Changes in Georgia
School Districts 1999-2007
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Figure 3.3 depicts the same millage rate changes listed in Figure 3.21, but they
separate out the increases from the reductions in the rates. Figure 3.3 shows that the
positive and negative rate changes in the school districts are similarly distributed with a
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left-skewed shape, though the reductions have a fatter right-side tail. The overall change
counts, however, show that, across all 185 districts, the tax rates were increased 386
times and reduced 543 times. These counts indicate that reductions to the property tax
rate occur with similar, if not greater frequency as rate hikes. This pattern does not
appear consistent with the explanation that rate changes are primarily driven by the need
to compensate for an inelastic property tax base.
Figure 3.3

Property Tax Rate Changes in Georgia School Districts 19992007
By Direction of Change
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Reductions

One caveat to this analysis of the rate changes is that these numbers do not
account for the size of the change, only the direction. If the rate reductions are relatively
small in comparison to the rate increases the overall pattern would fit a policy of
adjustment for a lagging base. Also, there are other factors that may cause a rate
reduction other than adherence to the budget balancing rule. In Georgia the adoption of
the Local Option Sales Tax required the local governments to ‗roll back‘ their property
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tax levies dollar for dollar for their sales tax receipts. The Georgia Municipal
Association summarized the manner that the rollback is computed:
―…[E]ach jurisdiction‘s governing authority must calculate the millage
rate necessary to produce property tax revenues which, combined with
other local revenues, would generate sufficient funds to cover the
jurisdiction‘s general fund expenditures for that year. The millage rate is
reduced by the amount that would produce an amount equal to that
jurisdiction‘s LOST distribution from the previous year. The remainder is
the millage rate that is used to calculate property tax bills. ‖ (Georgia
Municipal Association 2011 pp. 1)
In practice, however, local governments can choose the initial millage rate for the year so
that the post-rollback rate generates the desired level of property tax revenue.

Also,

after the initial rollback has been implemented the future rollbacks will be much smaller;
the first rollback adjusts for the entire new revenues stream while subsequent rollbacks
adjust for growth in the existing revenue source.
This basic analysis of property tax rate changes is not conclusive evidence that
local officials are setting the rate according to the balanced budget rule, but they are
suggestive that this type of behavior may be a factor in the determination of local levies.
The following section presents a more thorough analytical approach to identifying this
effect.
Empirical Approach
In order to test the validity of the budget-balancing property tax framework, I
generate two sets of short-run income elasticites for the property tax. The first will be
calculated using the budget balancing model of property tax determination. The second
income elasticity is estimated using the comparison model in which local officials make
no adjustments to the millage rate in order to compensate for short-run shocks to other
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revenue sources. Under this approach the tax rate is assumed to be held constant in the
near term and the short-run variability of the property tax levy solely determined the
variability of the property tax base.

Using both sets of elasticities I will generate

forecasts of the property tax levy given actual changes of income and compare the two
models on their predictive power.
I will first estimate the key parameters of Equation (3.7) by performing separate
estimates of εE,I and εNP,I for school districts in Georgia. These estimates will be taken
over a subset of the panel data I possess. I will then use the estimates of the elasticities
along with the actual changes to personal income to generate predicted values for the
property levy over the remainder of the time series. I will then generate alternative
predicted values for the property tax levy in which the levy is independent of other
revenues and is dependent on changes in the property tax base and other economic
characteristics.
To estimate the elasticity parameters, I adapt the methodology employed by Sobel
and Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et. al (2006), though with some key differences. In both
of these papers, the authors had access to long time series of data of approximately 40
years for their respective tax bases. Bruce et. al were able to estimate their model
separately for each state, while Sobel and Holcombe only needed to estimate one model
for their national aggregate of state tax bases. The data available for this analysis covers
a shorter time span (1998 – 2009) and it was therefore not be possible to run separate
time-series models for each local jurisdiction. On the other hand, the panel of school
districts I have developed covers 159 separate districts. A greater number of crosssectional units may compensate for the shorter period of observation.
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Both Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et. al (2006) employ Error Corrected Models
(ECM) to estimate short-run revenue-income elasticities. An ECM model is employed
when it is possible that the long-run effect of a change in income may not be fully
realized on yield of a tax until after an adjustment period. ―[S]tability between tax bases
and personal income need not hold in the short run; any differences between short and
long-run income elasticities create deviations between the long-run equilibrium base and
the current period base.‖ (Bruce et. al 2006, pg 319) The difference between the current
level of the tax base and its long-run value can be measured using the current-period error
term from an estimate of the long run income elasticity. It is therefore necessary to first
estimate the long-run income-revenue elasticity and then use the residuals from that
regression to inform the estimation of the short-run elasticity.
The long-run revenue income elasticity was estimated by both Holcombe (1996)
and Bruce et. al (2006) using Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Models (DOLS) . These
models use leads and lags of changes to the explanatory variable to correct for serial
correlation. The structure of the DOLS model is shown below:
(3.8)
I estimate equation (3.8) using both expenditures and non-property tax revenues as the
dependent variable.

The

term represents district-level personal income.

The

operator indicates the first difference over time. Sobel and Holcombe indicate that
typically five sets of leads and lags are used in DOLS, but due to the relatively shorter
time series in this panel I only use two degrees of leads and lags. At two degrees the
second set of leads and lags were no longer statistically significant.
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After Equation (3.8) is estimated for both expenditures and non-property tax
revenues the residuals are retained to create the error correction term. The current period
residual is given in Equation (3.9).
(3.9)
The ECM model controls for the deviation from the long-run equilibrium that exists at
the beginning of the period. It does this by including the error term from the previous
period,

, as shown below:
(3.10)

The

term is the short-run revenue elasticity. The

term represents the percent

reduction in the deviation from the long-run equilibrium that occurs each period over
time.
An implicit assumption of the ECM model described by (10) is that the
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is a symmetric response whether the jurisdiction is
currently above or below the long-term equilibrium. Bruce et. al (2006) relax this
assumption and allow asymmetric responses by introducing an indicator term (DB) that
measures whether the deviation was positive or negative. This asymmetric ECM model
is given below.

(11)
Where
The first term,

if

and 0 otherwise

, allows for a test of whether the short-run response to a change in

income is more elastic when revenues are above their long-run equilibrium.

105

The final step in constructing a residual-rule revenue elasticity for the property tax
is to take the short-run elasticity estimates for expenditures and non-property tax
revenues and combine them with school district property tax shares to complete the
formula given in Equation (3.7).
I also estimate the short-run revenue elasticity of the property tax bases using
assessed property values as the dependent variable in equations (3.8) and (3.11). This
short-run elasticity represents the alternative model of property tax determination, in
which the levy is expected to grow in proportion to assessed property value.
Data

This analysis is performed using data from Georgia school districts from 1998
through 2009. Each of the 159 counties in Georgia has a county school district. There
are also several other independent school districts in Georgia that align with municipal
boundaries.

Because of the difficulty in obtaining comparable income data for the

independent districts I have omitted them from this analysis.
The data for this study were obtained from several sources. Information on the
actual receipts and expenditures of the school districts, as well as the property tax millage
rates were obtained from the Georgia Department of Education. Information on the
assessed values of the property tax bases was obtained from the Georgia Department of
Revenue. Personal income data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis within the
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U.S. Department of Commerce25. All dollar amounts were inflation adjusted to 19831984 dollars with the Bureau of Labor Statistics South Region CPI Index.
I measure expenditures using the total operating expenditures for each school
district for the fiscal year. Non-property tax revenue is all revenue coming from local,
state or federal sources, minus ad-valorem property tax receipts. The largest source of
school funding is the Quality Basic Education (QBE) grant program. This is a state aid
program that is a combination of a foundation grant with an equalization grant. For
further explanation of the specifics of Georgia‘s education funding programs see
Rubenstein and Sjoquist (2003). The QBE program provides approximately one-third of
primary and secondary education funding for county school districts over this period.
The property tax is the second most prominent source of education funding. It
delivers approximately a quarter of school funds. One potential concern for this analysis
is that the State of Georgia has placed a statutory cap on school district millage rates of
20 mills. This cap can be overridden, however, with the approval of local voters. If the
cap were binding it would restrict the ability of local officials to apply the budget
balancing rule. In 2007 three school districts had property tax rates that were higher than
20 mills and four counties had property tax rates that were at the limit. Figure 3.4 is a
histogram of property tax rates for 2007. The average property tax rate for that year was
14.88 mills and the median rate was 14.942 mills. I therefore conclude that the statutory

25

Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce

CA1-3 Footnotes http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/footnotes.cfm?tablename=CA1-3
Regional Economic Information System
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limit is not a significant enough deterrent to raise the tax rate above 20 mills that it
significantly affects the distribution of the tax rates.
Figure 3.4

Distribution of Millage Rates for Georgia
School Districts in 2007
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Aside from the property tax and the QBE grants, school districts in Georgia rely
on a variety of other revenue sources. Additional local own-source funding comes from
the Local Option Sales Tax, fees from the sale of breakfasts, lunches and textbooks,
appropriations from city or county governments, tuition charges for students from outside
the school district and local fundraisers. Some local school districts also receive revenue
from additional sales taxes on top of the LOST. The State provides additional revenue on
top of the QBE grants. These funds come from lottery receipts, nutrition grants, and ‗on
behalf‘ payments that go to employee benefit systems.

The federal government sends

direct grants that fund nutrition programs as well as additional funding that is disbursed
through the Georgia Department of Education. The final revenue stream comes through
miscellaneous financial sources such as the issuance of bonds and the sales of fixed
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assets. Figure 3.5 displays the aggregate revenue shares from each source from 19992007.
Figure 3.5.

Georgia County School District Revenue Sources
1999-2007
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Long and Short Run Elasticity Estimates

The discussion of the estimation results is divided into two sections. The first part
will present the estimation of the residual-rule elasticities. The latter part discusses the
naïve model of property tax determination in which the levy grows in proportion to the
property tax base.
Residual-Rule Elasticity Estimates
In this section I will first discuss the income elasticity estimates for expenditures
and non-property tax revenues. I then discus the residual-rule computation of the income
elasticity of the property tax.
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Table 3.2 provides a summary of the long and short-run elasticity estimates
obtained from Equations 3.8, 3.10 and 3.11. This table displays the income elasticity
estimates for expenditures and non-property tax revenues – the two sets of income
elasticities needed to compute the budget-balancing version of the property tax income
elasticity. This table also displays the income elasticities for the property tax base which
are used for the alternative model. These estimates are average elasticities for all county
school districts in Georgia. Both expenditures and non-property tax revenues exhibit
income elasticities close to unity, with expenditures being slightly more income sensitive
than non-property revenues. The value of 0.855 for the long-run non-property tax
revenue revenue-income elasticity is close to similar long-run elasticity estimates for
sales tax receipts reported by Holcombe and Sobel (0.691) and by Bruce et. al (0.811).
Both of the long-run estimates are statistically significant. I calculated 95% confidence
intervals for both long-run elasticity estimates and found that the difference between the
two estimates is statistically significant as well. Table 3.3 presents greater detail on the
estimated coefficients from the long-run regressions.
I estimated both the symmetric and asymmetric specifications for the short-run
elasticities. These are given in Table 3.4. The symmetric variant of the short-run
expenditure-income elasticity yielded an estimate of 0.765. This short-run expenditure
elasticity is slightly lower than the long-run elasticity, suggesting that school district
spending is less-sensitive to immediate income shocks than the overall growth trend, but
the difference between the elasticities is not statistically significant. Allowing for an
asymmetric response, expenditures exhibit short-run income elasticities of 0.641 when
below the long-run average and 1.008 when above the average. Both the above and
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below estimates are statistically significant and therefore are evidence of an asymmetric
response. Changes to the level of public school spending appear to be more responsive to
changes in income in years that spending is above its long-run equilibrium.
Table 3. 2 Summary of Estimated Income Elasticities
Equation Mean
Expenditures Elasticities
Long-run Expenditures elasticity
Short-run Expenditures elasticity (symmetric)
Short-run Expenditures elasticity above equilibrium
Short-run Expenditures elasticity below equilibrium

T Statistic

(8) 0.952*
(10) 0.765*
(11) 1.008*
(11) 0.641**

(40.24)
(3.74)
(3.54)
(2.59)

Non-Property Tax Revenue Elasticities
Long-run Non-Property Tax Revenue elasticity
Short-run Non-Property tax elasticity (symmetric)
Short-run Non-Property tax Elasticity above
equilibrium
Short-run Non-Property tax Elasticity below
equilibrium

(8)
(10)

0.855*

(52.68)

0.324+

(1.97)

0.173

(0.76)

0.412+

(1.823)

0.950*

(53.41)

0.377*

(3.94)

0.875*

(6.41)

-0.234+

(-1.91)

(11)
(11)

Alternative Model – Property Tax Base Elasticities
(8)

Long-run Property Tax Base elasticity
Short-run Property tax elasticity (symmetric)
Short-run Property Tax Base elasticity above
equilibrium
Short-run Property Tax base elasticity below
equilibrium

(10)
(11)
(11)

The short-run non-property tax revenue income elasticity is less-than half of the
long-run elasticity. The symmetric estimate is statistically significant and indicates that a
one-percent increase in personal income is associated with a 0.324 percent increase in
revenues. The asymmetric elasticity is not statistically significant when revenues are
above their long-run average. One factor that may explain the short-run stability of nonproperty tax revenues is the large portion of school funding that comes from the state
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QBE program. A portion of the grant program designed to provide a foundation level of
funding that reflects the cost of providing an education. Although this cost should only
be affected by the long-run rate of income growth, the state legislature sets annually in
the budget what the cost assumptions will be. This allows legislators to take into account
the budgetary impact of the cost assumptions and adjust the level of QBE funding
according to economic conditions (Ross Rubenstein and Sjoquist 2003).
Table 3.3 Long-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates
(1)
(2)
Non-Property
VARIABLES
Expenditures
Tax Revenues
Log of I
First Lag of ΔI
Second Lag of ΔI
First Lead of ΔI
Second Lead of ΔI
Constant

0.952*
(40.243)
-0.722+
(-1.792)
-2.366*
(-6.560)
-0.237
(-0.710)
-0.158
(-0.421)
5.288*
(18.430)

Observations
1,260
R-squared
0.902
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

(3)
Net Assessed
Property Value

0.855*
(52.688)
-1.263*
(-5.021)
-0.843*
(-3.394)
-0.428+
(-1.836)
0.198
(0.778)
5.988*
(29.964)

0.950*
(53.409)
0.460
(1.214)
-0.307
(-0.921)
0.968*
(3.211)
0.521
(1.593)
8.004*
(36.104)

1,237
0.939

1,270
0.917

I have computed short-run property tax income elasticities using the estimates of
the short-run income elasticities of school district expenditures and non-property tax
revenues. These are computed by applying Equation (3.7) to the estimates.
It was necessary to make an adjustment to the calculation of the property tax share
due to an influential number of records with missing or erroneous data on property
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tax receipts. Rather than using the data on actual property tax receipts, I computed the
statutory levy, which is the amount that the local officials legally obligate taxpayers to
pay when they set the tax rate. The statutory levy is calculated by multiplying the
property tax rate by the net assessed property value. The difference between the statutory
levy and actual receipts is the uncollected property tax for the year less any receipts from
previous years. It could be argued that using the statutory levy is a superior measure for
the tax share calculation as it is the actual policy target of local officials while actual
receipts are an uncertain quantity.
Table 3.4 Short-Run Revenue Income Elasticity Estimates
Symmetric Error Correction
Asymmetric Error Correction
Models
Models
Non Property
Non-Property
VARIABLES
Expenditures
Tax Revenue
Expenditures
Tax Revenue
ΔI

0.765*
(3.747)
-0.154*
(-9.977)

ECT

0.324+
(1.970)
-0.260*
(-9.078)

0.641**
(2.599)
-0.239*
(-8.512)

0.412+
(1.823)
-0.212*
(-5.469)

0.367
(1.111)

-0.238
(-0.763)

0.021*
(3.631)

0.150*
(4.618)
0.078*
(13.516)

-0.078
(-1.402)
0.027*
(4.095)

1,234
0.130

1,259
0.094

1,234
0.133

Above LR
Average*ΔI
Above LR
Average*ECT
Constant

0.091*
(19.578)

Observations
1,259
R-squared
0.081
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

For S I use the average ratio of the property tax levy to total revenues across the
159 county school districts between 1999 through 2007. In order to compute a measure
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of central tendency for the computed property tax elasticity it is necessary to account for
the algebraic properties of random variables.


I treat the mean property tax share as a scalar since it is an observed characteristic of the
population of counties over this period. I assume that the estimates of the elasticities for
expenditures and non-property tax revenues are independently distributed normal
variables. The mean of the calculated property tax elasticity is simply computed by
substituting the value of S and the estimates of

and

in to Equation (3.7). I

calculated the variance by taking the variances of the estimates of

and

from

the variance-covariance matrices of their respective regression equations and calculating
the following value:

Table 3.5 displays the results of the computations. Two sets of elasticity
computations were made using the symmetric and asymmetric elasticity estimates,
respectively. Four elasticities can be computed using the asymmetric results because
there are four possible combinations of the expenditure and non-property tax revenue
elasticities depending on whether each value was above or below its long-run average.
Only a single computation is made using the symmetric estimates.
The revenue-rule computations of the short-run income elasticity of the property
tax are higher than the elasticity estimate for both expenditures and non-property tax
revenues. The symmetric estimates yield an elasticity of 2.44 while the values generated
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from the asymmetric estimates range from 1.51 to 4.18. The income elasticity
computations are higher when either expenditures or non-property tax revenues are above
their long-run averages. This suggests that the most active ‗residual rule‘ adjustments to
the rate tend to occur when revenues and spending are above their long-run trend and a
downward adjustment is imminent.
Table 3. 5 Short-Run Income Elasticity Computations for the Property Tax Using
the Budget Balancing Rule
Symmetric Short-Run Elasticities
Mean
2.44
Variance
1.61
Asymmetric Short Run Elasticities
Non-Property Tax Revenue
Expenditures
Below
Above
Below
Mean
1.51
2.42
Variance
2.62
2.65
Above
Mean
3.27
4.18
Variance
3.09
3.12

Property Tax Base Elasticities
I have estimated the long and short-run income elasticities of assessed net
property values for all county school districts in Georgia and the results are displayed in
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6. These estimates are used to generate a comparison set of
property tax revenue projections in the following section. The elasticity estimates
themselves are of some interest, however. The long-run income elasticity of assessed
property values is nearly the same as the expenditure income elasticity and greater than
the non-property tax revenue elasticity. This result is contrary to the conventional
understanding that growth in the assessed value of the property tax base is slower than
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the rate of income growth. If over the long run assessed values track income growth then
there would be little need for regular rate adjustments to compensate for low long-run
income-elasticities.
Table 3.6 Short-Run Elasticity Estimates for Net Assessed Property Value
Property Tax Base
VARIABLES

Symmetric

Asymmetric

ΔI

0.377*
(3.937)
-0.013
(-1.558)

-0.234+
(-1.912)
-0.045**
(-2.531)
1.109*
(6.819)

ECT
Above LR Average*ΔI
Above LR
Average*ECT
Constant

0.060*
(20.241)

Observations
1,111
R-squared
0.016
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1

0.010
(0.348)
0.059*
(14.118)
1,111
0.051

The symmetric short-run elasticity appears to indicate that assessed values are
relatively inelastic to immediate changes to income. Allowing for an asymmetric
response reveals, however that when assessed values are above their long-run equilibrium
the short-run response is only slightly lower (0.875) than the long-run elasticity. In
contrast, when assessed values are below their long-run equilibrium they actually have an
inverse relationship with income changes over the short-run. This large divergence in the
short-run elasticities is likely influenced by the highly volatile housing market over the
most recent recession and a relatively long delay in adjusting assessments to falling
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housing prices. Assessments may have been just catching up with the rapid rise in
property values over the middle of the first decade of the 2000‘s and were continuing to
rise even as incomes were beginning to fall with the onset of the recession. Table 3.5
gives full details on the short-run estimates for the property tax assessments.
Post-Estimation
The objective of this post-estimation exercise is to generate two sets of
predictions of the property tax levy and observe which model is more accurate. If the set
of projections generated using the residual rule of property tax determination is a better
predictor then this will provide empirical support for the argument that county officials
are setting their levies in response to receipts from other revenue sources and their
budgeted expenditures.
I calculate the revenue-rule elasticity
district/year record with the estimates of
revenue share for the year

using Equation (3.7) for each school
and

and the counties‘ property tax

. This is in contrast to the aggregate calculation of

performed in the previous section that used the average value of
years.

After computing

I

across all districts and

for each county using Equation (3.7) I calculate the

predicted property tax levy according to the residual rule using the following formula:
(3.12)
I then take the difference between the projected levy at time t with the actual levy for that
time period.

I divide this difference by the current period levy to get the percent

difference of the projection from the levy. For the comparison, I generate a predicted
levy using the assessed property tax base income elasticity as follows:
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(3.13)
I compute the percent difference of the comparison levy from the actual levy in the same
fashion as I did for the residual-rule levy.
The projections were computed for the years 2000 through 2007. Table 3.7
presents the mean, median and confidence intervals for the percent differences of the
projections from the actual levies.

The projections were computed using both the

symmetric and the asymmetric sets of elasticity estimates. The point-values for the
average difference between the predicted value and the actual value are smaller for the
residual-rule projections using both the symmetric and the asymmetric approaches. The
difference in means is statistically significant; therefore on average the residual rule
model provides a better fit to the actual levies than the comparison model.
Table 3.7 Years of Superior Fit Using the Residual Rule Model, by County
Count of Districts
Years
Symmetric Asymmetric
3
3
0
12
12
1
22
26
2
32
36
3
25
22
4
22
21
5
20
24
6
18
13
7
5
2
8

Looking at the average difference across all counties obscures much of the unitlevel variation in the performance of the predictors.

Another way to look at the

projections is to examine the frequency with which the residual-rule projection fares
better than the assessment-driven model. Figure 3.5 displays the annual percentage of
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school district levies that were more accurately predicted using the residual rule model.
Over the eight years displayed the residual rule was a better predictor for more than half
of the counties for only four years. There appears to be a slight upward trend in the
percentages, suggesting that the residual-rule approach to setting the property tax rate
may have been more prevalent in the later half of the time series.
Figure 3.6.
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One important piece of information that the annual percentages do not convey is
whether it is the same districts every year following the residual rule, or whether having a
superior fit is more randomly distributed across the district/year units of observation. I
investigate this issue by counting the number of years for each school district that the
residual rule model gave a better fit and then examining the frequency of the counts
across the population of school districts. Table 3.8 gives a frequency of the year counts
for both the symmetric and the asymmetric projections. Looking at frequencies from the
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symmetric set of estimations, I observe that 5 counties had a better fit with the residual
rule model over all eight years of the projection period. Nearly 41% of counties were
more accurately fit by the residual rule model for five or more years of the period. This
suggests that these counties levy-setting behavior appears to be more accurately
described by the residual rule model of property tax determination, rather than a incomeadjusted tax base model. The projections from the asymmetric model depict a similar
pattern, though those projections are also slightly less accurate predictors.
Table 3.8 Comparison of Projection Accuracies
Mean
Std
Dev
Symmetric Elasticities
Residual-Rule Projection
Comparison Levy
Projection
Asymmetric Elasticities
Residual-Rule Projection
Comparison Levy
Projection

Median

Lower 95%
CL For
Mean

Upper 95%
CL For
Mean

0.013
0.064

0.115
0.074

0.017
0.052

0.007
0.06

0.02
0.068

0.002
0.064

0.138

0.01

-0.009

0.006

0.074

0.052

0.06

0.068

The next question is whether the districts that receive a better fit through the
residual rule model have different characteristics than the other districts. Table 3.9
provides summary statistics for all school districts both in aggregate and broken out by
whether the model gave a superior fit for 5 or more years. This table shows that those
school districts with five or more years of superior fit have, on average, a higher income
per capita and have a higher population density than the districts with a poorer fit.
Additionally, the better fit districts also have larger property tax shares. Returning to
Table 3.1, which describes how changing S will affect
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, helps describe what the

difference in the tax share means. When the expenditure income elasticity is greater than
the non-property tax revenue elasticity then a larger S will reduce the magnitude of the
changes to the property tax needed to adhere to the residual rule. So the districts with the
largest tax shares would be making proportionally smaller changes to their levies in
response to expenditures and other revenues. For jurisdictions with a smaller S, the
political cost of making the proportionally large changes to their levies needed to adhere
to the rule may be too high. It makes sense then that the districts with the lowest political
cost of following the rule exhibit fiscal behavior that is better predicted by this model.
Table 3.9 Demographics by Model Fit
N
Variable
Mean
Obs
All
Districts

Four or
Fewer
Years

Five or
More
Years

159

94

65

Population
Density
Income Per
Capita
Property Tax
Share
Population
Density
Income Per
Capita
Property Tax
Share
Population
Density
Income Per
Capita
Property Tax
Share

Median

189.4

63.35

Lower
95% CL
for Mean
129.07

Upper
95% CL
for Mean
249.72

$27,896

$27,034

$27,050

$28,741

23.0%

21.0%

22.0%

25.0%

85.71

37.63

42.72

128.69

$25,847

$25,127

$24,977

$26,717

19.0%

18.0%

18.0%

21.0%

339.35

151.56

212.15

466.55

$30,859

$29,580

$29,487

$32,231

29.0%

27.0%

26.0%

33.0%

Final Discussion
The ability to identify empirically which local governments implement the
residual rule of property tax determination raises other questions that should be the topic
of future research. The first step would be to move from identification of the policy to
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evaluating its effectiveness and overall impact on local fiscal structures. The underlying
objective of following the residual rule is to balance the budget by offsetting cyclical
shocks to other revenue sources. It would be interesting to investigate whether local
governments that follow this approach have a more stable fiscal structure in aggregate. Is
there a tradeoff between a more stable overall structure and a predictable property tax
levy? One way to address this would be to construct a panel over a longer time period so
that the elasticities could be estimated for each jurisdiction individually. Then the
residual-rule property tax elasticity could be used in a second stage analysis as an
explanatory variable for a regression on overall revenue stability. This would be one
potential approach to evaluating the policy's effectiveness in promoting local stability.
Another interesting question is how continued revenue diversification would
affect the predictability of the property tax in jurisdictions that use this approach to
setting their levies. In the case of Georgia, where the short-run expenditure elasticity was
higher than the non-property tax revenue elasticity, further reductions in S would increase
the size of the changes in the levy needed to follow the residual rule. This may lead
jurisdictions to abandon the rule, potentially losing the ability to smooth the performance
of their overall revenues, or continue with the rule and further reduce the predictability of
the property tax at an unknown political cost. On the other hand, there may be
jurisdictions where non-property tax revenues are more income elastic than expenditures
which could cause a reduction in S to actually stabilize the property tax levy.
It may also be interesting to further investigate how the tools of investment
management may be used to account for characteristics of the property tax within a
portfolio of revenue sources. Gentry and Ladd‘s (1994) critique that the property tax
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defies the traditional portfolio approach to modeling revenue stability may be weakened
if the structure of the residual rule can be incorporated into the characteristics of the
revenue portfolio. The model presented in this paper provides an approach to predicting
the pattern of rate changes enacted by local officials over economic cycles. Incorporating
this information into a portfolio model may produce revenue structure recommendations
that improve the overall stability of local finances.
Within the context of public financial management, this essay also identifies a
policy regime that local jurisdictions lose access to when they implement property tax
limitations. As discussed earlier, it is not possible to follow the residual rule when tax
rates and overall levies are capped. The residual rule is one of the channels that the
tradeoff between predictability and stability may be made. Future research on whether
the residual rule increases overall stability will highlight exactly what tax-limited
jurisdictions are giving up.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTRACT DESIGN FOR EXTREME OUTSOURCING: A CASE
STUDY OF SANDY SPRINGS, GA

Introduction
The rise of the contract city as a new form of municipal governance presents
many thorny issues for the theory and practice of public management. The contract city
model is an extreme form of municipal outsourcing in which the city enters into
comprehensive private partnerships for the production of the majority of municipal
functions. On the practitioner side, cities adopting this model of service delivery see the
role of the city manager shift from administering public resources to monitoring and
enforcing contracts (Prager 2008). For researchers interested in the theory of public
contract management, this form of government challenges the conventional approach to
studying internal vs. external production decisions. The question shifts from whether a
single service function is a candidate for external production (see for example Levin &
Tadelis, 2007), to whether a large set of service delivery and managerial functions can be
outsourced at once. A key difference between the two models of governance is that
rather than evaluating the economic merits of outsourcing each function individually,
contract city managers choose the overall service delivery regime and contract for an
array of services. Additionally, limited competition in the market for the private
production of municipal functions, forces contract city officials to evaluate bids from a
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small set of potential service providers who are willing and able to undertake the
production of the bulk of municipal functions.
In this essay I investigate the implications that the contract city model of
governance has for contract management. It raises questions such as: does the scope of
this type of public-private partnership facilitate interactions between outsourced functions
that create greater contract management problems than would have otherwise existed if
the services were provided by different partners? Are there synergies among certain
municipal functions that when they are outsourced together increase the difficulty of
contract management by creating the potential for conflicts of interest? Does the design
of the actual contracts between contract cities and their private partners reflect the unique
managerial challenges that could arise with this scale of outsourcing?
I investigate these questions through a case study of the initial contracts signed by
the city of Sandy Springs, Georgia with its primary contractor, the private firm CH2M
Hill. I identify three key categories of municipal functions that are interrelated and, when
outsourced to a single private partner, create the potential for a conflict of interest. These
three functional categories are: 1) the production of direct services, 2) the creation of
managerial and financial information and 3) administrative and control functions. My
analysis of the contract documents indicates that combining this broad scope of services
in a single public-private partnership creates the potential for ―negative synergies‖ which
raise the cost of monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be
required if the functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors. I also
identify beneficial structures that can counteract some of the adverse incentives created
by the scope of the contracts. These features would not be present in the contracts
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associated with traditional municipal public-private partnerships that do not exhibit the
same scope of outsourcing. The identification of these interrelationships between
municipal functions can inform the design of contracts, especially when determining how
contract cities should allocate functions across various private partners.
This essay begins with a review of the literature covering the local government
outsourcing and the contract city model of public management. Section III introduces the
city of Sandy Springs and gives some background on how its public-private partnership
with CH2M Hill was developed. Section IV discusses the textual analysis approach that I
employ to examine the contracts for services. Section V presents the findings from my
analysis and Section VI offers the conclusions and policy recommendations from my
analysis.
Before commencing I must emphasize that this analysis is confined to the
incentives that are embedded within the contracts and the potential behaviors that they
may encourage. In no way does this study examine any actual behaviors on the part of
CH2M Hill and does not imply that any action has at any time been taken in conflict of
interest with respect to the City of Sandy Springs. The objective of this analysis is to
inform both public and private partners on some of the potential pitfalls in this new form
of municipal administration. I also hope to provide information of academic value on
how the principal-agent relationship operates within the context of the contract city
model of governance.
The Contract City
The contract city is an alternative model of municipal governance that is
characterized by the outsourcing of nearly all city functions. Services in contract cities

126

are either produced through arrangements with other nearby local governments, as in the
case of Highlands, California (see Ni, 2010), or through public-private partnerships with
for-profit firms and non-profit organizations. Contracts may be secured with multiple
partners or with a single firm that provides the bulk of services and may employ multiple
sub-contractors. The key distinction between a contract city and other municipalities
which engage in outsourcing is the scale of this activity. Bradbury and Waechter (2009)
describe it as an ―all but the top‖ approach to outsourcing where merely a few key
managerial positions and their support staff remain as direct city employees.
Current research into contract cities has identified a variety of ways in which this
form of service delivery challenges much of the framework for understanding contract
management in cities which only outsource a small share of their functions. One key
difference is that the nature of the work involved in administering the operation of a city
changes when all service production functions are performed externally. Prager (2008)
finds in his analysis of the city of Weston, Florida that the role of a contract city manager
is ―monitoring contracts and taking measures in those instances when a contractor‘s
performance fails to meet expectations.‖ In contrast, the city manager‘s role in a
traditionally structured city primarily consists of the direct management of human and
physical resources.
Another key feature of many contract cities is that they adopted this model at the
time of their incorporation, rather than shifting to it from a traditional own-source
production regime. The city of Highlands, CA was designed from its inception to obtain
essentially all of its services through contracts with other nearby local governments (Ni
2010). Similarly, the cities of Sandy Springs, GA and Weston, FL contracted with
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private firms and with other local governments for the entirety of their services at the
time of their incorporations.
The decision-making process for whether to pursue a self-producing or contract
city service production regime is categorically different than the traditional make-or-buy
decision that is studied in the existing contracting literature. The traditional approach
applies transaction cost economics to determine whether it would be efficient to
outsource an individual city function (e.g. Brown & Potoski, 2003b). Levin and Tadaelis
(2007) follow this line of research as they test their hypothesis that there are economies
of scope for contract management. They estimate that ―a given service is 3-5% more
likely to be privatized if a city privatizes one additional other service.‖ While scope
economies may encourage cities to shift gradually into contract-intensive production
regimes, this framework is based on a marginal analysis of each service function and
does not explain why newly formed cities with no history of contract management
experience would outsource essentially their entire operations to private partners.
Bradbury and Waechter identify the role of ideology as an important factor behind
the initial decision to employ a contract city model during the incorporation of Weston,
Florida. Rather than performing a rational analysis and calculating the relative costs of
the make-or-buy alternatives for all service areas, the decision was influenced by an
underlying belief that outsourcing would generate cost savings and improve operations.
The authors report that after several years of operation some functions were eventually
shifted to internal production, such as the negotiation and monitoring of existing
contracts with other private partners. By shifting these functions to in-house production,
the city of Weston responded to the actual costs of contract management for these
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administrative functions and found that it would be more efficient to make a slight
movement away from their prior commitment to a pure contract city model. While
ideology may play a strong role during the period leading up to the creation of a contract
city, efficiency and pragmatism can, over time, counterbalance ideological commitment
to a single model of governance.
A recent theme in the contract management literature been the tension between
"hollow state" arguments and the finding that local governments can outsource contract
administration to increase overall managerial capacity. A dialogue has occurred between
the leading authors behind both arguments, with Milward and Provan developing the
former and Brown and Potoski pursuing the latter. Milward and Provan (2000)
summarize the key findings and insights they obtained from multiple studies they had
performed during the prior decade. Over the course of their research program they
develop a concept of a ―hollow state‖ to indicate the ―degree of separation between a
government and the service it provides.‖ Their research highlights the potential for
principal-agent problems to arise between the government and its contractors and that the
government faces the risk of losing legitimacy if it appears to be trying to shift the
responsibility for adequate service provision to third parties.
One of Milward and Provan's insights is that contract management is most
successful when the principals are also engaged in the production of some services. This
allows the principal to obtain some independent information on the costs of service
production and thus deters agents from colluding on pricing. This insight appears to
weigh against the viability of the contract city model as no direct production of services
would occur internally. Furthermore, as the contract city in most cases is implemented in
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new municipalities, there would be no historical knowledge of service costs that would be
carried over from the previous regime.
The extent of outsourcing in a contract city introduce new problems that are not
considered in the "hollow city" framework. Milward and Provan describe an extreme
case of a ―hollow state‖ as one that has contracted out ―all its production capability to
third parties, perhaps retaining only a systems integration function that is responsible for
negotiating, monitoring, and evaluating contracts" (p. 362). The contract city, as it has
been implemented in at least two cases, goes even further than Milward and Provan‘s
extreme case, as the negotiating, monitoring and evaluating functions have either been
outsourced, or the contractor gives support to these activities.
While municipalities with contract city models of governance would appear to be
at great risk of the governance issues associated with the ―hollow state‖, other research
suggests that a key feature of local outsourcing has been omitted from Milward and
Provan‘s studies that would allow local governments to increase their management
capacity. Brown and Potoski (2006; 2003a) respond to the "hollow state" by pointing out
that studies up to that point had failed to acknowledge that municipalities can
successfully outsource the functions of bidding for contracts, negotiating with and
selecting vendors, and evaluating contractors‘ performance. Brown and Potoski argue
that studies that omit the managerial functions delivered through private partnerships
obtain biased assessments of governments‘ total administrative capacity. Their analysis
of survey data from municipalities in Ohio finds that cities that outsource contract
management services perform at least as many contract monitoring activities as those that
perform all contract management functions internally. The key issue for the contract city
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raised by this research is whether it is feasible to design a contract or set of contracts that
will include the appropriate contract management functions for all service production
functions. There is some reason to be skeptical that this is possible. In their more recent
paper Brown and Potoski (2006) note that their findings are restricted to waste
management, a function with easily observable outcomes. It is likely easier to design a
contract for a private-partner to monitor another third party‘s delivery of this service. It
is not clear whether outsourcing contract management functions for less tangible services
would result in similar success.
This paper examines the consequences for contract cities of outsourcing lessobservable function areas such as forecasting economic conditions, advisement on capital
project planning, procurement, contractor monitoring and accounting. The outputs of
these functions are intangibles such as providing information on the future service needs
of the city or maintaining a well-operated fiscal management system. It would likely be
more difficult, therefore, to assess the quality of a third party‘s production of these
services and even more so for the city to outsource the monitoring of these functions to
another private partner. Weak monitoring of these information-based functions creates
another, potentially more serious problem -- the subversion of this information to create a
conflict of interest. As highlighted by Prager and by Bradbury and Waechter, contract
cities may receive relatively few bidders for their contracts, resulting in some cases where
the majority of city functions have been outsourced to a single principal contractor who
then employs sub-contractors for individual functions. If the city must make decisions
based on information created by its own contractors, then there is potential for that
information to be manipulated by the contractor in order to serve its own interests in the
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service-production segments of the contract. The subsequent sections of this paper
analyze the structures of the contracts between the City of Sandy Springs and its primary
contractor in order to identify these types of potential weaknesses.
Sandy Springs, Georgia
Prior to its incorporation on December 1, 2005, Sandy Springs consisted of the
unincorporated region of Fulton County bordering immediately to the north of the city of
Atlanta. The county government provided municipal-type services. These included Fire,
Police, Parks and Recreation and Environment and Community Development activities.
Fulton County operated a special service district fund through which it financed
municipal services to unincorporated areas. Revenues for the fund were obtained through
an annual property tax levy on the unincorporated districts and through fees and charges
for services26.
Sandy Springs was primarily made up of commercial and residential properties
and had an estimated population of less than 90,000 residents. It covers an area of
approximately 36 square miles on the northern tip of Fulton County and lies within the
greater metropolitan region of Atlanta, GA. Sandy Spring‘s racial composition is similar
to national proportions, though in comparison to the rest of Fulton County it is relatively
less diverse. According to the 2009 ACS population estimates (2005-2009 American
Community Survey, 2009), the population of Sandy Springs is 78.5% white, 13.0% Black
or African American, 4.1% Asian and the remainder belonging to other racial groups.
Also, 13.1% of the population is estimated to identify as Hispanic or Latino. In contrast,
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Fulton County as a whole is 47.8% White, 42.9% Black or African American, 4.1%
Asian and the remainder identified as either other or two or more races.
Sandy Springs is also more affluent than Fulton County as a whole. The median
household income of Sandy Springs is $76,477 and for Fulton County it is $58,573. The
ACS 2009 estimates also report that the median value of owner-occupied homes in Sandy
Springs was $452,700 and $250,800 for the rest of the county. The unemployment rate
shows the same pattern with a 3.7% rate in Sandy Springs and 8.4% for the entire county.
Several factors increased local support for incorporating the Sandy Springs area.
In the early 1970‘s the city of Atlanta attempted to annex Sandy Springs. A citizen‘s
group called the Committee for Sandy Springs was formed to resist annexation and
pursue incorporation as a means of maintaining local control over services and taxation.
The primary obstacle to forming a new city, however, was a Georgia requirement that
both houses of the state legislature must pass bills to authorize the creation of new
municipalities. Over a 30-year period the Democrat-controlled legislature resisted giving
approval to form a new city in Sandy Springs. The Committee for Sandy Springs acted
as the key advocacy group supporting municipal incorporation over this entire period.
While resisting annexation was the initial objective of the incorporation
movement, over time another issue came to draw even more support to the side of
incorporation. According Porter‘s account, the administration of municipal-type services
to the Sandy Springs area by Fulton County was unresponsive and inefficient. He
describes a historical trend in which votes by the Fulton County Board of Commissioners
consistently fell against the interest of the Sandy Springs area (Porter 2006, 109–111).
He also claims that the Fulton County government neglected the traffic control and road
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maintenance needs of Sandy Springs (Porter 2006, 58). Part of the rhetoric supporting a
new city was that self-governance would be more responsive and efficient than
administration through the county government.
In 2004 control over the legislature shifted to the Republicans and soon a bill was
passed and signed by the Governor giving authorization to form the new city. The bill
gave Sandy Springs an extremely short time frame to develop and implement an
incorporation plan. The bill was signed into law in April of 2005 giving authorization to
form the new city, subject to citizen approval, on December 1 of that same year. On June
6th a local referendum for residents of the Sandy Springs area passed with 94% of the
votes in support of incorporation.
Once the legal authority to create the new city was given, the Committee for
Sandy Springs transitioned into the key organizing body that planned the structure of the
new city government. The Committee appointed Oliver Porter as an ―Interim City
Manager27‖ on a volunteer basis and also formed several volunteer task forces to develop
plans for the future city to perform its essential services and functions (Porter, 2006 p.
38). The key responsibility of each task force was to identify for its respective service
area whether services should be produced through in-house production, contracts with
Fulton County, contracts with other nearby local governments, or outsourced to a private
partner. Table 1 depicts which production alternatives were used for each functional
area.

27

The Interim City Manager was a volunteer position that existed prior to the incorporation of Sandy
Springs. Porter agreed not to run for office or accept a paid position in the city government upon
incorporation upon accepting this voluntary appointment (Porter, 2006, p. 38)
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Table 4.1 Initial Service Production Methods of Sandy Springs, GA
Alternative
Internal Production

Service/Function

Mayor

City Council

City Manager

Courts

City Clerk

Clerk of Court

Office of City Attorney

Police (6-month contract)

Fire (6-month contract)

E911 (6-month contract)

Sewer

Contract with Current
Government (Fulton County)

Contract with other local
governments
City of Roswell, GA
City of Smyrna, GA
City of Atlanta, GA
Private Partnerships


Jails

Enhanced Library Service

Water

Accounting

Finance

Information Technology

Administration

Human Resources

Administrative support of:
Courts, Police and Fire.

Parks and Recreation

Community Development
(Planning, Zoning and Permitting)

Public Works

Transportation

Solid Waste (one-year
nonexclusive contract, evolving into
franchises)

(Porter 2006, 60, 116–118)
The exact timeline for deciding to adopt the contract city model in Sandy Springs
is not clear from Porter‘s book, though he does note that he first heard about the city of
Weston, FL in early 2005. As discussed earlier in this paper, Weston, FL is one of the
earliest adopters of the contract city model of governance and was the subject of Prager‘s
(2008) case study. Porter, as the Interim City Manager of Sandy Springs, made an
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exploratory visit to Weston or order to learn about their implementation of the contract
city model (Porter 2006, 10–11). Following this visit the city manager of Weston and
representatives from that city‘s two principal contractors travelled to Georgia to make a
presentation to the Committee for Sandy Springs on the operation of a contract city.
Soon after that presentation, Committee for Sandy Springs decided to pursue a
contract city model of governance for the new municipality. The committee members
compiled a list of potential firms that might have the capacity to deliver services to the
as-yet non-existent city. They then sent these firms a ―Prequalification Letter‖ which
asked two key questions. First, it identified a variety of municipal service areas and
asked firms to indicate whether they had the capacity to deliver any of them. It also
asked prospective firms to provide a reference from a similar city or other entity for
which the firm was already providing a comparable service. Second, it asked whether
―the firm would consider making major implementation expenditures before a contract,
or even a handshake, could be concluded‖ (Porter 2006, 124). This second requirement
was necessary because the Committee had no authority to enter into a contract or
informally commit to any binding agreement until the city had formally incorporated,
which would not occur until December 1, 2005. Therefore the processes of issuing
requests for proposals and the subsequent bidding and negotiating of contract would
occur without actual guarantees of the future city council agreeing to the contract after
the city had formally incorporated. This limited the number of firms that were interested
in bidding for contracts once the requests were issued by the Committee. Based on the
responses to the letter the Committee found that the interested firms could be split into
those that could provide technical services and those offering administrative services.
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The Committee therefore decided to issue two separate RFPs for technical and
administrative services. Table 2 depicts this division.
Table 4.2 Contents of the Initial Requests for Proposals by the Commission
for the City of Sandy Springs
Services Included in Each Request For Proposal
RFP #1 ―Administrative‖
Administrative, Financial Services,
Emergency 911, Physical Plant, Motor
Vehicle, Staffing, Purchasing,
Procurement, and Contracting Services
RFP #2 ―Technical‖
Public Works, Transportation,
Streets, Right-of-Way, Facilities, Parks and
Recreation, Capital Improvements,
Planning and Zoning, Inspections, Code
Enforcement, Permitting, Purchasing,
Procurement, and Contracting Services
Source: Contract, RFP #1; Contract, FRP #2
Although the Committee for Sandy Springs and its sub-committees were
responsible for the design of the RFPs, the actual RFPs were issued by a separate entity:
the Governor‘s Commission for Sandy Springs (GCSS). This was a five-person
appointed commission established on June 24, 2005. This was done primarily because
the volunteer Committee could have potentially been held liable for the costs of the
companies responding to the RFP (Porter, 2006 pp. 134). Porter indicates that four of the
five commissioners appointed by the governor had not been active members of the
Committee for Sandy Springs and that two of the members did not reside within the
jurisdiction‘s boundaries. The GCSS was, however, supportive of the Committee‘s work
and agreed to sponsor the RFPs as initially prepared during their first meeting on July 29.
By sponsoring the RFPs the GCSS became the entity responsible for evaluating the
proposal submissions.
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After sending out the prequalification letter, the Committee held a pre-proposal
conference on August 14, 2005 so that firms interested in submitting proposals could
obtain further information about the conditions of the agreement and the nature of
services to be provided. Porter reports that 41 firms attended the conference. An
additional feature of the conference was that it helped smaller firms unable to meet the
full range of service requirement in either of the RFPs to match together in order to
design collaborative proposals. Ultimately only one firm, CH2M Hill, submitted a
proposal for the RFP for Administrative services and only three firms submitted
proposals for the Technical services RFP, one of which was also CH2M Hill (Porter,
2006, p. 143-144).
The RFPs were evaluated by a team selected by the GCSS. Porter reports that
―[f]ive members were residents of the community with experience in RFP procedure and
in evaluation of bids. The sixth member was the County Manager of an adjacent county‖
(Porter p. 141). The proposals were evaluated using composite scores that gave equal
weight to the following criteria: (1) Qualifications and Experience, (2) Previous
Experience with Similar Services and Duties, (3) Start-up and Implementation Plan, and
(4) Cost. The evaluation team received written proposals as well as oral presentations
from all parties submitting proposals. Because only one firm submitted a proposal for the
Administrative RFP the evaluation team reviewed the proposal as either being
Acceptable or Unacceptable. The three submissions for the Technical RFP were
evaluated and compared using the full set of scoring criteria.
The contract evaluation process resulted in a single firm, CH2M Hill being
selected as the principal contractor for both RFPs, but during the negotiation process
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CH2M Hill agreed to employ as a sub-contractor Optech Monette, LLC (Anon. 2008)
which offered a proposal for providing public works services and had received a higher
rating by the evaluation committee in that area (Porter 2006, 145). The contracts were
signed on December 20, 2005 which made the CH2M Hill firm the principal contractor
responsible for the majority of city functions. One of the key criteria that Porter cites as
having swayed the Committee in adopting a competitive contracting model was that it
would lower costs. The estimate received from CH2M Hill on the cost of servicing the
new city was 25% lower than the Committee‘s own estimates of what it would cost to
produce the same services internally (Porter 2006, 131).
The initial compensation amounts for each agreement were specified in the
contract documents. Compensation for the Administrative contract was set at $11.2
million and the Technical contract was set at $18.5 million. The language in the
agreements explicitly allows for a profit margin to be charged in association with each
service provided. This profit margin is discussed in sections allowing for an adjustment
to the total compensation level following a reduction in services. It stipulates that the
reduction in compensation will be no ―less than the actual cost of said services, and the
allocated overhead and profit for such services."28 The contract agreements do not define
what this profit allocation would be, whether it is a constant percentage or if it is based on
whether actual expenditures are less than predicted spending.
Although this study focuses on the initial design of the partnership between Sandy
Springs and CH2M Hill, one key adjustment to the structure of the agreement has since

28

Agreement 1: Section 9.5 and Agreement 2: Section 8.5
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been made. In 2006 the City Council became concerned that CH2M Hill responsibility
for the Financial Services function created the potential for a conflict of interest. On
October 10, 2006 the minutes to the City Council meeting state that the City Manager
recommendation was to create a position to directly employ a Finance Director. The
following justification was given to create this position:
Inherent problems exist from this type of arrangement over
financial matters that involve city finances. Financial considerations
and issues can not always be considered separately given the nature of
providing governmental services. Reasons for separating the
financial function from the CH2M Hill contract would be as follows:
 Increase independence and impartiality with financial
decisions.
 Improve segregation of duties with authorization, custody
and reconciliations functions.
 Removes limited ability to make financial decisions and
transactions.
 Eliminates perceived conflict of interest where the interest
of one job contradict another or when public and private
interests collide over financial matters or interests.
 Instills a sense of loyalty to the City.29
The City Council subsequently authorized the creation of the new Finance
Director position. The office staff remain CH2M Hill contractors, though they are
directly overseen by this public official.
This partial adjustment to the contract agreement between Sandy Springs and
CH2M Hill highlights the broader challenge of administering a contract city. The broad
scope of municipal functions in a single private partnership has little precedent in the
history of public management. The key interest in this paper is whether such a
combination of functions can exacerbate public officials‘ challenge of administering the

29

City of Sandy Springs Georgia. (October 10, 2006). Work Session of the Sandy Springs City Council.
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principal/agent relationship. Porter argues that ―a sense of partnership‖ between the
CH2M Hill firm and city officials prevents the firm from abusing any potential it may
have for acting in its own interest at the expense of the city as it fulfills these contracts.
However, on whether this mutual appreciation is sustainable, even Porter is uncertain:
―Only time will tell whether the partnership will deteriorate into an owner/worker
mentality‖ (Porter 2006, 151). In this analysis I assess the structure of the contracts
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill as they were initially designed and identify
where the potential for conflicts of interest can be found. This would allow the city to
identify where it should focus its contract monitoring efforts should its relationship with
its contractor deteriorate. It also would also contribute to the literature an assessment of
structures and incentives that can arise in this class of comprehensive service contracts.
Theoretical Framework
I approach this analysis of the structures that may exist in contract cities‘ private
partnership agreements within the framework of principal-agent theory. Principal-agent
theory is a well-established component in several fields of social science. The first
formal discussion of the theory is by Ross (1973). For a review of how principal-agent
models have been applied in a variety of different settings see Eisenhardt (1989). In the
context of this essay, I describe public officials implementing a contract city as principals
seeking private partners willing to serve as agents. These agents would deliver services
according to the terms defined in a contractual agreement. I assume that agents are
profit-motivated and that they possess superior information relative to the principals
regarding the quality of the work actually performed. By entering into a contract
agreement the city unburdens itself of the task of directly producing services for the
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public, but also acquires new risks associated with administering the contract and
overseeing the agent‘s performance.
Local officials that are aware of these risks may seek to place structures in the
outsourcing contracts that are sdesigned to reduce the threats that are created by the
contract city model. As put by Gary Miller (1993, p. 2), ―The principal‘s job is to
anticipate the rational responses of agents and to design a set of incentives such that the
agents find it in their own interests (given the incentive system) to take the best possible
set of actions (from the principal‘s perspective).‖ Alternatively, it is also possible that the
contract documents contain loopholes or create adverse incentives that increase the
potential for the agent to act against the interest of the principal. After the contract has
been signed the principal can engage in monitoring, which is costly, to observe actual
agent performance in order to enforce the terms of the contract.
The agent‘s objective is to maximize long-term profits from the agreement.
Periodically the agreement must be renewed and the principal has the opportunity to
select a different agent. If the principal observes that the agent efficiently produces the
contracted services, then the probability of retaining the agent for subsequent periods
increases. This induces the firm to operate efficiently. On the other hand, opposing
conditions can give the agent an incentive to shirk in its efforts in order to extract shortterm gains from the principal without damaging her long-run gains. Weak competition
for the contract reduces the likelihood that the city will select an alternative service
provider when it is time to renew the contract. A high degree of information asymmetry
regarding the true costs of production and the quality of service output can also give an
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incentive to the firm to reduce its efficiency. The design of the agreement will reflect the
efforts by both parties to secure their long-term interests.
In this section I discuss how context of the contract city model of governance
affects the principal-agent relationship. My review of the literature highlights two
important factors: the broad scope of services that are outsourced and the relative lack of
competition among potential private partners.
Scope
The scope of outsourcing that occurs in a contract city increases the tension
inherent to a principal-agent relationship. On the one hand are the potential efficiency
gains, particularly the economies of scale that may be gained from outsourcing the
majority of public functions to a single private firm. I assume that obtaining these gains
is the city‘s primary purpose for becoming the principal in a contracting agreement. On
the other hand, the city must overcome the twin challenges of designing a contract that
can properly harness the contractor‘s incentives to the city‘s interest and then monitoring
actual performance to ensure that the agent complies with the terms of the agreement
The breadth of services outsourced under the contract city model may give rise to
unique structures within the contracts that are not present in traditional relationships
where only a single service or a relatively small share of total municipal functions are
delivered by a single private partner. An example of the type of structure that would be
expected to appear in contract city agreements would be features that facilitate the
agent‘s capacity to achieve economies of scale. As discussed in the previous literature
review, a key objective for public officials pursuing the contract city model is that they
expect to obtain efficiency gains through the private delivery of public functions.
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Officials may therefore include elements in the contracts that discuss the private partner‘s
allocation of funds and resources across functional areas within the city. If the private
partner is a large firm with other operations outside of the local jurisdiction there may
also be contract elements that discuss the allocation of human and physical resources
across the larger firm. These elements of contract design would serve the principal‘s
interest by helping to ensure that the promised efficiency gains actually materialize.
Another way that the scope of outsourcing in a contract city may affect the
principal-agent agreement is that it may exacerbate the information asymmetry problem.
A key feature of the principal-agent relationship is that in most cases the agent possesses
superior information regarding the costs of production and the quality of services
delivered to the public. Within the context of a contract city the agent is responsible for
providing a mix of external services consumed by the public (e.g. road maintenance) and
internal functions that provide information and administrative support to city officials
(e.g. preparation of regular financial statements for the city and providing advice on
capital investments). The combination of these two types of functions in a single
outsourcing agreement may increase the information asymmetry. This is because public
officials become dependent on the agent for the financial and managerial information that
they receive regarding the quality of external service delivery. This creates potential for
what I describe as ―negative synergies‖ to arise in which the difficulty of the contract
management task for the aggregate contract agreement is greater than the sum of the
management costs that would be associated with each function individually. The
potential for the agent to suffer from a conflict of interest between its information
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production role and its role as a producer of external services is a key factor in creating
these synergies.
Principal-agent theory predicts that public officials will respond to information
asymmetry by engaging in monitoring activities. Audits, quality of service reviews and
direct service monitoring are a few of the types of functions that may be done by public
officials to verify performance. These functions incur a cost and are central to the
function of contract management. The scope of outsourcing in contract cities may
increase the difficulty and costs of monitoring agent behavior. Many functions
outsourced are not easily monitored. These include information and administrative
functions that do not yield tangible outputs. Also, when contract monitoring activities are
also outsourced to other private partners it therefore becomes necessary to ensure that no
collusion occurs among the various agents. The concept of ―negative synergies‖ is
manifest in contract monitoring because officials must not only monitor the performance
of individual functions, but also investigate whether there is any action in conflict of
interest
These two issues, the potential efficiency gains from outsourcing and the costs of
mitigating the information asymmetry, reflect part of the tradeoff that public officials
face as they decide whether to make or buy public services. Entering into a principal
agent relationship with a private partner requires the city to allocate a certain amount of
its resources to contract management. On the other hand, outsourcing may allow the city
to obtain services at a lower cost. These costs and benefits must then be compared with
the costs of producing internally. Levin and Tadaelis (2007) explore this tradeoff in their
formal transaction cost model of the make-or buy decision for U.S. cities. The authors
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find that high costs for monitoring performance, lack of competition in the market for
private service production and high sensitivity among residents to changes in service
quality are important factors that deter privatization. Their analysis is conducted within
the traditional framework of outsourcing in which the scope of privately produced
activities is relatively small and managers are able to apply a rational analysis to each
potentially outsourced function to identify whether it would be most efficiently produced
internally or externally.
The scope of outsourcing in the contract city context changes the way that makeor-buy decisions are made. In a small-scope context, managers marginally assess each
municipal function and determine whether it should be produced internally or externally.
In a large-scope context, officials assess the overall service delivery regime and decide
whether the entire municipal enterprise can be administered through a private partnership.
One factor in this comprehensive analysis is that the contract city model allows
governments to escape some fixed costs, such as the administration of employee health
and retirement plans.
Bradbury and Waechter (2009) note that all of the cases of extreme contracting
they review adopted that model during the formation of a new government. Because the
entity does not actually exist at the time that costs are being considered, the only
information available comes from other governments that are currently delivering
services and cost estimates from potential contractors. The lack of information
challenges the rational analysis that is assumed in the traditional contracting context and
opens the door for ideology and generalized perceptions to play a role in determining the
outcome. It is these larger issues of what functions the city will play, the overall cost
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efficiencies and the political implications of the new mode of governance that will
dominate the discussion. This occurs because the scope of outsourcing which occurs in a
contract city raises broader issues that overcome the specific efficiencies of individual
functions which are at the heart of make-or-buy decisions in a more traditional context.
Lack of Competition
Another challenge for contract cities is the thinness of the market for large-scale
municipal service production. Johnston and Seidenstat (2007, p. 239) argue that for
successful outsourcing, ―the private sector should be structured such that alternative
suppliers … can compete for contracts … Without competition, privatization might
simply consist of a private monopoly substituting for a government monopoly.‖ This is
especially true for contract cities that require such a broad range of services that relatively
few firms may emerge that are able to provide them. In the case of Sandy Springs only a
single firm submitted bids for both of the RFPs.
Additionally, the level of competition in the public service markets contract cities
purchase from are significantly weakened by the absence of the government as a potential
public service provider. In a conventional contracting environment the government can
act as a competitor with private firms by reversing the decision to outsource a given
function. Bradbury and Waechter (2009 p. 245) argue that reversibility is a problem for
contract cities ―because the adoption of the strategy at the time of incorporation means
that, for many services and programs, there is no in-house expertise or infrastructure on
which to fall back.‖ This gives potential agents an advantage at the initial stage of
contract design and municipal incorporation because they can promise service delivery
within the necessary time frame. For subsequent renewals of the contract the initial
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private partners possess a first-mover advantage relative to other potential bidders
because they already possess infrastructure, human capital and direct knowledge of the
true costs of production.
The scope of outsourcing and the relative lack of competition in the market for
services can impact the relationship between principal and agent in a variety of ways.
For this analysis I focus on the contract agreements that govern the principal-agent
relationship and explore how these agreements reflect the challenges associated with the
contract city environment. In the following section I discuss how I apply this theoretical
framework to the actual elements of contract documents.
Data and Research Strategy
The purpose of this study is to examine how the contract city model of
governance increases the complexity and challenge of contract management. Within the
framework of the principal-agent model, the principal and the agent develop an
agreement that creates incentives that should theoretically harness the agent‘s self-interest
towards the achievement of the principal‘s goals. These incentives are established by
designing specific structures in the contract documents. The structures define the service
requirements set rewards for good performance and define consequences for any breach
of the agreement. Additionally, individual structures also have the potential to create
unintended effects that can increase the difficulty of contract management.
I pursue my research objectives by analyzing the text of the contracts that were
signed by City of Sandy Springs, GA and the private firm CH2M Hill at the time of the
city‘s incorporation. These documents reflect the incentive structures as they were
initially developed between the two parties. In this section I describe how this textual
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analysis is conducted so that its output will provide useful information that will
contribute to our understanding of the operation of contract cities. To my knowledge,
there are no other social science studies that have analyzed the elements of a contract
within a comparable theoretical framework. I have developed the following research
strategy on my own. I will first provide a brief description of the documents, then present
how the elements of the contracts are coded for analysis, and then discuss how the coded
elements are assessed under the theoretical framework presented in the previous section.
Description of Documents
The subjects of this analysis consist of two sets of documents that were provided
to me directly by the City of Sandy Springs through the Office of the City Manager.
Each set pertains to its respective RFP submission and consists of 1) the actual agreement
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill and 2) an accompanying Scope of Services
document that provides greater detail on the nature of services to be provided. The
services areas included in each contract follow the same grouping used for the RFPs, as
was depicted in Table 2.
The documents follow a legal format. Paragraphs are numbered according to
their respective sections and sub-sections and they each contain a single element of the
contractual arrangement between the City and the Corporation. From a research
standpoint this is useful because it makes it possible to disassemble the document and
consider each paragraph a data point for analysis. I use spreadsheet software to manage
the individual elements of the documents. I have transferred each document into its own
worksheet, with the paragraphs contained in separate rows.
Data Framework
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In order to be more precise regarding how the content of the contract documents
influence agent behavior, I present the following data framework. This framework
describes the mechanism through which a contract transmits a signal that affects the
behaviors of both the principal and the agent in the service relationship.
The beginning of the path of influence from the contract to actual behavior is in
the text of the documents30. Each paragraph of the documents addresses a single
component of the relationship between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill. These paragraphs
are discussed within this framework as individual document elements. The text of each
paragraph is identified as a single data point for this analysis.
These document elements combine in various ways to create conceptual structures
that are understood in the minds of those that read them. These conceptual structures
define the parameters of the relationship between the principal and the agent. They
describe the nature of the work that is to be outsourced, the expected behavior that both
parties will exhibit and the consequences for both complying with and/or violating the
terms of the contract. There does not necessarily need to be a one-to-one relationship
between document elements and conceptual structures. Multiple elements can
collectively generate a single conceptual structure, and a single element may be mapped
to multiple structures.

30

It could be argued that there is an earlier stage: the contract writing process where both principal and
agent discuss what they want the relationship to be like and transmit those ideas into the contract. There
may be a filter at this point where the concepts in the minds of both parties are expressed in writing with
varying degrees of accuracy. A thorough analysis of that topic, however, would require venturing into the
cognition and psychology of public administration which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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The conceptual structures create incentives that can then be analyzed within the
principal agent framework. These incentives work to either align the agent‘s interest with
that of the principal or induce the agent to deviate from the principal‘s intent. Incentives
will interact with the agent‘s pursuit of profit maximization and lead to behavioral
outcomes. The principal will attempt to design a contract where the document elements
create conceptual structures that reward good behavior and punish deviant behavior.
There is room within this framework, however, for unintended incentives. These may
arise if the document elements combine in ways that were not expected by the principals,
resulting in conceptual structures that create adverse incentives for the agent.
To rephrase the research objective of this paper within this data framework, the
contract city model creates a new context for document elements. This new context
arises because the principal-agent relationship in a contract city is burdened with the
challenges of an increased scope of contracting and a lesser degree of competition. As a
result, new conceptual structures may be generated from the document elements that
would not exist if the city operated within a traditional contracting environment. These
new conceptual structures may then create incentives that public officials would not have
expected. Also, agents may respond differently to contract elements that are found in
traditional outsourcing agreements because the issues of scope and competition interact
with those contract elements to create new incentive structures. I do not observe actual
behavior and so the analysis in this essay is confined to the top three elements of the data
framework presented in Figure 1. The empirical objective of this paper is to identify the
ways that the context of the contract city impacts the incentives created by the contract
documents.
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This essay is a single case study rather than a multi-case study and so I do not
directly compare the incentives created from contract city document elements with those
from traditional city outsourcing agreements. Instead, I assess which incentives are
created as a direct result of either the scope of services provided by the contract
agreement with CH2M Hill or the relative thinness of the market for comprehensive
municipal service contracts. If the incentive arising from a set of outsourced functions
would disappear if the services had been outsourced to separate firms then it is identified
as being scope-related. Likewise, if an incentive is created due to the relative scarcity of
market competition for the contract then it is considered competition-related.
Figure 4.1

Data Framework
Document Elements

Conceptual Structures

Incentives

Agent Behavior

Coding of Elements
My approach to analyzing Sandy Springs contract documents begins with a
careful reading of the texts and then coding the individual elements of the contracts
according to several thematic categories. These categories serve to group by functional
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area the conceptual structures generated by the document elements. These categories are
displayed in Table 3. Each category is derived from applying the principal-agent
framework presented earlier. Because a given document element may be associated with
multiple conceptual structures, individual paragraphs may receive multiple codes. All
appropriate codes are assigned to each element. I provide a description of each category
below.
Table 4.3 Classification Categories
Category
Scope
Human Resources
Information
Direct Service Production
Financial Control
Further Expansion of
Agreement
Trust and Harmonious
Relationship
Capital Project Management

Null

Description
Elements of the agreements that reflect the large scope of
services provided by the private partner.
Elements of the agreements that relate to how human
resources are managed by the private partner
Elements of the agreements that outsource information
production functions
Elements that provide for outsourcing direct service
production that will be consumed by citizens
Elements that outsource financial control functions and
contract management
Elements that provide for future expansion of the
partnership
Elements that describe and require a trusting and
harmonious relationship to exist between the City and the
Corporation
Elements that provide for the Corporation to provide
either support for or direct oversight of small-scale
capital projects
This label is applied to elements of the documents that do
not appear to pose significant issues for the purposes of
this study.

Scope
The scope category identifies the contract elements that either directly or
indirectly address the scale of outsourcing activity that occurs in contract cities. This is
one of the broadest identifiers used in this study as the issue of scope is central to what
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distinguishes the principal-agent relationships in contract cities from other contracting
agreements. I will therefore briefly discuss what features an individual contract element
may have in order for it to receive the scope identifier.
The issue of scope can be manifest in two ways: breadth and proportion. Breadth
refers to a contract agreement with a single partner outsourcing a large range of
municipal functions. Individual contract elements that refer to how resources may be
allocated by the private partner across functional areas directly address the issue of
breadth. For example, contract language that discusses the sharing of resources across
functional areas to obtain efficiencies of scale would be direct examples of breadth.
Contract elements may also indirectly affect the breadth of the contract agreement if
some set of elements outsources a combination of functional areas to the private partner
that create incentives for the private partner to act against the interest of the principal. An
example would be contract elements that outsource both the provision of capital project
planning and the actual production of the same projects. The combination of these two
functions creates the potential for a conflict of interest if the private partner adjusts the
project recommendations it gives in order to increase its profits from the actual
production of those projects.
Contract elements that reflect the proportion of outsourcing activities contain
language that reflects how the municipal government will be administered with few direct
public employees. The concept of ―hollowing out‖ in government due a share of
municipal functions that are produced externally captures the issue of proportion.
Elements of the contracts that either seek to mitigate the issues of hollowing out or that
inadvertently increase the potential risks will fall into this category.
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I code individual elements that associate with breadth and/or proportion with a
single identifier because the issues are closely related and there may be substantial
overlap if separate identifiers were used. Also, as the other identifiers are more specific,
it is interesting to view the overlap between this broader category and the more specific
issues tied to other codes.
Human Resources
This code designates elements of the contracts that are associated with the
disposition of the direct employees of the primary contractor and the other human
resources that are obtained through the agreement. Under the terms of both agreements,
CH2M Hill ―shall be solely responsible for all compensation benefits, insurance and
rights of the Corporation employees during the course or arising or accruing as a result of
any employment…31‖ The human resource code highlights elements that discuss how
contracted employees will represent the city to the citizens and the city‘s rights with
regard to the retention of individual employees. This designation also highlights areas of
the agreement that relate to the risks associated with a workforce that is almost entirely
contract labor. These risks would include the loss of workforce and institutional
knowledge in the event of severance of the contract and the possibility of employees
being transferred elsewhere in the contracting firm‘s organization. Another example is
the outcome that the contractor set the pay and benefits levels for the majority of the
employees producing public services.

31

Agreement 1: Section 7.1 and Agreement 2: Section 5.1
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Information
Another notable feature of the contract city model is the private production of
information used for managerial and financial decision-making. This includes the
generation of financial forecasts and the development of financial reports. Even under a
conventional service delivery framework, where the scope of outsourcing is relatively
small, private production of financial and administrative information would face close
scrutiny. This is because the nature of the service does not align with the criteria found in
the public administration literature to be predictors of whether a function is a good
candidate for outsourcing. Brown and Potoski find that ―[s]ervices that are difficult to
monitor and prone to opportunism may be riskier candidates for transferring management
responsibilities to vendors (2006 pp. 338).‖
Assessing the quality of financial reports and economic data is a difficult task on
its own because economic conditions change and the city manager likely does not possess
all the technical accounting skills necessary to evaluate fully the accuracy and quality of
financial information. Although auditing firms are retained to validate the end-of-year
financial statements, they are not involved in evaluating lesser financial reports that are
produced regularly solely for the purpose of internal consumption. Within the contract
city framework there is the added challenge of the risk that the private partner may
produce the information in such a way that serves its own interests. One potential
example may be presenting financial forecasts that project increased demand for services
that the firm is also providing to the city. This may result in expansion of the contract
and additional profits for the firm.
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Elements of the contracts that relate to the outsourcing of information production
activities are classified with the information code.
Direct Service Production
This classification is used to identify elements of the agreements that relate to
services that the contractor will provide directly to the citizens of Sandy Springs. This
includes descriptions of the nature of the services, performance measurement and
compensation.
Financial Control
A broad range of financial control functions are also outsourced in contract cities.
This designation is applied to segments of the agreements that contract for contract
management services. It also applies to functions such as procurement, revenue
collection, account management, and advisement for investment activities. This
designation will at times overlap with the information production functions as the
production of financial reports and the provision of advice on capital projects have both
elements of control and information production.
Further Expansion of Agreement
In cases where the contract city is in a relationship with one primary contractor, as
is the case in both Weston and Sandy Springs, it would be expected that the contract be
designed with sufficient flexibility as to allow the city to request an expansion or a
reduction in services from the contractor as needs arise. This reflects both the city‘s
dependence on its primary partner for essentially all service delivery and the uncertainty
that all governments face when developing policies that will meet future service
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requirements. This code designates the procedures for the city manager to request
additional services both on a one-time and on an ongoing basis and the manner of
compensation for these services.
Trust and Harmonious Relationship
This identifier is motivated by Oliver Porter‘s discussion of how trust and a
positive relationship between the city of Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill is one of the
essential elements in successfully implementing and maintaining a contract city approach
to municipal governance. If these positive personal relationships are so key to the
success of the government, then the contract agreements between the two parties may
include structures that are intended to foster this type of relationship and protect the city
if the relationship begins to deteriorate. Elements of the contracts that refer to the
interpersonal relationships and the tone of the interactions between city officials and
employees of the contracting firm are coded with this identifier.
Capital Project Management
In addition to providing services that are consumed immediately, contract cities
also obtain planning, advisement, construction and maintenance services for capital
projects. This code is used to identify elements of the contracts that discuss the types of
projects that the private partner is responsible for and how the firm is compensated for
those projects.
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Null
This designation is applied to elements of the contracts that do not appear to
change the task of managing a private contract for services within the contract city
framework. This would include language that would be included in typical contracts.
Analysis
The analytical portion of this research strategy consists of determining what types
of incentives are created by the conceptual structures originating from the agreement
documents. More specifically, I seek to identify how the individual structures influence
the task of contract management. This assessment consists of considering two principal
questions for each section. First, does the specific contract element contribute to a
structure that increases the city officials‘ capacity to manage the contract relationship?
This could be manifested by structures that align the agent‘s incentives with the
principal‘s or that increase the principal‘s capacity to monitor the agent‘s productivity.
The second question I examine is whether the contract element creates openings for the
agent to pursue its own interest at the expense of the principal. For example, clauses in
the contracts that give a single private partner responsibility for both providing consulting
advise on which small-scale capital projects to pursue and a procurement contract for the
same small-scale projects with a built-in profit margin for the latter may incentivize a
firm to recommend that the city initiate more projects than what the actual service
requirements of the city merit.
Key Findings
My discussion of the findings from my analysis will loosely be organized
according to the coding classification groups that I used to organize the data. However,
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because many key findings involve issues that span multiple categorical areas it is not
possible to strictly confine my discussion to single categories. I also include in the
discussion several recommendations I have developed as possible approaches to address
the contract management challenges that are associated with the contract city model of
governance. I begin with the issues that involve the most crossovers and that I find to be
the most significant and interesting. I then move to the more narrow issues that can be
grouped within single categories.
Resource Shifting Increases Contract Management Complexity
The agreement between CH2M Hill and the City of Sandy Springs is divided into
two separate contracts for services. The first32 contract is composed of administrative
functions while the second covers primarily direct service production. The payments for
services were each specified in the initial contracts. The first contract was funded in its
first year for $11.2 million33 and the second contract was funded for $18.5 million34.
There is language in both contracts, however, that grants CH2M Hill the right to shift
resources and funds between the two agreements. This resource shifting is permitted ―per
the priorities agreed-to with the City Manager so long as such allocations do not
adversely affect the City regarding either (1 ) cost of services under this Agreement, or

32

The designation of ‗first‘ and ‗second‘ contract follows the designation from the RFP‘s which labeled
RFP 1 and RFP 2. The first contract refers to the agreement for the provision of Administrative, Financial
Community Services, Motor Vehicle, Staffing, and Purchasing, Procurement and Contracting services. The
second contract is the agreement for the provision of Public Works, Transportation, Streets, Right-of-way,
Facilities, Parks and Recreation, Capital Improvements, Planning and Zoning, Inspections, Code
Enforcement, Permitting, Purchasing, Procurement, and Contracting Services.
33
Agreement 1: Section 9.1
34
Agreement 2: Section 8.1
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(2) service quality to the public.‖ 35 So in effect, subject to these requirements, the
contracting firm is able to move resources across the two agreements as if it were
fulfilling a single contract. This power of resource shifting can be viewed as being a
reasonable way to achieve greater economies of scale that can exist from having a single
firm provide such large proportion and range of city services. Because the outcome of the
RFP process resulted in a single firm receiving both contracts it would appear to serve
policymaker‘s objective of facilitating economies of scale by allowing funds to move
across contracts. The city saves the cost of requiring the private partner to develop
protocols that ensure funds from either contract are not comingled. For example, if
senior CH2M Hill managers are responsible for service areas under both agreements it
would be necessary to keep track of the share of their services allocated to each contract.
Allowing resource shifting may increase the cost of to the city of monitoring the
true costs of providing services. Within the context of a principal-agent framework, it
would be expected that the principal allow the agent to achieve a certain rate of return
and a normal level of profits for its services. This would give the agent the incentive to
reduce costs while maintaining the specified level of service in order to achieve profits
and return value to its shareholders. Periodically, however, the contract would be
renegotiated and the city would have the chance to assess whether the agent has cut costs
enough to receive a rate of return that exceeds the normal market rate. If this is the case
then the city should be able to rebid the contract and receive the services at a lower cost
and the firm‘s return would return to the normal market rate. Presumably, the normal

35

Agreement 1: Section 2.3 and Agreement 2: Section 2.3
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market rate would be determined by taking bids from other firms interested in competing
for the contract. This may not be feasible, however, if no other firms offer bids or if the
incumbent firm is advantaged in the bidding process due the economies of scale it enjoys.
Resource shifting in a contract city framework would allow the private partner to
transfer resources from profitable areas to lower margin areas to achieve an average rate
of return over the entire contract. Because a contract city has such a broad range of
services outsourced in a single contract, it may be difficult for the city officials to
untangle the resource shifting that has occurred in order to assess which functional areas
are yielding a higher than normal rate of return for the contractor. Identifying these
higher profit areas is important for the city so that it can negotiate for a lower
compensation amount during contract renegotiations. Under a conventional contracting
framework each individual service area would likely have its own contract and multiple
firms would provide the outsourced segment of government services. Resource shifting
potentially increases the difficulty of ensuring that the private partner is not achieving a
higher than normal rate of return.
Another issue associated with resource shifting is its implications for the city‘s
compliance with Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules regarding the
Statement of Activities. Should contract cities that allow resource shifting present the
allocation of funds within the Governmental Activities function before or after the private
contractor shifts funds across functions? For example, among the sub-categories that fall
under Governmental Activities, two significant sub-categories are General Government
and Public Works (City of Sandy Springs GA, 2007). A shift of resources from
Agreement 1 to Agreement 2 could result in funds that were initially allocated to General
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Government functions providing support to Public Works. The question then arises
whether the city is reporting in the Statement of Activities how it allocated resources
originally to its contractor or how the contractor ultimately allocated those funds. The
contract documents are silent on which method should be used. The latter approach
seems clearly preferable, however, so that the financial statements accurately account for
the use of public resources. The language in the contract documents that resource
shifting is subject to the ―priorities agreed to with the City Manager‖ suggests that the
City Manager, a public employee, approves reallocations. There is no specific guidance
in the contracts to detail when approval is needed and how it is granted. There is also no
language in the contracts regarding how such transfers would be documented or reported
within the financial statements. A review of Sandy Springs‘ Consolidated Annual
Financial Report for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2006 shows that the document
does not contain any mention of these types of transfers. The interested reader can
examine the Budget and Actuals statement from the Notes to the Financial Statements by
opening the attached file.
I make the following two recommendations for cities that allow resource shifting
across multiple contracts awarded to a single service provider.
Recommendation 1: Cities that allow their contractors to engage in resource
shifting across contracts should request documentation of the flow of funds so that the
pre- and post-shifting resource allocations can be compared with actual spending. This
will provide city officials with better information on the true cost of service provision.
Recommendation 2: Specify that the Statement of Activities reflects shifting of
resources across contract agreements. The Notes to the Financial Statements should
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detail the size and nature of these allocations. This would be supported by
documentation of the City Manager‘s approval of these transfers.
Potential Expansion of the Contract
One of the challenges of contract design at this scale is ensuring that the
agreement is adequately clear and focused so that the private partner‘s responsibilities are
clear, yet flexible enough to be able to meet unforeseen or changing service needs. It
would be expected, therefore, that a contract city agreement would include structures that
provide for the expansion of services when determined necessary by public officials. The
City Manager of Sandy Springs is the public official that is charged with administering
the contract and, subject to authorization by the City Council, is responsible for
requesting and negotiating for expansions of services. The contract documents contain
multiple elements that develop a flexible framework for changing service requirements.
Both contract documents36 contain elements that provide for written requests for
services that are not included in the Scope of Services documents. Within five days of
receipt of the change order CH2M Hill agreed to provide a price to the additional
services. If that price is agreed upon the additional services will be invoiced in the next
monthly payment cycle, unless otherwise specified. If the change order requests an
additional ongoing service rather a function provided on a one-time basis then the Scope
of Service document will be adjusted and the monthly compensation amount will
similarly reflect the new agreement.
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Agreement 1: Section 9.2 and Agreement 2: Section 8.2
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What are the incentives associated with a structure that makes the future scope of
services more flexible? Having structures that facilitate the future expansion of services
may not only lower the administrative cost to the city of changing the agreement, but it
also may increase the likelihood that the firm will present projects to the city that would
merit service expansion. In other words, does the door swing both ways for allowing
new service orders into the contracting agreement? Because the contracting firm is
allowed to include a normal rate of profit in the price it gives for change orders, it has a
financial incentive to expand services when possible. This creates one of the most
challenging incentive problems for the contract city model. Within this contract city
framework, the private partner is also responsible for generating economic forecasts37,
research on current and future trends for the city38, financial reports39, and developing the
draft of the city budget for approval40. The potential exists for the firm to structure these
documents to present biased information to the city that would indicate that new services
are required to meet the needs of the city. Detecting this type of bias would be difficult
because it would likely require an assessment of the technical details of the process for
producing fiscal information. The city manager, with a limited staff41 independent of the
private contractor, may not have the capacity to perform this evaluation. It may therefore
be necessary to acquire services from other third party evaluators to validate fiscal
information on a periodic basis.
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Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.8
Scope of Services 1: Section 1.1.2.1
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Scope of Services 1: Section 1.2.7
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At the time of incorporation the only direct employees of Sandy Spring were the Board, the Mayor, the
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An additional provision for the expansion of services is made for the event that
Sandy Springs obtains additional services from third parties other than CH2M Hill and its
subcontractors. If those other third parties fail to meet their service obligations then ―any
additional services performed or costs reasonably incurred by the Corporation in
conjunction with compensating for the failure of the third party to fulfill its obligations
shall be handled as a change to this Agreement... 42‖ This structure is key because it
reaffirms the CH2M Hill‘s role as the agent of last resort should other contractors fail to
deliver services. This structure is designed to protect the city from disruptions by
ensuring a continuation of services. In a conventional contracting framework where the
share of outsourced services is relatively small there would be other municipal employees
that could be temporarily reassigned to provide services during a disruption. That
capacity is not present in contract cities and they must therefore ensure that one of its
private service providers can act as the agent of last resort.
There is the potential for an adverse incentive with this structure, however,
because in the Sandy Springs/CH2M Hill relationship, the agent of last resort also
provides the city with contract management services43 for third party contractors. This
creates a situation where the agent responsible for evaluating the other third party
potentially could replace that party. The potential threat would be that the primary firm
takes advantage of its evaluator role in order to learn production techniques and business
strategies of the third party firm and then uses its position to replace the third party in
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Agreement 1: Section 2.4 and Agreement 2: Section 2.4
Scope of Services 1: Section 1.1.1.1- 1.1.1.4
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providing that service. The city may become liable to litigation if the third party firm
sues the primary firm for this type of abuse.
Another area where the potential for service expansion may cause a scope-related
management challenge is the outsourcing of several financial functions. CH2M Hill is
responsible for administering the city‘s accounts payable and receivable. This includes
operating the purchase ordering system ―such that timely payments are made on behalf of
the city…44‖ Additionally, Sandy Springs outsourced to CH2M Hill the collection of
taxes and fees. Thus, the firm‘s interaction with third-party firms delivering service to
the City include contract management and assessment, payment, as well as serving as a
possible replacement for the functions delivered by the third parties. This combination
has the potential to give the private partner significant leverage over third party firms. It
also provides access to confidential tax information of other private entities that could
provide an advantage in bidding for future contracts with Sandy Springs or other local
governments. If these third parties are large firms, where services delivered to the City of
Sandy Springs are a relatively small portion of their entire enterprise, then this leverage is
likely to be small, but if Sandy Springs is employing small, locally controlled firms to
provide services then it is possible that the primary firm may be able to exert influence
over the private partner in order to serve its own interest.
The contracts documents also task CH2M Hill with providing the city with a
variety of procurement related services. These include:
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Making recommendations to develop procurement policies that are
consistent with state and local law45



Assist in the selection of vendors46



Prepare requests for proposals to be distributed to vendors and
suppliers47



Prepare and process purchase orders48

Adding the ability to influence which vendors are selected to the previously
mentioned administrative challenges would appear to strengthen the primary firm‘s
position in negotiating with other firms that would try to do business with the city.
Both contract documents include language that require the CH2M Hill firm to
disclose any potential conflicts of interest49 arising from relationships with other entities.
These statues also prohibit employees of the private partner to hold other employment
that is ―antagonistic or hostile‖ to the City of Sandy Springs. Also prohibited are
kickbacks to employees of CH2M Hill for delivery of services and payments from CH2M
Hill to persons associated with the City of Sandy Springs in order to form a contract for
services. One notable absence is that there is no explicit prohibition for employees of the
city or members of the board to enter into the employ of CH2M Hill immediately after
separating from public service. This segment of the agreement may be strengthened by a
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required waiting period between separation and new employment with the primary
contractor in order to prevent jobs from being offered as replacement for kickbacks.
Finally, there is language prohibiting collusion between CH2M Hill and other
parties contracted to provide services to the City, or any joint business ventures with
other contract providers without the approval of the City Manager. These structures of
the contracts set the expectations for the agreement and allow the City to take punitive
action in the event that the private partner is found to have acted in conflict of interest.
No explicit discussion appears in the contract documents regarding CH2M Hill providing
services to other cities, though if a nearby municipality were both providing services to
Sandy Springs and receiving services from CH2M Hill that would appear to fall under the
disclosure requirement.
Recommendation 3: Periodically obtain third-party validation of the financial and
economic information produced by the primary contractor.
Recommendation 4: Either separate the functions of agent of last resort and
contract management for third-party firms, or maintain additional vigilance in the
relationships among contractors.
Recommendation 5: Give extra scrutiny to the relationships between the large
primary contractor and smaller third party contractors, especially those where the
preponderance of their business is with the city.
Recommendation 6: Regulate the reemployment of city officials and employees
by the primary contractor. Consider requiring a waiting period between separation from
the city and employment by the contractor. Require city officials to disclose if they enter

169

into any discussion with the primary contractor regarding potential employment
opportunities.
Termination of the Agreement
The degree of outsourcing in a contract city both in terms of breadth and
proportion creates the risk of government failure should the relationship between the city
and its primary private partners deteriorate. Several elements of the contract agreements
discuss the circumstances that would lead to a termination of the relationship between the
City of Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill. There are also contract elements that develop
structures designed to protect the city from severe service disruptions.
Two types of termination are discussed in the contract documents: termination of
the entire agreement and partial termination of specific services. Termination of the
entire agreement may be initiated by either the City of Sandy Springs or CH2M Hill at
either‘s discretion with or without cause50. For both parties the termination of the
agreement would go into effect one hundred and eighty days after written notice had been
given to the other party. The City of Sandy Springs is also given the ability to terminate
the agreement in its entirety without any advanced notice in the event that ―a vote by the
Board of Directors, officers or employees to transfer of a controlling interest in
Corporation (which shall be defined to mean more than 50% of the ownership interest) to
a non-related entity.51‖ This structure protects the city from the event that ownership of
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Agreement 1: Section 12.1-12.2 and Agreement 2: Section 11.1-11.2
Agreement 1: Section 12.2 and Agreement 2: Section 11.2
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its primary service provider transfers to an entity that may be hostile or antagonistic to
the City of Sandy Springs.
Complete termination of the agreement may also result from the City failing to
appropriate sufficient funds through its annual budgetary process. The contract
documents state that the agreement is ―contingent upon sufficient appropriation and
authorization being made annually by the City Council‖ at least 120 days prior to the
renewal period52. If the appropriation is not completed in this time frame then the
agreement will be terminated following the City giving written notice to the CH2M Hill.
This clause may increase the risks associated with the budget process in contract cities.
Failure to appropriate funds on a timely basis in a conventionally governed city may lead
to a continuing resolution with temporary funding or result in temporary layoffs and
government shutdown. Once the budgetary problems are resolved and an appropriation
is made, however, it would be relatively straightforward to restart service delivery as the
public bureaucracy and employees would presumably be available to return to duty. In
contrast, a contract city that fails to appropriate funds for the year may lose its ongoing
relationship with its primary contractor and be required to go through the RFP process
and review bids for new service providers before services can be reinstated. Having
established that budgetary failure may occur in that city, future contract negotiations may
result in terms that are less favorable for the city.
The high cost for contract cities of failing to adopt a budget potentially increases
the likelihood of a holdout problem on the city council. The last member of the council
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Agreement 1: Section 12.6 and Agreement 2: Section 11.6
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needed to approve the appropriation may be able to extract concessions from other
members in order to avert termination of the city contract. The holdout problem cannot
be addressed by adding structures to the contract because it is external to the principalagent relationship between the city manager and the private firm. This problem would
need to be addressed with changes to the rules regulating the appropriations process for
the city council. An assessment of how the contract city model may require changes to
the political structure of the city itself is outside the scope of this paper, but it certainly is
an important research question raised by this analysis.
Partial termination of the agreement is also provided for as long as the City gives
written notice to CH2M Hill at least 60 days in advance53. In the event of a reduction or
elimination of services the City Manager and CH2M Hill will come to an agreement on
how much the compensation amount shall be reduced accordingly54. These elements of
the contracts would allow the city to make adjustments to changing economic conditions,
such as rapidly declining revenue flows necessitating mid-year cuts to services.
At an even smaller level, the City Manager has the right to require CH2M Hill to
transfer any of its employees assigned to providing service to Sandy Springs to a different
position within the city or to a position outside of the city. This power is limited by
language that requires the City Manager to use ―an objective standard based upon job
performance‖ when making a transfer request55. This language allows the City Manager
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an approximation of the ability to dismiss individual employees for cause despite the city
staff being actually employees of CH2M Hill.
The issue of how the city budget affects the terms of the contract is further
complicated because the preparation of the budget is outsourced to CH2M Hill. The
annual budget is prepared by the firm and submitted to the City Manager56. Other City
Departments not administered by CH2M Hill receive assistance in preparing their own
departmental budgets from the contractor57. Also, budget materials used in ―budget
meetings, hearings, and agenda meetings‖ are provided under the agreement58. The
combination of these functions places considerable responsibility in the design of the
budget in the hands of the private partner. After submitting the budget to the City
Manager, the Mayor‘s office will receive the budget for comment and review and it is
then sent to the City Council for approval59. So there are at least three reviews by public
officials of the budget materials prepared by the private firm before it is voted upon by
the council. These reviews will help ensure that the content of the budget aligns with
public interest. Nonetheless, the work done by the private partner on the budget will
certainly influence the budget process.
The potential for a primary contractor to influence the city budgets for its own
interest could be compared to the traditional model of budget maximizing bureaucrats
introducing slack into their budget requests (see ) . One key difference, however, is the
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scope of budget preparation performed across all departments of the local government.
While individual departments are competing with each other for budget dollars, a single
firm that administers multiple departments can collude with itself to generate a set of
departmental budgets that serve its interest.
Another element of the contracts dealing with contract termination is language
that defines a default by the private partner on one of the agreements as a default on the
other agreement60. This structure would allow the City to sever its entire relationship
with the private partner for cause should one element of the service agreement be
violated. This protects the city from having one segment of its relationship being
discontinued under the no-fault termination rules, while the other being subject to the
default rules. This language does, however, come with some associated risk, as it may
increase the risk to the entire service delivery enterprise of a break in service capacity
should any of the segments of the agreement go into default. Under a conventional
contracting framework, the city may have multiple private partners and the default of one
would not affect the city‘s relationship with any of the others. The one caveat to this
issue is that the city does not have to find both agreements in default, only that it may
elect to do so. Before exercising this clause the city officials would need to carefully
weigh whether a default on a single service responsibility merits abandoning the entire
relationship. This appears to be part of the tradeoff for the gains to scale of having a
single private partner – all the eggs are in one basket.
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The contract documents also provide for a transition period should the agreement
between Sandy Springs and CH2M Hill be terminated. A transition period is provided
for in both agreements that shall last the lesser of ninety days or the point at which the
city is able to provide for a continuation of services on its own61. More importantly, the
contracts provide the city with the right to offer direct employment to employees of
CH2M Hill if the agreement is terminated. This would lower the city‘s cost of finding a
qualified workforce and training new employees in their duties. Although the
corporation could presumably transfer members of its Sandy Springs workforce to other
divisions, the loss of the contract‘s revenue stream would likely result in most employees
losing their employment.
In the event of breach of contract by either the city or the primary firm it is also
likely that one party would bring a civil case against the other. Several elements of the
contract documents define the extent to which both parties can be held liable for
damages. The agreement states that CH2M Hill ―shall indemnify, defend and hold
harmless the City … against any and all liability, suits, actions, damages, costs, losses
and expenses … arising out of any errors, omissions, willful misconduct or negligent acts
of Corporation, its officials, agents, employees or subcontractors…62‖ This places the
contracting firm liable for service failures such as incorrect collection of taxes or fees or
injuries. Few firms would undertake such a risk without limitations and the Sandy
Springs contract also includes a limitation on CH2M Hill‘s potential liability. The
aggregate fines and civil penalties that CH2M Hill can be liable for is capped at $150,000
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per year across any federal, state or regulatory agency63. This type of limitation may be
necessary in order to entice a firm to provide such a broad scope of services, but it may
also create adverse incentives for the firm if it reaches the liability cap. At that point the
city is financially responsible for any further damages assessed due to contractor
negligence and the only policy option available would be to terminate the contract.
Recommendation 7: Conduct a fiscal impact study of replacing the services
provided by the primary contractor before determining to sever the agreement.
Recommendation 8: If the primary contractor reaches the cap of financial liability
for fines and penalties evaluate whether the city‘s potential liability for further damages
outweighs the value of retaining the contractor.
Financial Information
The service agreements outsource to CH2M Hill the production of a variety of
financial and economic information. Among these responsibilities is assessing on behalf
of the city changes in the cost of factors of production for municipal services. City
officials likely have limited resources to validate these cost estimates independently,
though they could request that the firm explain the development of any cost figures
presented. These cost estimates are important to the contract agreement because they are
used in periodic negotiations regarding adjustments to the rate that CH2M Hill is
compensated for the services it provides64. The compensation formula included in the
contract does not automatically adjust for increases in the cost of production, but there is
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language that allows CH2M Hill to renegotiate the compensation formula with the City
Manager with any agreement subject to City Council approval. The contract also
stipulates that cost-related increases to the compensation formula cannot exceed 9% in a
given year. The cost of production estimates would likely play a significant role in
determining whether an adjustment for the cost of production is warranted.
The key issue with this arrangement is that in the contract city framework the city
has little analytical capacity to validate this information on its own and is therefore in a
compromised negotiating position for these cost adjustments. In a traditional city there
would be public employees of a city budget office that could validate the figures and
conduct a comparison with third-party data. Also, in a traditional contracting framework
the private firm would have pressure from competition to provide accurate cost estimate
data. The thinness of the market for comprehensive municipal services, however, has the
potential to lessen the pressure from competition.
Recommendation 9: In the event that a contract city enters into negotiations with
its primary contractor over the cost of factors of production the city should obtain a thirdparty validation of the economic data used to justify the changes to the compensation
formula.
Capital Projects and Investment
The City of Sandy Springs contracted with CH2M Hill to acquire a
comprehensive set of services pertaining to cash investments and capital project planning
and implementation. The firm‘s capital project services consist of ―providing
coordination and recommendation to the City on an annual basis as to the capital program
requirements in future years, which includes the scheduling of capital program
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projects65.‖ The agreement stipulates that these services only pertain to small-scale
capital projects of a value less than $50,000. Capital project administration services for
larger projects may be requested under the service change procedures. The firm will also
assist the city in obtaining financing for capital projects, maintain the capital projects
fund in the city finances and make budgetary recommendations for financing projects
over time66. The investment-related functions outsourced through this agreement include
developing procedures that will keep the city in compliance with Government Finance
Officers Association practice and State law, selecting an investment firm, and producing
reports, statements and cash flow analyses that will allow the city officers to evaluate the
performance of the investment strategy67.
These services introduce long-term planning issues that would not be present in
most traditional service arrangements. Assessing whether the agent has acted in the
principal‘s interest with respect to these services requires determining whether
performance has been acceptable in both the short and long term. If the capital or
investment planning horizon goes beyond the span of the contract renewal period, it is
not clear that a contractor will have the correct incentives to maximize value over the
correct time span. For instance, if a firm is giving advice to a contract city regarding a
debt service plan for an imminent bond issuance, will the firm‘s advice on the timing of
the repayment plan be influenced by the contract renewal schedule? The firm may have

65

Scope of Services 1: 1.2.2.1
Scope of Services 1: 1.2.2.3-1.2.2.4
67
Scope of Services 1: 1.2.3.1-1.2.3.3
66

178

an incentive to make the city‘s finances look their best during the season when its
renewal will be assessed by the city manager and the city council.
Possibly more troubling is the potential for conflict of interest if there is collusion
between the primary contracting firm and the bond underwriter. Rule G-23 of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board stipulates that ―[n]o broker, dealer, or municipal
securities dealer that has a financial advisory relationship with respect to a new issue of
municipal securities shall acquire as principal either alone or as a participant in a
syndicate or other similar account formed for the purpose of purchasing, directly or
indirectly, from the issuer all or any portion of such issue, or act as agent for the issuer in
arranging the placement of such issue…68‖ By combining the role of providing financial
planning advice and playing matchmaker between the city and a financial institution there
is potential for the primary contractor to enter into a relationship with the financial
institution that may qualify as a ‗syndicate‘. It is unclear what type of information and
negotiations would pass between the primary contractor and the various financial firms it
encounters in the market before a single firm is selected and recommended to the city.
Although any collusion would violate the contract elements that require the disclosure of
any outside relationships with third-party firms and potential conflicts of interest, it
would be very difficult for city officials to actually monitor this behavior and determine
whether to take action.
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The task of selecting a bank creates another area where there is the potential for
collusion. Sandy Springs has contracted CH2M Hill to ―[a]ssist the City in selecting an
investment firm that will invest City Funds at the direction of City Manager and in
accordance with GFOA policies and State law.69‖ If the primary contractor has a prior
relationship with a financial firm it may steer the city to that firm in return for financial
benefits. The extreme reliance on the principal contractor for advice in obtaining
financial services leaves city officials vulnerable.
The threat of potential violations of rule G-23 has already been raised for the
conventional contracting context. Tamar Frankel (2007) raised the issue that some
brokers have contracted with cities to provide financial advice and then have terminated
the relationship to then subsequently begin a new relationship as bond underwriter.
Frankel‘s point that while the rule only prohibits firms from providing both types of
services simultaneously, serially providing both services to skirt the rule still allows for a
significant conflict of interest because the firm has developed a relationship of trust with
the issuer and could potentially capitalize on this trust. On May 27, 2011 the MSRB
approved amendments to rule G-23 that prohibited this practice (Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, 2011). The extreme dependence of a contract city on its primary
service provider can create a similar degree of trust that may leave the city vulnerable to a
conflict of interest.
Recent changes to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act have expanded the
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MSRB‘s role to include the protection of state and local bond issuers. Part of the new
regulations require that ―municipal advisors‖ register with the SEC. The MSRB‘s has
issued statements explaining that:
Municipal advisors also include firms and individuals that solicit
business from municipal entities on behalf of broker-dealers, banks, other
municipal or investment advisers to secure certain types of investment
banking, financial advisory or investment advisory work with municipal
entities, such as public pension funds, 529 plans, local government
investment pools and other state and local governmental entities or funds.
These municipal advisors are sometimes referred as consultants, thirdparty marketers, placement agents, solicitors or finders.
The investment services that CH2M Hill provides to the City of Sandy Springs
appear to qualify under this definition of municipal advisor. These services are:
1.

―Assist the City in the development of investment policies and

procedures pursuant to Government Finance Officers Association of America
(GFOA) and State law70.‖
2.

―Assist the City in selecting an investment firm that will invest

City Funds at the direction of City Manager and in accordance with GFOA
policies and State law71.‖
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3.

―Produce investment reports, including cash flow analysis and

modeling stating the effectiveness of the chosen investment policy, on a quarterly
basis72.‖
Recommendation 10: Remove the role of selecting a bond underwriter from the
firm responsible for providing capital finance advice. Monitor any contact between firm
providing advice and the underwriter.
Recommendation 11: Evaluate the recommend bond repayment plan in light of
the contract renewal schedule.
Recommendation 12: Require that primary contractors offering CH2M Hill-type
financial advisement services register with the SEC as Municipal Advisors.
Recommendation 13: When contracting for advice on finding banking or other
financial service providers, officials should request two or three potential providers that
can then be compared on the basis of rates and service to mitigate the potential for
collusion in the matchmaking process.
A final consideration of the capital advisement role is that it is also combined with
the procurement function. This means that the private partner will receive a normal rate
of profit on providing the resources for the capital improvements that it recommends to
the city. There is potential here for an additional conflict of interest if the firm begins to
recommend that the city undertake more projects than is economically efficient. Because
of the information dependence of the city on its private partner, this is another area where
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it may be necessary to conduct periodic third-party reviews of the economic merits of the
capital investment strategy.
Recommendation 14: Obtain periodic external evaluations of the economic merits
of the capital investment plan recommended by the primary contractor in order to limit
the potential for conflict of interest.
Relationship of Trust
Noted earlier in this paper, Oliver Porter acknowledged that the City of Sandy
Springs is highly dependent on its private partner performing due diligence in fulfilling
the service agreement, but that a relationship of trust existed between city officials and
the corporation‘s representatives at the beginning of their relationship. One of the key
threats to the city, however, is that this harmonious relationship may erode at some point
in the future as elected officials are replaced and the city and corporate workforces
change over time. The designers of the contract documents included elements that
attempt to mandate that the harmonious relationship be maintained as an essential part of
the service agreement. There are also contract elements which are clearly designed as a
reaction to the unsatisfactory relationship that previously existed between the citizens that
formed the new city of Sandy Springs and the Fulton County government.
Both contract documents include language specifying that the ―Corporation shall,
at all times, foster and maintain harmonious relationships with the members of the City
Council, all employees of the City, all employees of the City's contract services providers
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and all City's residents, and shall represent the City in the best light possible73.‖ This
language is included prominently in the General Services section of the contracts. It is
not clear how this relationship would be assessed or what types of actions would be taken
over time to maintain it. It appears that this language is in place to allow the city to take
action when it determines that the relationship has faltered.
Other contract elements which specify specific behaviors shed further light on
what is expected in a harmonious relationship. One element which discusses the
operation of phones during business hours specifies that all incoming calls will be
answered by actual people and not through the use of automated attendants74. Another
requirement is that the code of conduct for corporate employees will emphasize that
―rudeness and impoliteness toward any person is unacceptable conduct and will not be
tolerated75.‖ These elements of the contract documents reflect the historical context of
the development of the City of Sandy Springs. Because most contract cities are formed
in the process of municipal incorporation it is likely that a similar history of antagonism
between the preexisting government framework and the citizens groups that formed the
city will be reflected in the contract documents.
Discussion
By assessing the features of the contracts between the City of Sandy Springs and
the private firm CH2M Hill, I believe that I have identified multiple features of the
principal-agent relationships in contract cities that are not present in traditional municipal
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public-private partnerships. The most notable of these features are those that are
associated with interactions between outsourced functional areas. I find in the contract
structures the potential for ―negative synergies‖ to exist which raise the cost of
monitoring and managing contractor performance above what would be required if the
functions were individually outsourced to separate contractors. I also observe beneficial
structures placed in the contracts that are designed to prevent these additional costs and to
achieve the efficiency gains that the contract city model promises.
Another key feature that distinguishes outsourcing decisions in contract cities is
that the traditional analytical assumption that cities evaluate the merits of outsourcing
each function individually does not appear to hold in this governance context. One cause
of this is that the contract city model tends to be adopted by municipalities at the time of
incorporation and it therefore necessarily involves a discrete shift to near 100% external
production of municipal functions, rather than a gradual adjustment towards increased
outsourcing. The other key contributing factor is the role of ideology and the reliance on
contractor cost projections for making the evaluative decision, rather than using historical
cost estimates of internal production. Because the contract city model is most often
adopted by new cities there is no historical data to use and therefore the public officials
are either making estimates based on the costs of other government units or using
information that they receive from their potential contractors. These factors suggest that
the traditional framework used to study outsourcing may need to be reevaluated when it
is applied to contract cities and that further research into this area of study is definitely
called for.
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The two key factors that I identify as being responsible for creating these new
features are the scope of services outsourced by contract cities and the thinness of the
private market for comprehensive municipal service delivery. These two concepts were
first identified in the literature on contract cities and in the historical documents
describing the development of the City of Sandy Springs. The textual analysis research
methodology used in this case study has helped reveal how the influence of scope and
market depth has manifested in the structures embedded in the contract documents.
For practitioners in this field this research highlights several areas of contract
management that merit special attention because of the increased potential for conflicts of
interest. I wish to reiterate that this paper is confined to the incentives and the potential
behaviors that may be spurred on by them, but in no way does it reveal any actual
behavior on the part of CH2M Hill in conflict of its interest to provide services to the
City of Sandy Springs. The findings and conclusions drawn from this research should be
a guide to both public and private partners on how to design appropriate contract
structures so as to protect both participants in contract agreements.
This paper opens several doors to future research. One potential avenue to extend
this work would be to more formally develop the outsourcing decision contracting
officials face within the principal-agent framework. This may serve to clarify the
distinction between a traditional contracting decision and this extreme case of
outsourcing. A key feature of such a model would be to explicitly model the monitoring
cost interactions across individual functions within the contract. The public officials
would then weigh the cost of the contract net of these ―negative synergy‖ monitoring
costs, but also including the potential scale efficiencies that a comprehensive contract for
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services would provide. Other options that the official may face would include internal
production, but with imperfect information about the true costs of internal production,
and multiple discrete contracts.
Another potentially fruitful line of research would be to gather updated data on
the prevalence of the contract city model across the country and more broadly assess their
contract management practices. There is a sense in the literature that the contract city is a
new form of governance that may be adopted by many more cities. Five years after the
incorporation of Sandy Springs it would be interesting to see how many other
communities have adopted this model and whether similar contract structures can be
found in them.
The implications of these findings for the study of public financial management
and regulation also raise a number of interesting questions for the study of local
outsourcing at large. How many local governments are receiving financial advice from
private contractors who are also playing matchmaker between the governments and
financial intuitions when it comes time to issue public debt? Are these firms acting in
response to the Dodd-Frank Act and registering as Financial Advisors? If so, what has
been the impact of registration on local government‘s financial activities? The issue
highlighted by this case study, how the combination of services in a single contract can
increase the potential for conflict of interest, is very relevant for public financial services
regulation.
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